



# 10-Year Analysis for Years 2010-2019

## Appleton Police Department Use of Force



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## Overview

It is the policy of the Appleton Police Department that officers shall use only the amount of force that is reasonably necessary to achieve a lawful objective. The force used shall be in accordance with the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Wisconsin.

The Department's Use of Force Policy provides sworn personnel with specific guidelines to effect the detention, seizure, or arrest of a person. The policy also establishes guidelines for using force in self-defense or defense of another, to prevent or interceded in an attempt at self-injury, in defense of property, and in fulfilling the community caretaker function. The guidelines on proper use of force established in policy ensure due process for persons as well as provide protection from liability for officers and the Department.

The Appleton Police Department Use of Force Policy is based on the Defense and Arrest Tactics (DAAT) program of the State of Wisconsin as developed by the Training and Standards Board (Department of Justice-Bureau of Training and Standards).

The Appleton Police Department prides itself in transparency as it relates to calls for service, citizen complaints, and use of force documentation. Detailed use of force information tends to be difficult to find nationwide. Our department began gathering data in 1999, with added details and improvements being made each year to the analysis. We feel this information is important to maintain trust within our community and provide our trainers with "real world" statistics to ensure our skill and scenario based trainings meet the needs of our officers.

### General Guidelines

The Appleton Police Department Use of Force Policy has established the following guidelines:

1. Officers shall use only the amount of force that is objectively reasonable to control a situation, affect a seizure, or control a person. The force decision shall be based on the DAAT system.
2. Officers shall not continue to use force beyond that which is objectively reasonable to maintain control once the subject has stopped resisting and control of the subject has been established.
3. All persons arrested will be handcuffed, searched and then transported in a police vehicle, unless exceptional circumstances exist.
4. An officer shall not brandish, display, or threaten the use of any control devices, impact weapons, kinetic energy impact weapons, canine, or firearm unless he or she can reasonably conclude its use may become justified and anticipated.

## **De-Escalation and Reducing Uses of Force**

Law enforcement is an inherently dangerous profession. In many incidents, a use of force is unavoidable. However, it is the responsibility of the officer to try and minimize the severity and pro-actively prevent as many uses of force as possible. This is achieved through proper analysis of perceptions, threats, and behaviors of subjects during each unique encounter. In addition, officer conditional factors such as stress can become relevant during a use of force incident.

According to Whitelock and Asken (2012), "Stress is a result of a perceived imbalance between the demands of the emergency situation and your ability to meet those demands where failure to do so has important consequences to you." Factors which can contribute to stress include the officer not being able to establish meaningful contact, little or no time to make a decision, risk posed to the officers or public, resource availability, and degree of exigency or necessity to intervene. In addition, the situation can become increasingly dangerous to both the officer and suspect if the officer loses emotional control, misidentifies the threat cues, overreacts to the threat, has insecurities in their own physical and tactical skills, mission creep, uncertainty in policy and statute, and negative neurophysiological influences.

To help combat the dangers faced by officers, a strong understanding of self-control and de-escalation tactics are required. This is accomplished with a proficiency in psychological understanding, ability to communicate under stress, adaptivity, creative problem solving, and ongoing officer training. Furthermore, if verbal efforts fail, each officer needs to be able to restrain the subject and control the incident by utilizing appropriate physical "hands-on" skills.

To be successful, a portion of the officer's training needs to include early recognition of a person who has cognitive issues or may be in a mental health crisis. To meet these needs, Appleton Police Department introduced CIT training to patrol officers. Various CIT (Crisis Intervention Team) programs have been implemented nationwide to improve law enforcement response to people experiencing mental health challenges. By utilizing CIT concepts, we have built a strong partnership with mental health provider agencies, individuals, and families affected by mental illness. These efforts have reduced uses of force against individuals in need of help who are not intentionally trying to resist officer efforts to control the situation.

## **Intervention Options Requiring Documentation**

When an officer uses any of the following Intervention Options against a person, they shall contact an on-duty supervisor as soon as practical after the use of force. The officer shall then complete a written report documenting the incident. Intervention Options necessitating this response include any of the following:

- Electronic Control Devices
- OC Spray
- Passive Countermeasures
- Active Countermeasures
- Incapacitating Techniques
- Impact Weapons
- Kinetic Energy Impact Weapons
- Canine Bites
- Firearms/Deadly Force

Appleton Police Department policy states an on-duty operations supervisor should respond to the location where the use of force incident occurred anytime a circumstance listed above has been met. That supervisor is then responsible for the initial gathering and evaluating of information related to the use of force. The supervisor must then complete a Use of Force Supervisor Summary form and initially determine if the use of force was within policy guidelines. Upon completion, each form is attached to the incident report and forwarded to the DAAT Coordinator, Unified Tactics Coordinator, District Patrol Captains, and the Assistant Chief for further review and evaluation.

## **Use of Force Review Process**

Policy outlines a specific review process any time an Appleton Police Officer utilizes an intervention option requiring use of force documentation. The process begins with the officer contacting an on-duty supervisor to report a use of force as soon as the situation is reasonably safe. The on-duty supervisor will then attempt to report to the location where the use of force took place to assess any situational factors which may have contributed to the incident.


After the on-duty supervisor has completed the initial assessment, the APD\_103 form is to be completed. This form is then electronically forwarded to the use of force review team. The use of force review team consists of the DAAT Coordinator, the Unified Tactics Coordinator, the District Patrol Captains, and the Assistant Chief. The team reads each officer report and compares the narrative to collected evidence such as body camera footage. Once all the information is collected, members of the team determine whether the use of force conformed to department policy. In 2019, all 65 calls for service involving uses of force were determined to be within policy guidelines.

Each year, data collected from all use of force incidents are compiled by the DAAT Coordinator for training purposes and public release. Through the careful study of a vast array of officer situations

and techniques, a selected group of “core competencies” have been identified. These core competencies are techniques found most relevant and versatile and therefore made a focus in training. Based on the 2019 data, no major training deficiencies were detected. Had a deficiency been detected, the necessary adjustments would have been made to the core competencies. As needs change and evolve, so do the core competencies and in-service training.

### Total Calls for Service

Compilation of the department’s use of force numbers required a consistent perspective on how the totals were tabulated. As an example, in 2019 there were 65 calls for service that included a use of force. However, there were 66 individuals who had force used on them during those incidents. In total, 89 officers utilized force to detain the 66 individuals in those 65 calls for service. See chart 01 below. For a proper, comprehensive analysis, these three statistical distinctions need to be consistently identified and kept separate during the analysis process.




Over the past 10 years, the Appleton Police Department had just under half a million (494,888) calls for service. A slight, but clear, downward trend can be seen in overall calls for service during that time. Between 2010 and 2014, there were 12,046 more calls for service than in the next 5-year period. Since 2010, the Appleton Police Department averaged 49,488.8 calls for service with the 10-year high in 2012 (52,309) and the 10-year low in 2018 (46,056).

In 2019, there was just over a 1.2% increase in calls for service from the previous year. Of those 46,633 incidents, just 65 (0.1%) had a use of force. This equates to roughly one for every 717 calls for service. The low ratio highlights how relatively infrequent use of force situations arise. However, infrequency can lead to the danger of presumed compliance. Officers are trained to

continually remain alert, and 2019 training focused heavily on the recognition of potentially assaultive individuals.

In the chart 02 below, the yearly totals of calls for service are compared to 5-year and 10-year averages. The orange represents the most recent 5-year average while the red represents the 10-year average. This chart provides a visual representation of the data table to help see trends and statistical outliers. Similar charts are featured throughout the report for a variety of topics.



Total Calls for Service Involving a Use of Force										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
2010-2014 Average 59.0					2015-2019 Average 56.4					57.7
48	54	69	55	69	47	48	53	69	65	577


Table 01

The calls for service which required a use of force declined by approximately 6% in 2019. This decline broke a four-year upward trend which saw an increase from 47 to 69 (32%) calls for service. Despite the recent decrease, the calls for service were still nearly 12% above the 5-year and 10-year averages. It should be noted that even being above both averages, 65 calls for service are still within the statistical standard deviation. Stated another way, 2019 was on the edge of what could have been predicted the previous year and is not considered far enough off of average to be considered an outlier.

Each of the 577 calls for service with a use of force over the past 10 years were reviewed and classified as “justified.” After justification, the training staff takes a second look at each incident to find areas, although legal and justified, could be improved upon.

## General Assaults and Battery to Officer Arrests

The vast majority of people who interacted with Appleton Police Officers were compliant. However, in 2019 there were 65 calls for service with elevated risk to the officers because of physical non-compliance. In these instances, officers were required to use an intervention option which resulted in a use of force. Contributing factors included intoxication, chemical impairment, high levels of aggression, and/or mental health crisis. In six incidents, the level of non-compliant behavior escalated to assaultive against the officer. In one incident, the subject’s behavior was dangerous enough to result in an officer’s use of deadly force.



General Assaults and Battery to Officer Arrests										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
2010-2014 Average 7.2					2015-2019 Average 10.6					8.9
6	9	8	7	6	6	12	18	11	6	89

Table 02

Wisconsin State statute 940.203(2) provides the legal framework for the charge of battery to an officer. It states that whoever intentionally causes bodily harm, or threatens to cause bodily harm, to the officer or family member of any law enforcement officer is guilty of a Class H felony.

In 2010, there were six criminal referrals for assaults against officers. Those, along with the six in 2015, 2015, and 2019, represent the lowest yearly number of referrals in this analysis. The relatively low referral numbers began to rise dramatically in 2016. Between 2004 (earliest data available) and 2015, the Appleton Police Department averaged 7.2 referrals to the district attorney’s office for battery to an officer. The referrals doubled from 2015 to 2016 and ultimately reached a 10-year high of 18 by 2017. The 18 referrals were well beyond the standard deviations for both the 5-year and 10-year averages.

In 2018, the number of referrals to the DA's Office for battery to an officer declined by nearly 40%. This was followed in 2019 with another 45% decline. These two declines returned the referral rate for battery to an officer back to more "normal" levels. Between 2010 and 2019, six referrals finished below both the 5-year and 10-year averages. While the two most recent declines are encouraging, there were numerous verbal threats made to officers after arrest which were not referred to the district attorney's office. Most of the time these threats are not carried out with action, but the dangers are real and all threats must be taken seriously.

In total, 89 referrals have been made to the district attorney's office between 2010 and 2019 for assaults against Appleton police officers. Those referrals represent situations where citizens and officers were physically injured, suspects attempted to disarm officers, and individuals with behavior so dangerous that deadly force was required.

### **Use of Force to Total Arrest Ratio**

Another way to look at the data is to compare use of force to arrest. Between 2010 and 2019, there were 59,155 total arrests compared to 598 individuals (577 calls for service) which required force. However, not everyone who is involved in a use of force is arrested. An example would be someone brought to the ground who has threatened to jump off a bridge. When an individual is brought back over the railing and secured on the ground, that is still counted as a use of force even though no arrest was made.

To properly compare use of force to arrest ratios, the 59,155 total arrests need to be broken down by the 521 individuals who were ultimately arrested after a use of force. The ideal situation for everyone's safety would be for cooperation and compliance during an arrest process. With proper dialogue and de-escalation, the Appleton Police Department was able to gain compliance in 99.1% of arrest situations. Less than one in 100 arrests required even a low-level use of force.

Calls for service in 2019 remained relatively flat from the previous year. However, the decline in calls for service with a use of force (-6%) outpaced the 1% decline in overall calls for service. However, despite both declines, the ratio of use of force to arrest in 2019 rose to approximately 2.35 people for every 100 arrests. This inverse relationship can most likely be attributed to a drop in both juvenile and adult arrests. Refer to table 03 on page 11 for details.

Adult arrests in 2019 declined from 3,860 to 2,508 (-35%) while juvenile arrests declined even more sharply from 549 to 296 (-46%). Lower arrests numbers, even with a decline in uses of force, caused the ratio to increase to 2.35 persons for every 100 arrests. The previous year ratio was approximately 1.61 persons for every 100 arrests. However, that increased ratio does not present a clear viewpoint in regards to use of force to arrest ratio.

Use of Force to Total Arrest Analysis								
	2010-2014 Average	2015	2016	2017	2018*	2019	2015-2019 Average	2010-2019 Average
Calls for Service	50,693	47,694	49,854	51,184	46,056	46,633	48,284	49,489
Reported Part 1 / Group A Crimes	4,305	4,128	4,363	4,414	3,980	3,691	4,115	4,210
Reported Part 2 / Group B Crimes	6,726	5,666	5,163	5,297	4,454	3,765	4,869	5,798
<b>Total Adult Arrests**</b>	<b>6,091</b>	<b>4,511</b>	<b>4,647</b>	<b>4,475</b>	<b>3,860</b>	<b>2,508</b>	<b>4,000</b>	<b>5,045</b>
<i>Uses of Force on Adults Charged with Crime</i>	<b>46.6</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>38.2</b>	<b>42.4</b>
Use of Force to Adult Arrests as a Percentage	.77%	0.64%	0.71%	0.78%	1.40%	1.59%	1.03%	0.90%
<b>Total Juvenile Arrests**</b>	<b>1,127</b>	<b>929</b>	<b>697</b>	<b>595</b>	<b>549</b>	<b>296</b>	<b>613</b>	<b>870</b>
<i>Uses of Force on Juviles Charged with Crime</i>	<b>8.6</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>10.8</b>	<b>9.7</b>
Use of Force to Juvenile Arrests as a Percentage	0.76%	1.40%	1.43%	1.51%	1.64%	4.39%	2.08%	1.43%
<b>Total Overall Arrests**</b>	<b>7,218</b>	<b>5,440</b>	<b>5,344</b>	<b>5,070</b>	<b>4,409</b>	<b>2,804</b>	<b>4,613</b>	<b>5,915</b>
<i>Total Use of Force on Individuals Charged</i>	<b>55.2</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>49.0</b>	<b>52.1</b>
Use of Force to Total Arrests as a Percentage	0.76%	0.77%	0.80%	0.87%	1.43%	1.89%	1.06%	0.88%
<b>Total Individuals Involved in Use of Force</b>	<b>62.0</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>57.6</b>	<b>59.8</b>
<i>Individuals Not Charged</i>	<b>6.8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>8.6</b>	<b>7.7</b>
Use of Force with No Crime as a Percentage	10.97%	14.29%	12.24%	16.98%	11.27%	19.70%	14.93%	12.88%

The (\*) references a change in the records management system effective June 25, 2018.

Table 03

Compilation of data in this report was done as closely as possible from two different systems.

The (\*\*) references the combination of ordinance and state charges.

Situations arise, either due to mental health or through the process of investigation, where an arrest is not appropriate. As stated, the use of force to total arrest ratio in 2019 was 2.35 for every 100 arrests. However, that number was based off of 66 individuals being involved in a use of force. While it holds true all individuals were ultimately detained, the ratio would be 1.89 for every 100 arrests if only those charged with a crime were counted in the arrest ratio.

Over the past 10-years, 77 individuals in Appleton required a use of force that were ultimately not charged with a crime. In 2019, there were 13 people who had force used on them that were not charged. These 13 people represented a 10-year statistical high. Comparatively, over the past five years these numbers finished higher than arrested juveniles involved in a use of force.

Use of force numbers on those not charged are significant and falsely skew any arrest ratios if left in the frequency equation. Therefore, they have been left out of the Appleton Police Department ratios. Potential explanations as to the frequency of uses of force on individuals not charged are discussed later in the report.

Specific to adults, the use of force to arrest ratio remained below 1 to 100 in seven of the past 10 years. However, over the last four years, there has been an escalating ratio shown in the data. In 2018, the ratio increased to 1.4 adults for every 100 adult arrests. In 2019, the ratio increased again to 1.59 adults for every 100 adult arrests. The minor increase is despite a drop of 1,352 arrests and 14 fewer adults involved in a use of force.

The use of force to arrest ratios for juveniles were comparable to the adult between 2010 and 2013. Starting in 2014, the juvenile ratios increased dramatically and continued to outpace the adults through the end of 2019. This was due in large part to an overall reduction in juvenile arrests. The 296 juvenile arrests in 2019 represented a 76.5% decline since 2010. As the arrests declined, the number of juveniles requiring a use of force stayed above, but reasonably close to, the 5-year and 10-year averages. In 2019, the use of force on juveniles to juvenile arrests was 4.39 for every 100 persons under 18 years old. Much of the arrest declines for juveniles can be attributed to a focus on restorative practices with the SRO Unit. Refer to the 'SRO Unit in Schools' specific breakout on page 131 of this report for details.

When total overall arrests are brought together with total overall uses of force on those charged with a crime, the overall ratio remains similar to those found with adults. This is due to the larger proportion of adults involved as compared to juveniles. The use of force frequency on those arrested compared to total arrests in 2019 was 1.89 per 100 persons. That total was higher than both the 5-year and 10-year averages and near the edge of the standard statistical deviations.

In a study done by Bob Scales of Police Strategies, LLC, 16 law enforcement agencies from Dane County, WI were studied between 2014 and 2018. In the study, the use of force numbers per 100 calls for service were 0.1% and the use of force rate per 100 arrests was 2.5%. These numbers show the use of force frequency by officers at the Appleton Police Department are less than those comparable agencies within Wisconsin.

## Involved Individuals Analysis

More important than calls for service or arrest ratios are the total number of individuals directly involved in a use of force. Most calls for service that require a use of force involve just one individual. Occasionally, an individual resists multiple times during a call for service. For reporting purposes, each use of force separated by time or location gets reported as a new incident within the same call for service. There are also times when force is used on multiple different individuals in one call for service. This is the reason the number of involved individuals each year is typically higher than the calls for service. The presence of multiple individuals, even passive bystanders, often causes the situation to become far more dangerous.

From a trainer perspective, the careful analysis of individuals involved in a use of force provides critical data for realistic scenario development. Training constructed around what officers typically experience increases the “buy-in” from officers and improves the officer’s situational awareness. Realistic scenarios become a blueprint for future decision making on the street. However, a danger can exist if the data is taken out of context. Improperly used data can result in racial profiling and unsafe, or unfair, assumptions during a call for service. In truth, anyone can create an unsafe situation for themselves and officers. Profiling and stereotyping can increase that danger. That is one of the key reasons why officers are trained to react to observed behaviors.


From the public’s perspective, this analysis is important from an accountability standpoint. The public needs to trust we are treating everyone equitably, fairly, and with as little of force as possible to achieve a lawful objective.

This section will break down individual characteristics such as age, race, and gender. However, it is important to understand that none of these characteristics on their own caused a use of force. There are many different conditions and situational factors that cause a person to resist officer direction or detainment.

### **Number of Involved Individuals**

Between 2010 and 2019, a use of force had been required to detain an individual 598 times. The most recent 5-year average of 57.6 persons per year was slightly lower (-3.68%) than the full 10-year average. During this period, the highest frequency year was 2014 when 77 people were directly involved in a use of force. That year fell well outside the standard deviation rate, which had a high of 69.6 individuals. While 2014 was the largest outlier, the 71 individuals involved in 2018 also fell outside the standard deviation.

The lowest frequency (49) year happened three times – 2010, 2015, and 2016. While not overly significant, all three years fell just outside the low range (50) of the standard deviation. While technically outliers, they are close enough to the expected range to have not had as dramatic effect on the averages as seen with the 2014 statistics.



Individuals Involved in a Use of Force										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
2010-2014 Average 62.0					2015-2019 Average 57.6					59.8
49	56	69	59	77	49	49	53	71	66	598

Table 04

Chart 04 above shows all individuals directly involved in a use of force between 2010 and 2019. Specific to 2019, there was a 7% decrease from the previous year, but still 13% above the most recent 5-year and nearly 10% above the full 10-year averages. The decline between 2018 and 2019 ended a two year upward trend which had seen a 31% increase since 2016.


### Gender, Age, and Race

Appleton Police Department officers are trained to respond to an individual’s actions and behaviors rather than factors such as gender, age, and race. However, these factors were tracked and analyzed to ensure officers treated everyone fairly, equitably, and ethically.

**Gender Analysis:** Between the years 2010 and 2019, the number of males involved in a use of force far exceeded the number of females. This held true for both adults and juvenile age groups. Males accounted for 524 (87.63%) of total individuals involved in a use of force. The number of female individuals were far less with just 74 (12.37%). See chart 05 on the next page for visual representation of these differences.

**Males:** In the first year of the analysis (2010) there were 43 males involved in a use of force. For the next few years, a steady growth was observed in these numbers specific to adult males. The number of juvenile males dropped in 2011, but bounced right back up the next year. By the end of

2012, the use of force on all males had grown by approximately 31% to tie a 10-year high of 66 for this analysis period. The use of force numbers leveled off for two years, then dropped significantly (-31.82%) in 2015. The numbers again leveled off at this lower rate (45 and 44 respectively) for the next few years.




In 2018, there was a second significant increase seen in the use of force totals on adult males. Similar to what happened in 2012, a 41% spike brought the overall use of force numbers against males (66) back to a 10-year high. These two spikes were far enough outside the 5-year (50.2) and 10-year average (52.0) to be considered statistical outliers. Having both the 5-year and 10-year averages so close suggest that even with varying numbers from year-to-year, the overall trend is fairly flat in terms of use of force frequency on men.

Individuals Involved in a Use of Force by Age and Gender											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
Male Adult	2010-2014 Average 46.2 (74.52%)					2015-2019 Average 39.4 (68.40%)					42.8
	35	45	51	50	50	32	35	36	59	35	428
	71.43%	80.36%	73.91%	84.75%	64.94%	65.31%	71.43%	67.92%	83.10%	53.03%	71.57%
Male Juvenile	2010-2014 Average 8.4 (13.55%)					2015-2019 Average 10.8 (18.75%)					9.6
	8	3	11	4	16	13	9	9	7	16	96
	16.33%	5.36%	15.94%	6.78%	20.78%	26.53%	18.37%	16.98%	9.86%	24.24%	16.05%
Female Adult	2010-2014 Average 5.6 (9.03%)					2015-2019 Average 5.2 (9.03%)					5.4
	5	5	7	3	8	2	4	6	3	11	54
	10.20%	8.93%	10.14%	5.08%	10.39%	4.08%	8.16%	11.32%	4.23%	16.67%	9.03%
Female Juvenile	2010-2014 Average 1.8 (2.90%)					2015-2019 Average 2.2 (3.82%)					2.0
	1	3	0	2	3	2	1	2	2	4	20
	2.04%	5.36%	0.00%	3.39%	3.90%	4.08%	2.04%	3.77%	2.82%	6.06%	3.34%

Table 05

## Use of Force Analysis on Various Age Groups Year-Over-Year Comparison

Chart 06



**Females:** Similar to the data seen in use of force on males, the females had two years which reached well beyond their 5-year (7.4) and 10-year (7.4) averages. The analysis started in 2010 with six uses of force on women. For the first four years, the totals remained relatively flat. Then, in 2014, the number jumped to 11 uses of force on females. The next year, numbers declined back to just five uses of force.

The 10-year high for females was reached in 2019 with 15 total involvements. The previous year (2018) had just five, meaning the female use of force involvements tripled. The growth was seen

Use of Force Analysis on Various Age Groups											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
Adults 50+	2010-2014 Average 3.0 (4.84%)					2015-2019 Average 5.6 (9.72%)					4.3
	3	1	3	6	2	5	4	3	12	4	43
	6.12%	1.79%	4.35%	10.17%	2.60%	10.20%	8.16%	5.66%	16.90%	6.06%	7.19%
Adults 40-49	2010-2014 Average 7.6 (12.26%)					2015-2019 Average 6.8 (11.81%)					7.2
	3	10	10	8	7	6	6	6	7	9	72
	6.12%	17.86%	14.49%	13.56%	9.09%	12.24%	12.24%	11.32%	9.86%	13.64%	12.04%
Adults 30-39	2010-2014 Average 11.6 (18.71%)					2015-2019 Average 14.2 (24.65%)					12.9
	12	9	15	11	11	8	11	13	22	17	129
	24.49%	16.07%	21.74%	18.64%	14.29%	16.33%	22.45%	24.53%	30.99%	25.76%	21.57%
Adults 18-29	2010-2014 Average 29.6 (47.74%)					2015-2019 Average 18.0 (31.25%)					23.8
	22	30	30	28	38	15	18	20	21	16	238
	44.90%	53.57%	43.48%	47.46%	49.35%	30.61%	36.73%	37.74%	29.58%	24.24%	39.80%
Total Adults	2010-2014 Average 51.8 (83.55%)					2015-2019 Average 44.6 (77.43%)					48.2
	40	50	58	53	58	34	39	42	62	46	482
	81.63%	89.29%	84.06%	89.83%	75.32%	69.39%	79.59%	79.25%	87.32%	69.70%	80.60%
Total Juveniles	2010-2014 Average 10.2 (16.45%)					2015-2019 Average 13.0 (22.57%)					11.6
	9	6	11	6	19	15	10	11	9	20	116
	18.37%	10.71%	15.94%	10.17%	24.68%	30.61%	20.41%	20.75%	12.68%	30.30%	19.40%

Table 06

in both juvenile and adult females. However, the rate for adult females increased much more than juveniles by 2019 year-end totals.

**Age:** As a whole, adults in 2019 were involved in more uses of force than juveniles. However, that is only true when all adults are lumped into one large group 18 years old and above. When adults were broken down into similar-sized age ranges as juveniles, the statistics appeared much more balanced – with one exception.

Age Group Breakdown by Gender in 2019		
	Males	Females
Adults 50+	2	2
Adults 40-49	7	2
Adults 30-39	13	4
Adults 18-29	13	3
Juveniles	16	4

Table 07

On average, adults 18-29 represented the largest age segment over the past 10 years. During that period, they accounted for 238 (39.80%) of the total uses of force. The next two age groups in terms of quantity were adults 30-39 with 129 (21.57%) and juveniles 12-17 with 116 (19.40%).




Chart 07

In 2010, there were 40 uses of force on all adults compared to nine on all juveniles. The adults 18-29 reached a high of 38 uses of force in 2014, but then saw a substantial decline in totals. A 10-year low immediately followed in 2015 with just 15 uses of force and has maintained a 5-year average of 18 uses of force. In 2019, Juveniles accounted for more uses of force (20) than any other age range for the year. This was the first time that happened since at least 2010. Refer back to chart 05 for a detailed breakdown.


In 2018, the adults 30-39 and adults 50 and over reached their 10-year highs with 12 and 22 respectively. Both of these were well above their 5-year and 10-year averages. Data would imply the adults 30-39 experienced a gradual rise in frequency. However, the adults over 49 had fairly flat numbers with 2018 being more of an anomaly than the start of a trend.

In 2019, the 20 juveniles involved in a use of force were more than double the frequency of the previous year. A modest increase was also seen in the adult 40-49 age group. All other age groups saw a decline, with the largest being a 66% decline in the adults 50 and over.

Over the 10-year span, the adults over 50 data remained relatively flat. The adult 40-49 data showed fluctuating results declining from the 10-year to 5-year average, but going up in 2019. Two of the groups, adults 30-39 and juveniles, showed a consistent upward trend in their numbers. The 5-year average in adults 30-39 was 1.3 higher than the 10-year average. The total of 17 in 2019 was 2.8 higher than the 5-year average and 4.1 higher than the 10-year average.

A similar consistent upward trend was seen in uses of force against juveniles. Those under 18 years old were involved in 11.6 uses of force over the past 10-years. That average grew by 1.4 when looking at data from the past 5-years, and 8.4 when 2019 is compared to the same 10-year average. However, the trend may not be as significant as this comparison showed since 2018 only saw 9 uses of force against juveniles and three years (2016, 2017, and 2018) were all below the 10-year average.

The only true downward decline was seen in the adults 18-29. The 10-year average for uses of force in this age group is 23.8. The 5-year average was a substantial 5.8 fewer than the 10-year average. In 2019, there were even less with 16 uses of force in this age group. However, the uses of force in 2017 and 2018 were both higher than the 5-year average while remaining below the 10-year average. This might suggest the trend is actually “flatter” instead of trending upward. Data from 2020 will be needed to confirm either the flattening or upward trends.



**Race:** Since 2015, Appleton Police Officers have received training in fair and impartial policing practices. The training provides officers perspective on the effect of implicit bias in an effort to reduce stereotypes that are unsafe, ineffective and unjust. The curricula went beyond

racial/ethnic bias by delving into factors such as gender, sexual orientation, religion, and socio-economic status.

According to the US Census Bureau website, the population of Appleton as of July, 2018 (most recent figures available) was 74,526. Caucasians accounted for 60,589 (81.3%) of the population. The remainder of the population was approximately 5,515 (7.4%) from Asian descent, 4,448 (5.7%) from Hispanic descent, 2,310 (3.1%) from African American descent, and 447 (0.6%) from Native American descent.

Individuals Involved in a Use of Force by Race											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
White	2010-2014 Average 42.2 (68.06%)					2015-2019 Average 37.8 (65.63%)					40.0
	32	38	47	43	51	29	31	34	50	45	400
	65.31%	67.86%	68.12%	72.88%	66.23%	59.18%	63.27%	64.15%	70.42%	68.18%	66.89%
Black	2010-2014 Average 11.2 (18.06%)					2015-2019 Average 14.6 (25.35%)					12.9
	12	10	12	7	15	14	14	12	17	16	129
	24.49%	17.86%	17.39%	11.86%	19.48%	28.57%	28.57%	22.64%	23.94%	24.24%	21.57%
Hispanic	2010-2014 Average 4.8 (7.74%)					2015-2019 Average 2.8 (4.86%)					3.8
	3	4	6	5	6	4	3	4	2	1	38
	6.12%	7.14%	8.70%	8.47%	7.79%	8.16%	6.12%	7.55%	2.82%	1.52%	6.35%
Asian	2010-2014 Average 2.0 (3.23%)					2015-2019 Average 1.4 (2.43%)					1.7
	0	3	1	3	3	1	0	2	0	4	17
	0.00%	5.36%	1.45%	5.08%	3.90%	2.04%	0.00%	3.77%	0.00%	6.06%	2.84%
Native American	2010-2014 Average 1.6 (2.58%)					2015-2019 Average 0.8 (1.39%)					1.2
	2	1	3	1	1	0	1	1	2	0	12
	4.08%	1.79%	4.35%	1.69%	1.30%	0.00%	2.04%	1.89%	2.82%	0.00%	2.01%
Other / Unknown	2010-2014 Average 1.0 (0.32%)					2015-2019 Average 1.0 (0.35%)					0.2
	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.30%	2.04%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.33%

Table 08

Caucasians represented the largest racial group for both overall arrests and uses of force over the past 10 years. See table 08 above for further details. Census data shows the white population at approximately 81% of the population, yet only 66.89% of the uses of force according to the 10-year average. Since 2010, the highest uses of force numbers on white individuals was just under 73% in 2013. The lowest percentage during that time was 59.18% in 2015. This use of force percentage being lower than the population percentage was also true for the Asian American community (2.84% uses of force to 5.7% of the population).

Conversely, the percentage of use of force to population went the other way for the African American, Hispanic and Native American communities. Despite accounting for approximately 3% of the population, African Americans accounted for 21.57% of the uses of force over the 10-year analysis. Those with Hispanic descent were 6.35% of the uses of force despite being 3.1% of the population. Individuals from Native American descent had 2.01% of the uses of force while only consisting of 0.6% of Appleton's population.

In an ideal situation, all individuals would be cooperative and no use of force would be needed to take someone into custody, but we know that is not realistic. We also know that we will be required to use force on members of our community from many different demographics. The use of force on people from different demographics is important to track and monitor. This is

especially important when force is used on those who may have a negative experience with law enforcement, or when there is a real or perceived discrimination or bias towards a certain group.

It is important to monitor the data to see if we are disproportionately using force more frequently on one group of people we arrest versus a different group of people we arrest. To properly gauge that we need to compare the percentage of time force is used, and the type of force used as a percentage of those arrested; i.e. For every 1000 white males arrested for a misdemeanor or felony how often is use of force needed to take them into custody compared to every 1000 black males arrested for the same offenses?

The percentage of use of force in comparison to population is not an accurate assessment. For example, males make up around 50% of the population but account for 87.63% of uses of force. When we review the arrest rate for the 10 year analysis, 75.5% of arrests were Caucasian's, and the use of force rate for Caucasian's being 66.89%, while 17.6% of arrests were for African Americans and they accounted for 21.57% of the use of force.


While this number is disproportionate looking at all arrests, that number dissipates when we look at the higher level offense arrests. When we analyze Violent Crimes, as identified by the FBI, Caucasians committed around 62% of those crimes while African Americans committed around 28% of those crimes.

From the 129 total uses of force on African Americans in this analysis, less than half (48.8%) lived in the city, compared to about 60% of Caucasians. This equates to about 63 African Americans in the 10-year analysis, or an average of 6.3 uses of force per year on African American residents of Appleton. The majority of the uses of force against African American non-residents occurred in the Entertainment District, which attracts visitors from across the region and is heavily populated with liquor license establishments.

Regardless of what the numbers and percentages show, the Appleton Police Department knows there are always areas we can improve on and we will continue to work toward fairness and racial equity as we serve our community.

## Populous Breakdown

As previously stated, the United States Census Bureau showed the population specific to the City of Appleton in 2017 was 74,653 (most recent data available). Additionally, a USA Today Network article (Behnke, 2016), based on 2010 census data, the estimated population throughout the entire Fox Valley area was 216,154 citizens.



Use of Force Breakdown by Populous											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
Appleton Resident	2010-2014 Average 36.2 (58.39%)					2015-2019 Average 33.2 (57.64%)					34.7
	33	29	44	32	43	30	29	29	38	40	347
	67.35%	51.79%	63.77%	54.24%	55.84%	61.22%	59.18%	54.72%	53.52%	60.61%	58.03%
Non-Resident	2010-2014 Average 21.2 (34.19%)					2015-2019 Average 17.0 (29.51%)					19.1
	12	26	23	17	28	13	13	17	22	20	191
	24.49%	46.43%	33.33%	28.81%	36.36%	26.53%	26.53%	32.08%	30.99%	30.30%	31.94%
Homeless	2010-2014 Average 4.6 (7.42%)					2015-2019 Average 7.4 (12.85%)					6.0
	4	1	2	10	6	6	7	7	11	6	60
	8.16%	1.79%	2.90%	16.95%	7.79%	12.24%	14.29%	13.21%	15.49%	9.09%	10.03%

Table 9




**Residents:** Since 2010, Appleton residents have accounted for 347 (58.03%) of the 598 uses of force. The most uses of force against Appleton residents was 44 in 2012. The fewest (29) occurred three times; 2011, 2016, and 2017. The 5-year average (57.85%) and 10-year average (58.03%) show use of force on residents is relatively steady. In 2019, there were 40 uses of force (60.10%)

on Appleton residents, which is fairly consistent with the averages. Throughout the entire analysis period, the percentage of uses of force on Appleton residents did not drop below 50%.

In 2019, the use of force on residents (40) was slightly higher than both the 10-year average and 5-year averages. Refer to chart 09 to see all 10-years of data in a year-over-year format. The numbers, although higher, were not beyond the standard deviation and therefore within a range that would have been expected in future use of force projections.

**Non-Residents:** Between 2010 and 2019, a use of force occurred with 251 individuals who were not residents of the city. A total of 191 listed a permanent address outside the city and 60 were identified as homeless. However, a small margin of error should be considered with the residency data. Some individuals listed as residents were provided short-term living arrangements by local social services groups. Other individuals listed as non-residents may have not updated DOT records or have moved for a short period of time without changing their permanent address. The data is as accurate as possible given the information available at the time of collection.

As a percentage, 2011 had the highest use of force numbers (46.43%) on non-Appleton residents. The next closest year was 2014 when 36.36% of those involved were non-residents. The 5-year average (29.51%) and 10-year



average (31.94%) are both fewer than the two high years and much closer to the low of 24.49% seen in 2010.

In 2019, the use of force on non-residents (20) was consistent with the 10-year average and slightly higher than the 5-year average. Refer to chart 11 to see all 10-years of data in a year-over-year format.

A relatively high percentage of uses of force on non-residents was expected due to a number of factors. Some of these factors included the downtown entertainment district and some schools having a significant number of students brought in from outside the city. In many ways, Appleton functions as the downtown for the surrounding Fox Valley communities.

**Homeless:** The use of force on homeless individuals has seen a steady overall increase since 2010. However, like the data shown in age and gender breakdowns, two spikes were seen in the use of force data regarding homeless individuals. Between 2012 and 2013, the use of force on homeless individuals went from two to 10 (2.90% to 16.95%). A smaller second jump was recorded between 2017 and 2018 when use of force numbers went from seven to 11 (13.21% to 15.49%).


In 2019, the use of force on homeless individuals (6) was consistent with the 10-year average and slightly lower than the 5-year average. Refer to chart 12 to see all 10-years of data in a year-over-year format.

### **Potential Threat Observations**

Officers at the Appleton Police Department have been trained for years to watch a person's behavior and react to potential threat indicators. None of these observations made on their own definitively indicate an officer will be assaulted. However, the accumulation of these observations can indicate a higher potential for a threat.

For example, the most frequently observed potential indicator was an individual ignoring officer's attempt at dialogue. Officer's observed this prior to 74.2% of all uses of force in 2019. However, once the officer has made the observation, additional observations must be made to try and derive intent. It is possible the person's lack of communication due to them formulating a plan to fight/flee from officers. It is also possible because they person is non-verbal due to deafness or mental health challenges. While behavioral observations are critical for officers, the second part of understanding the situation from the individual's perspective is equally important.

The Appleton Police Department did not formally track behavioral observations until mid-2018 when the Use of Force Form received a major update. The update added 21 specific observational options along with one "other" and one for "no observations made" for officers to select.



Top-5 Potential Threats Observations in 2019			
	Observed	Individuals	Percent
Ignoring Officers	49	66	74.24%
Clinching Hands/Teeth	23	66	34.85%
Illogical Responses	19	66	28.79%
Verbalization of Harm	17	66	25.76%
Weight Shifting	14	66	21.21%
Hands Above Waistline	14	66	21.21%
<b>Total Potential Threat Observations Observed in 2019</b>	<b>219</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>3.3 : 1</b>


Table 10

In 2019, a total of 219 potential threat observations were documented in the use of force forms. On average, 3.3 observations were made of each individual who required a use of force. That means many of these observations overlapped with others. Potential danger could come with little or no warning, but the accumulation of multiple threat observations often increased the possibility of danger. In addition, multiple threat observations coupled with dangerous situational factors require an extra heightened sense of officer awareness.

Officers are trained to initiate contact with a person when they are legally justified and feel it is required to achieve a lawful objective. However, officers are allowed to delay contact if they feel needed for tactical or investigative purposes. Throughout the contact officers are trained to continually monitor a person’s behavior. As a guideline, if three specific potential threat observations have been made, officers should decide if they are going to disengage, initiate physical contact, or at a minimum take a few steps back and tell the person to stop their actions.

## Level of Resistance

The Appleton Police Department categorizes use of force contacts into three primary categories; passive resistance, active resistance, and assaultive behavior. A fourth is deadly force, which is at the most dangerous end of assaultive behavior. Between compliant behavior and the other categories are terms such as “continued” and “threat of” which are based on the officer’s perception and the person’s actions – both physical and verbally stated. To add further complexity to these categories, an individual’s actions and behaviors may change and fall into multiple categories throughout their contact with police. The data presented represents the highest level of resistance an officer encountered during their contact with the individual.



**Passive Resistance:** Passive resistance is defined by the State of Wisconsin as non-compliant and non-threatening behavior. An example could be a person refusing to stand when directed by an officer. The person has not physically counteracted an officer, simply did not follow direction. An officer delivering a focused strike at this point would not be justified. The response by the officer would need to be appropriate to the level of resistance. Refer to page 42 to see response options used during this analysis period on individuals directly involved in a use of force.

The 5-year average for passive resistance encountered was slightly lower than the 10-year average. Between 2010 and 2019, 47 individuals (7.86%) exhibited passive resistance to officers. Many of those resulted in a controlled decentralization with no injury to the individual or officers involved. The highest number of those with passive resistance was in 2011 with 10 individuals. That is the only year with a real outlier in the passive resistance data. The year prior (and along with 2016) had just one person with passive resistance.

In 2019, five people provided passive resistance. That number was just above the 5-year average and right at the 10-year average. Refer back to chart 14 for a visual representation.

**Active Resistance:** Active resistance is defined by the State of Wisconsin as behavior which physically counteracts an officer’s control efforts and which creates a risk of bodily harm to the officer, subject, and/or other persons. This was the most documented level of resistance by the Appleton Police Department between 2010 and 2019. Active resistance was nearly nine-times higher than passive resistance in use of force situations. This was due in large part to individuals physically resisting handcuffing or trying to escape an officer’s control.

Between 2010 and 2019, there were 422 individuals (70.57%) who actively resisted an officer’s attempt at detainment or arrest. As a percentage, the highest rate was 81.63% (40) in 2015. The level of active resistance never dropped below 66%. The overall 5-year average (71.18%) was similar to the 10-year average (70.57%) showing no real upward or downward trend. In 2019, the total active resistance encounters were 69.70% (46) which is what would be expected based on the averages. Refer to table 11 for further details.

Level of Resistance Encountered by Officers											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
Passive Resistance	2010-2014 Average 5.8 (9.35%)					2015-2019 Average 3.6 (6.25%)					4.7
	1	10	5	7	6	3	1	3	6	5	47
	2.04%	17.86%	7.25%	11.86%	7.79%	6.12%	2.04%	5.66%	8.45%	7.58%	7.86%
Active Resistance	2010-2014 Average 43.4 (70.00%)					2015-2019 Average 41.0 (71.18%)					42.2
	37	37	47	40	56	40	38	34	47	46	422
	75.51%	66.07%	68.12%	67.80%	72.73%	81.63%	77.55%	64.15%	66.20%	69.70%	70.57%
Assaultive Behavior	2010-2014 Average 12.2 (19.68%)					2015-2019 Average 12.4 (21.53%)					12.3
	10	9	16	12	14	6	10	15	17	14	123
	20.41%	16.07%	23.19%	20.34%	18.18%	12.24%	20.41%	28.30%	23.94%	21.21%	20.57%
Deadly Force	2010-2014 Average 0.6 (0.97%)					2015-2019 Average 0.6 (1.04%)					0.6
	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	6
	2.04%	0.00%	1.45%	0.00%	1.30%	0.00%	0.00%	1.89%	1.41%	1.52%	1.00%

Table 11

**Assaultive Behavior:** Assaultive behavior is defined by the State of Wisconsin as direct actions or conduct that generates bodily harm. While active resistance can lead to injury, assaultive behavior is by far the most dangerous encountered by law enforcement. Most assaultive behavior seen includes officers being punched, kicked, bitten – or worse presented with a deadly threat.

Between 2010 and 2019, the most incidents involving assaultive behavior were experienced in 2018 with 17 individuals. That was 23.94% of uses of force that year. However, 2017 was higher as a percentage with 28.30% of all individuals (15) being assaultive during detainment or arrest.

Overall, the data shown in table 11 above show the numbers for all levels of resistance were not too far off from the 5-year and 10-year averages. With no specific outlier observed, the overall trends have been consistent.

## Foot Pursuits

Foot pursuits pose an increased level of danger to both the individual running and the officer pursuing. Running at fast speeds through unfamiliar settings can lead to injury even before physical contact is made between the person and the officer. In addition, if an officer loses sight of an individual during a foot pursuit there is a danger for a counter-ambush style assault.

In recent years, the tactics surrounding foot pursuit situations have changed. Officers will still pursue if they feel it is reasonably safe for them and it is the best decision at that time. The change has come with increased usage of established perimeters to contain an individual, use of tracking dogs in the last known direction of travel, and most recently drone deployments to gain a better perspective on what might otherwise be a dangerous tactical situation.




Chart 15 above shows the overall number of individuals who engaged in a foot pursuit prior to (or immediately after) a use of force between 2010 and 2019. Included are the 5-year and 10-year averages for foot pursuits which involved a use of force. It also shows foot pursuit involvements compared to overall use of force numbers. Table 12 below presents the same statistical information since 2015 with percentages for each year.

Foot Pursuits Resulting in Use of Force										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
2010-2014 Average 11.2 (18.06%)					2015-2019 Average 13.0 (22.57%)					12.1
12	13	11	8	12	11	10	11	17	16	121
24.49%	23.21%	15.94%	13.56%	15.58%	22.45%	20.41%	20.75%	23.94%	24.24%	20.23%

Table 12

The recent changes have not brought down the number of uses of force with a foot pursuit element. This is due to a number of reasons. The first being how foot pursuits are tracked in the

use of force data. If an officer engaged in a foot pursuit, but then stopped pursuing, a foot pursuit would still be counted if the person required force after a perimeter was established or a drone was utilized. The second reason is overall more individuals who have attempted to run from law enforcement the past few years have been apprehended.

Between 2010 and 2019, 121 individuals attempted to run from officers at ultimately led to a use of force. The actual number of foot pursuits was higher, but those not resulting in a use of force were not tracked. There were situations where individuals initially ran, then gave up after a short period of time.

Since 2010, the most foot pursuits resulting in a use of force happened in 2018. Nearly a quarter of all uses of force that year had a foot pursuit component. The fewest occurred in 2013 when eight foot pursuits ended in a use of force. The data from 2019 was consistent with the previous year, having one fewer (16) but a slightly higher percentage (24.24%).

It should also be noted that foot pursuits were not formally tracked in use of force forms prior to 2018. All data collected between 2010 and the middle of 2018 was taken from written narratives. While the method of tracking was updated, the overall data collected is still accurate.

## **Hobbles and Spit Hoods**

Situations arise where handcuffs alone are not enough to control a person and keep those in close proximity safe. Additional tools like hobbles and spit hoods have been deployed when an individual has kicked someone, damaged property (such as a squad car), or intentionally spit on someone during detainment. The use of either option is low risk to the person, so neither on their own require use of force documentation. However, the use of both are tracked in all instances which had a use of force.

**Hobbles:** A hobble is a heavy duty nylon strap with a brass snap hook on one end and an alligator clip on the other used to assist with subject control and transport. The purpose of the hobble is to limit a person's ability to run from officers, kick at officers (or medical staff), or cause damage by kicking with their legs during transport. The hobble is applied either at the person's ankles or at their knees depending on the needs of the situation.

After a person is hobbled, they are quickly brought to a "recovery" position to ensure their ability to breathe. Hobbled individuals are transported in a seated position and never "hog-tied" on their stomach during transport. When a proper seated position is not possible, individuals are transported via Gold Cross Ambulance on a medical cot.




Chart 16 above shows the overall number of individuals who were placed in a hobble after a use of force between 2010 and 2019. Included are the 5-year and 10-year averages for hobble use related to a use of force. It also shows the use of a hobble compared to overall use of force numbers. Table 13 below presents the same statistical information since 2015 with percentages for each year.

Hobble Applied After a Use of Force										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
2010-2014 Average 7.2 (11.61%)					2015-2019 Average 9.6 (16.67%)					8.4
3	5	11	10	7	7	8	9	16	8	84
6.12%	8.93%	15.94%	16.95%	9.09%	14.29%	16.33%	16.98%	22.54%	12.12%	14.05%

Table 13

Between 2010 and 2019, a hobble was utilized after 84 (14.05%) use of force incidents. The 5-year average (16.67%) was slightly higher than the 10-year average (14.05%) due in part to relatively low utilization in 2010 and 2011. Starting around 2012, a new training video was created to train officers on the proper use of hobbles during transport. After release of that video, the usage rate doubled for patrol officers. The lowest use of hobbles occurred in 2010 with just three after a use of force. The highest use of hobbles occurred in 2018 with 16 hobble uses after a use of force.

In 2019, a hobble was utilized only eight times after a use of force. This was a 50% decrease from the previous year. However, since the previous year was a 10-year high and eight was just under the 10-year average, the data appeared consistent with what could be expected.

**Spit Hoods:** Spit Hoods are a mesh covering that is placed over a person’s head which limits a person’s ability to purposely spit at officers or other individuals. In all instances between 2010 and 2019, spit hoods were only applied after a person had already spit either at an officer, medical staff, or other bystanders. The mesh material does allow for the person to breathe and talk freely

and see the environment around them. At no point is a spit hood ever used to try and blindfold or choke an individual.




Chart 17 above shows the overall number of individuals who had a spit hood placed on them after a use of force between 2010 and 2019. Included are the 5-year and 10-year averages for spit hood use as it relates to a use of force. It also shows spit hood use compared to overall use of force numbers. Table 14 below presents the same statistical information since 2015 with percentages for each year.

Spit Hood Applied After a Use of Force										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
2010-2014 Average 1.6 (5.28%)					2015-2019 Average 3.2 (5.56%)					2.4
0	0	1	7	0	3	0	3	4	6	24
0.00%	0.00%	1.45%	11.86%	0.00%	6.12%	0.00%	5.66%	5.63%	9.09%	4.01%

Table 14

Spit hoods are used less frequently than hobbles. Between 2010 and 2019, a spit hood was placed on an individual 24 times. Due to the low number of applications, the percentages for both the 5-year average (5.56%) and 10-year average (4.01%) are somewhat unreliable in predictions of a normal year. Years 2010, 2011, 2014, and 2016 had no spit hood utilizations. However, there were seven in 2013 and six in 2019. The only two years in this analysis that fell within the averages were 2015 and 2017.

## Severity of Charges

There is often a correlation between the level of force used on an individual and the severity of charges afterwards. The way charges are tracked in regards to this analysis include any charges referred from the totality of the event. For example, a use of force during a felony OWI traffic stop would be considered a felony in this analysis, even if the offender did not batter the officer. Conversely, if a use of force is done to pull someone off a bridge who was threatening to jump, there would likely be no charges issued even though the person may have been trying to resist the officer's attempts at detainment.

For the purpose of this analysis, only the most severe charged referred to the DA's Office was tracked when a use of force occurred. As an example, a misdemeanor and a felony charge in this report would only show the felony level arrest. This data is to help assess reasonableness and assure the level of force used was appropriate for the resulting charge.

**No Charge:** There were times a use of force was justified, but resulted in no charges being filed. There were a number of different reasons this occurred. One was if the use of force was due to a mental health crisis. A use of force would be justified to save someone who is threatening to harm themselves with the means to carry through with the threat. A second example would be a minor use of force where a diversion program was more appropriate than an actual charge for resisting. Officers are allowed discretion even if a use of force was required.

Between 2010 and 2019, officers used force on 77 individuals (12.88%) that ultimately were not formally charged with a crime. The highest year was in 2019 when 13 individuals (19.70%) were not charged after a use of force. The lowest year was 2010 when there were two individuals (4.08%) not charged. As previously mentioned, the majority of these were mental health related as 64 individuals were ultimately placed on an emergency detention during this time period.

The 5-year average (14.93%) and 10-year average (12.88%) were well below the 2019 average of 19.70% individuals not charged. However, 2019 experienced a 38.5% increase in use of force with no charges from the previous year. It is likely the 2019 data was an anomaly, but the 2020 analysis will follow the statistics to see if a new upward trend emerges.

**Citation:** The City of Appleton does have an ordinance against individuals resisting and/or obstructing officers while making a lawful detainment. The ability to write an ordinance summons versus having to make a criminal referral provided officers additional discretion when determining appropriate charges after a use of force. Much like "no charge" situations, a summons allows for lower levels of resistance to be resolved in non-criminal ways when appropriate.

During the 2010 to 2019 time period, 31 individuals were issued a city summons rather than criminally charged. This represents 5.18% of all uses of force. However, the use of summons declined over the 10-year span. Between 2010 and 2014, a use of force resulted in 23 issued citations. Between 2015 and 2019, that number dropped to eight. In 2017, just one use of force resulted in a citation being issued. The next year had no citations issued. In 2019, the number of citations (3) returned to the 10-year average (3.1) and remained close as a percentage. The 2019 numbers finished nearly double the 5-year average.

## Severity of Charges After a Use of Force Year-Over-Year Comparison

Chart 18




Chart 18 above shows how misdemeanors strongly outpaced other charging options for the majority of the analysis. It also shows how felony level charges have been trending upward since 2015. Should the upward trend continue, felony charges may soon outpace misdemeanors. Refer to table 15 below for more specific information.

Severity of Charges After a Use of Force											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
No Charge	2010-2014 Average 6.8 (10.97%)					2015-2019 Average 8.6 (14.93%)					7.7
	2	10	9	3	10	7	6	9	8	13	77
	4.08%	17.86%	13.04%	5.08%	12.99%	14.29%	12.24%	16.98%	11.27%	19.70%	12.88%
Citation	2010-2014 Average 4.6 (7.42%)					2015-2019 Average 1.6 (2.78%)					3.1
	5	3	4	4	7	2	2	1	0	3	31
	10.20%	5.36%	5.80%	6.78%	9.09%	4.08%	4.08%	1.89%	0.00%	4.55%	5.18%
Misdemeanor	2010-2014 Average 37.8 (60.97%)					2015-2019 Average 32.8 (56.94%)					35.3
	31	36	40	38	44	36	31	29	39	29	353
	63.27%	64.29%	57.97%	64.41%	57.14%	73.47%	63.27%	54.72%	54.93%	43.94%	59.03%
Felony	2010-2014 Average 12.8 (20.65%)					2015-2019 Average 14.6 (25.35%)					13.7
	11	7	16	14	16	4	10	14	24	21	137
	22.45%	12.50%	23.19%	23.73%	20.78%	8.16%	20.41%	26.42%	33.80%	31.82%	22.91%

Table 15

**Misdemeanor:** These are where the vast majority of use of force incidents fall. When a use of force occurred on someone who was already being charged for other misdemeanor crimes, the resisting/obstruction was also often referred as a misdemeanor. This was because the use of force fell within the totality of the police contact and should be weighed with the accused crime.

The large number of misdemeanor charges were also attributed to individuals (juveniles and adults) who were on supervision due to previous behavior. A referral would inform an individual’s agent of the event so they could determine an appropriate course of action.

Between 2010 and 2019, there were 353 use of force incidents that ultimately resulted in at least one misdemeanor charge. The highest single year was 2014 when 44 (57.14%) uses of force involved a misdemeanor crime. The lowest single years were 2017 and 2019 when 29 uses of force involved a misdemeanor crime.

**Felony:** Felonies were the second most frequently charged behind misdemeanors. On occasion, the felony charges were the result of assaulting an officer or health care worker. Predominantly, however, the individual’s resistance was charged out as a misdemeanor while their initial reason for officer contact resulted in a felony investigation even without the use of force.

From 2010 to 2019, there were 137 use of force incidents (22.91%) which ultimately resulted in a felony charge. The 5-year average of 25.35% (14.6) was slightly higher than the 10-year average of 22.91% (13.7) felony charges. The higher 5-year average is the result of a steady upward trend. In 2015, there were four use of force incidents with a felony charge. Each year those numbers rose until reaching 24 (33.80%) in 2018 and 21 in 2019 (31.82%).


**Domestic Related**

Calls for service involving domestic violence have a reputation for being extremely dangerous. The perceived risk is often due in part to heightened emotions surrounding domestic relationships and Wisconsin’s mandatory arrest law. However, data showed less than 10% of uses of force involved a domestic arrest. Many times domestic investigations were conducted after the violence ended and both parties were separated. Refer to table 16 for yearly information related to domestics.

Domestic Arrest Involving a Use of Force										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
2010-2014 Average 5.2 (8.39%)					2015-2019 Average 4.6 (7.99%)					4.9
7	3	6	4	6	1	3	6	7	6	49
14.29%	5.36%	8.70%	6.78%	7.79%	2.04%	6.12%	11.32%	9.86%	9.09%	8.19%

Table 16

Chart 19 on the next page shows the overall number of individuals who were had force used on them during a domestic arrest between 2010 and 2019. Included are the 5-year and 10-year averages for domestic related use of force incidents. It also shows domestic related use of force compared to overall use of force numbers. Table 16 above presents the same statistical information since 2015 with percentages for each year.



Between the years 2010 and 2019, there were 49 uses of force that were directly related to a domestic abuse investigation. The 5-year average (7.99%) was nearly identical to the 10-year average of 8.19% uses of force. During the analysis period, use of force numbers from domestic investigations reached a low of one in 2015 and a high of seven in both 2010 and 2017.

In 2019, six of the 66 use of force incidents (9.09%) involved a person who met domestic criteria. That number was down slightly from 2018, but remained above both the 5-year and 10-year averages. As a whole, no definitive trend was seen in the data as numbers fluctuated frequently between 2010 and 2019.

### Mental Health Related

In an ideal situation, law enforcement would have a very limited role when someone experienced a mental health crisis. Social workers and highly trained mental health experts would be able to talk to someone, make positive progress, and get the individual into voluntary treatment. Recent protests have specifically asked municipalities to provide law enforcement less funding to bolster these types of resources for the community.

The reality, however, is far more complicated. Often times a person in crisis does not want professional help – yet they are still a danger to themselves or others. The process to begin the emergency detention process starts with a law enforcement professional physically detaining a person as they are evaluated by a mental health professional. If criteria is met to force an emergency detention, it is law enforcement’s role to monitor the safety of the individual at the hospital and transport to the treatment facility.

In addition, if a person is truly a danger to themselves or others, law enforcement is needed to make the scene safe before mental health professionals can begin their evaluations. No social worker could be asked to insert themselves into a situation where the person in crisis has a knife, gun, or other dangerous object.




Chart 20 above shows the overall number of individuals who were placed on an emergency detention after a use of force between 2010 and 2019. Included are the 5-year and 10-year averages for use of force related to emergency detentions. It also shows emergency detentions compared to overall use of force numbers. Table 17 below presents the same statistical information since 2015 with percentages for each year.

Emergency Detentions Involving a Use of Force										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
2010-2014 Average 5.8 (9.35%)					2015-2019 Average 7.0 (12.15%)					6.4
2	6	8	4	9	7	6	5	10	7	64
4.08%	10.71%	11.59%	6.78%	11.69%	14.29%	12.24%	9.43%	14.08%	10.61%	10.70%

Table 17

Law enforcement will always have a place in helping an individual experiencing a mental health crisis. This is especially true of situations where officers were contacted prior to knowing the mental health component or when interacting with someone trying to self-medicate mental health issues with drugs or alcohol.

With the law enforcement role of safely securing a person for evaluation, it is inevitable officers will need to use force from time to time to achieve their lawful objective. Officers are trained to recognize a person in crisis is often not intentionally or purposefully defying law enforcement directives. With that understanding, officer tactics are adjusted when possible. This is especially true when individuals who are developmentally disabled are experiencing a crisis and need to be

kept safe from danger while not being treated as someone being taken into custody after committing a crime.

Officers are trained to look at the totality of the situation and recognize that just because someone is non-compliant doesn't mean their actions are done with purposeful intent. CIT trained officers play a large part in trying to de-escalate individuals when possible. CIT officers often recognize those in the community with more frequent law enforcement encounters and therefore often have pre-planned responses. Collaborative efforts with family members can go a long way in minimizing use of force situations.

Between 2010 and 2019, there were 64 uses of force (10.70%) on individuals who were ultimately placed on an emergency detention. Some of the reasons force was needed included armed individuals, individuals sitting on a bridge railing threatening to jump, or individuals actively resisting because they didn't want to go to the hospital. The 5-year average (12.15%) was slightly higher than the 10-year average of 10.70%. The seven uses of force (10.61%) in 2019 which resulted in an emergency detention fell just under the 10-year average.

The most uses of force that resulted in an emergency detention was 10 in 2018. That represented 14.08% of the uses of force that year. The fewest was two in 2010. Those two represented 4.08% of that year's use of force numbers. The numbers suggest there might be a slight upward trend developing despite 2019 falling in-line with the averages.

### Drug and Alcohol Impairment


Officers experienced added dangers when physically coming in contact with individuals under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Aside from the higher pain tolerance, individuals under the influence are often more difficult to reason with and act more impulsively. The convergence of these factors can elevate the chance of injury for both the individual and the officer.

The extreme end of these factors can result in an individual experiencing excited delirium. Those with excited delirium experience a chemical imbalance that produces characteristic violent and delusional behavior. Visible symptoms can include profuse sweating, manic behaviors, and extraordinary strength. These are signs of a medical crisis and require immediate hospital treatment.

Suspected Under the Influence During Use of Force										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
2010-2014 Average 17.2 (27.74%)					2015-2019 Average 18.8 (32.64%)					18.0
11	15	20	27	13	14	17	16	21	26	180
22.45%	26.79%	28.99%	45.76%	16.88%	28.57%	34.69%	30.19%	29.58%	39.39%	30.10%

Table 18

Chart 21 on the next page shows the overall number of individuals who were suspected to be under the influence during a use of force between 2010 and 2019. Included are the 5-year and 10-year averages for a use of force on someone under the influence. It also shows individuals under the influence compared to overall use of force numbers. Table 18 above presents the same statistical information since 2015 with percentages for each year.



Between 2010 and 2019, the Appleton Police Department had 180 uses of force (30.10%) on an individual who was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The majority of those were alcohol related. The highest year was 2013 when 27 individuals (45.76%) who were involved in a use of force were under the influence. The lowest number was in 2010 when 11 (22.45%) were under the influence.

The 5-year average of 18.8 (32.64%) was slightly higher than the 10-year average of 18.0 (30.10%) uses of force on a person under the influence. Along with the spike in 2013, 2018 had 21 individuals (29.58%) and 2019 had 26 individuals (39.39%). These numbers suggest an upward trend has developed, but another year would be needed to confirm.

### Injuries to Involved Individuals

The ideal situation would be that all individuals were compliant with officer's lawful directives and as a result no one was injured. Often that situation is true. However, between 2010 and 2019 there were 598 individuals that did not comply with officers and a use of force was required. Each time an officer detains someone who is either actively resisting or demonstrating assaultive behavior there is a chance for injury. It is the responsibility of the officer to resolve these inherently dangerous situations quickly and with an appropriate level of force to minimize injuries.

The Appleton Police Department tracks injuries for individuals and officers using two different measures. The first measure tracks use of force that result in no injury, claimed injury, or visible injury. A claimed injury does not need to be substantiated to be counted. A visible injury can be as minor as abrasions with little to no bleeding up through the obvious, more severe injuries which resulted from a use of force.

The second measure used to track injuries involves the level of treatment after a use of force. With many of the “visible” injuries being minor and not requiring medical treatment, this second measure is often a better indication of how much an individual resisted or if an unnecessary level of force was used by the officer. Treatment measures are tracked as no treatment, EMS waiver, first aid, seen at a hospital and released, seen at a hospital and admitted, or “other” for any level of treatment not covered in the previous options.

**No Injury:** After a use of force, officers are trained to ask the individual if they are injured and need medical assistance. Even the most minor use of force may require medical assistance since the officer would likely be unaware of pre-existing injuries or an individual’s medical needs.

Despite all of the dynamics involved in trying to physically overcome an individual’s lack of compliance, the majority of uses of force result in no injury to the individual. Between 2010 and 2019, 346 individuals (57.86%) said they were not injured after the use of force. The 5-year average (57.29%) was nearly identical to the 10-year average (57.86%) of no reported injuries. The fewest injuries were reported in 2014 when 43 individuals (55.84%) said they were unhurt. As a percentage, 2011 was even better with 67.86% (38) who said they were not injured. During the entire analysis period, the percentage of individuals reporting no injuries only dropped below 50% once. That was in 2018 when 49.30% (35) said they were not hurt. The data in 2019 showed the uninjured (60.61%) was better than both the 5-year and 10-year averages.




Chart 22 above shows a visual representation of the injuries to individuals which resulted from a use of force between 2010 and 2019. Included are the 5-year and 10-year averages for use of force related injuries to individuals. Table 19 on the next page presents the same statistical information since 2015 with percentages for each year.

Injuries to Involved Individual Due to Use of Force											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
None	2010-2014 Average 36.2 (58.39%)					2015-2019 Average 33.0 (57.29%)					34.6
	31	38	38	31	43	32	30	28	35	40	346
	63.27%	67.86%	55.07%	52.54%	55.84%	65.31%	61.22%	52.83%	49.30%	60.61%	57.86%
Claimed	2010-2014 Average 3.8 (6.13%)					2015-2019 Average 3.6 (6.25%)					3.7
	4	4	3	4	4	4	2	2	4	6	37
	8.16%	7.14%	4.35%	6.78%	5.19%	8.16%	4.08%	3.77%	5.63%	9.09%	6.19%
Visible	2010-2014 Average 22.0 (35.48%)					2015-2019 Average 20.8 (36.11%)					21.4
	14	14	28	24	30	13	17	23	32	19	214
	28.57%	25.00%	40.58%	40.68%	38.96%	26.53%	34.69%	43.40%	45.07%	28.79%	35.79%

Table 19

**Claimed Injury:** After a use of force, there are times an individual claims an injury that is not visible and does not need medical treatment. Other times, individuals claim an injury with a desire to go to the hospital instead of being confined at the jail. Any time an individual requested medical assistance it was provided. The majority of individuals who claimed an injury were cleared relatively quickly by ambulance or hospital staff.

Between 2010 and 2019, there were 37 individuals (6.19%) who claimed an injury that was not visible as a result of a use of force. The 5-year and 10-year averages were nearly identical at 6.25% and 6.19% respectively. The highest number of claimed injuries occurred in 2019 when six individuals (9.09%) said they were hurt. The lowest number of claimed injuries was two and that occurred in both 2016 and 2017.

**Visible Injury:** It is not uncommon for an individual to suffer a minor visible injury during a use of force. Often the use of force occurred on a hard surface which caused a small abrasion or laceration. Other visible injuries included bruises and small puncture wounds from ECD probes. One visible injury included a broken bone while a second was a gunshot wound which resulted from a justified deadly force incident.

During the 2010 through 2019 analysis period, 215 individuals (35.95%) received a visible injury due to a use of force. The 5-year average (36.11%) was slightly higher than the 10-year average. Prior to 2019, the percentages had been growing steadily since 2015. In 2018, the percentage of individuals with a visible injury reached 45.07% (32 individuals). The fewest visible injuries was in 2011 when 25% of individuals involved in a use of force had a visible injury.

In 2019, the number of individuals declined to 28.79% which was below the 5-year and 10-year averages. The 2019 data ended a four-year increasing trend of individuals with visible injuries.

Between 2010 and 2019, the vast majority of individuals who were involved in a use of force were either uninjured or the injuries were minor enough to not need medical treatment. The tracking and understanding of medical treatment were often a better indication that appropriate levels of force were applied during this time period. This was especially true for juveniles and those who were elderly, injured, may be pregnant, or otherwise at higher risk of injury. The relatively low injury numbers support the notion that as a whole, the officers were not overly aggressive or reckless in their use of force.

Medical Treatment for Individuals Involved in a Use of Force											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
None	2010-2014 Average 53.0 (85.48%)					2015-2019 Average 45.8 (79.51%)					49.4
	42	52	60	47	64	41	40	40	52	56	494
	85.71%	92.86%	86.96%	79.66%	83.12%	83.67%	81.63%	75.47%	73.24%	84.85%	82.61%
Waiver	2010-2014 Average 0.8 (1.29%)					2015-2019 Average 1.2 (2.08%)					1.0
	0	0	0	4	0	2	3	1	0	0	10
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	6.78%	0.00%	4.08%	6.12%	1.89%	0.00%	0.00%	1.67%
First Aid	2010-2014 Average 1.4 (2.26%)					2015-2019 Average 0.6 (1.04%)					1.0
	2	1	1	1	2	0	0	2	0	1	10
	4.08%	1.79%	1.45%	1.69%	2.60%	0.00%	0.00%	3.77%	0.00%	1.52%	1.67%
Treated / Released	2010-2014 Average 6.0 (9.68%)					2015-2019 Average 9.0 (15.63%)					7.5
	4	3	7	6	10	6	5	9	18	7	75
	8.16%	5.36%	10.14%	10.17%	12.99%	12.24%	10.20%	16.98%	25.35%	10.61%	12.54%
Treated / Admitted	2010-2014 Average 0.2 (0.32%)					2015-2019 Average 0.2 (0.35%)					0.2
	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	2
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.30%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.52%	0.33%
Other	2010-2014 Average 0.6 (0.97%)					2015-2019 Average 0.6 (1.04%)					0.6
	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	6
	2.04%	0.00%	1.45%	1.69%	0.00%	0.00%	2.04%	0.00%	1.41%	1.52%	1.00%

Table 20

**No Medical Treatment:** As previously stated, during the 10-years covered within the analysis, 346 individuals were not hurt and required no medical treatment due to a use of force. In addition, 148 individuals who had either claimed they were injured or had a minor visible injury required no medical treatment. The total of individuals who had force used on them but required no medical treatment after was 494 (82.61%) of 598.

The year with the highest numbers of individuals not needing medical treatment was 2011 when 52 of 56 individuals (92.86%) required no medical clearance or treatment due to a use of force. The remainder of years were fairly consistent, ranging from the mid-70 percent to mid-80 percent. The 5-year average was 79.51% (229) while the 10-year average was 82.61% (494).

The year with the fewest individuals not needing medical treatment was 2018 when 26.76% of individuals needed some time of treatment. However, for 2018 and all other years, this number would be higher if it included EMS waivers and basic first aid only treatments. Additionally, a significant number of individuals required medical clearance at a hospital less because of injury and more because of the presence of alcohol or drugs. The jail will often require a signed doctor's release before jail admittance when a person is under the influence.

**EMS Waiver:** An EMS waiver was only used 10 times between 2010 and 2019 after a use of force. The times a waiver was required was when officers suggested medical treatment and the person refused. Often times officers can convince someone to accept first aid or go to a hospital for evaluation, but some individuals could not be convinced. Sometimes it was because of financial reasons, other times it was due to a lack of cooperation.

**First Aid:** Much like the EMS waiver, first aid was seldom the highest level of treatment due to a use of force. During the 10-year period of this analysis, just 10 individuals required no medical

care beyond basic first aid. Officers are trained to provide some first aid on the street, but given a choice that aid is better rendered by medical professionals. Most often officers initiated first aid, but then if the injury was severe enough, the person was transported to a hospital to receive additional care.

**Taken to Hospital and Released:** Individuals taken to the hospital for medical examination is the most frequent medical treatment – with the exception of “no treatment” as an option. Medical clearance at a hospital is often required when someone is under the influence or someone may have an injury that has the possibility of being severe. Officers exercised caution and brought 75 individuals (12.54%) to the hospital after a use of force to be evaluated after a use of force occurred. While the use of force itself was often the not the major factor in the need for medical clearance, the fact force was used may have compounded an existing medical issue.

Between 2010 and 2019, the most individuals taken to a hospital and released after clearance was in 2018. That year, 18 individuals (25.35%) were examined at a hospital. The fewest was 3 (5.36%) in 2011. The 5-year average (15.63%) and 10-year average (12.54%), along with data from 2017 and 2018, suggest an upward trend in required medical clearance. On a positive note, the percentage did come down in 2019 to less than half of what was observed in 2018 and reached a percentage below both averages.

**Taken to Hospital and Admitted:** In the time between 2010 and 2019, just three individuals needed to be admitted to a hospital due to or after a use of force event.

**Other Treatment:** In the time between 2010 and 2019, six individuals received medical treatment that was unsuccessful. Even in a deadly force situation, officers are trained to render aid as soon as the situation is safe.

## Types of Force Used

When verbalization and persuasion do not work, officers are trained to utilize control alternatives within the State of Wisconsin's Intervention Options. These alternatives are designed to control a person who is either resisting or threatening to resist lawful orders. Control alternatives are separated into four groupings; escort holds, compliance holds, control devices, and passive countermeasures.

If an individual cannot be controlled, officers are trained to either disengage or transition into protective alternatives. These are designed to protect officers in situations when individuals continue to resist or are threatening to assault someone. Similar to control alternatives, protective alternatives are separated into sub-categories; active countermeasures, incapacitating techniques, and intermediate weapons.

The highest level of force available to an officer is deadly force. The purpose of deadly force is to stop the threat. The only trained option for deadly force is the use of a firearm. Between 2010 and 2019, deadly force was used on six individuals.

In this section, the types of force used are presented based on the number of individuals who were directly involved. Later in this report, the types of force will be shown again based on the number of officers who utilized the techniques, tools, and/or tactics.

It should be noted that the total number of techniques, tools and/or tactics used will exceed the number of individuals and officers. This is due in large part because aggressively resisting subjects often require multiple officers attempting multiple options to try and gain control of an individual. For example, Officer "A" is forced to use passive countermeasures (force subject to the ground) while Officer "B" is required to deliver focused strikes (hands or knees) to gain control of the subject's hands because the subject will not comply with orders to stop resisting. After the passive countermeasure, Officer "A" may utilize an additional control alternative as the handcuffs are being applied.

The Appleton Police use of force reporting form captured these events which are separated by incident, officer, and technique/tool utilized. The resulting information is used for future training purposes and to ensure all force is used properly. As stated previously, if an officer used force five or more times in a year, a use of force review of those incidents was completed to provide a secondary analysis of them from a broader perspective than was possible during the earlier individual review process. The goal is to identify officer or subject actions, if any, which may have led to more frequent uses of force being utilized.

Rather than follow the intervention options provided by the State of Wisconsin, this report will divide the use of force techniques, tools and tactics in an easier to follow format.

## Hands-On Controls


Hands-On Controls will group for types of controls that do not require the use of a tool. A tool in this case is anything held by an officer which would assist him/her in controlling an individual. The hands-on controls included escort holds, compliance holds (wrist locks and pressure points), and positional holds. When applied as trained, none of these techniques pose a high risk of injury to the individual and allow an officer to gain control without resorting to physical strikes.

**Escort Holds:** Escort holds are mentioned in this report because they are generally the first level of physical contact with an individual. However, escort holds are not formally tracked as a use of force because they are done with very low risk to the person and do not rely on pain compliance to be effective. The two escort holds trained at the Appleton Police Department are the blanket-the-arm and SPEAR escort holds.

The goal of an escort hold is to allow the officer to safely initiate physical contact with a person who did not comply with verbal directions. They can be described as physical de-escalation because the purpose is to separate agitated individuals or to move the location of the contact to a safer, more controlled environment.

**Overview of Compliance Holds:** The general goal of any compliance hold is to overcome passive resistance. Passive resistance is when a person refused to comply with a lawful directive from an officer, but does not engage in physical action likely to cause harm to the officer or the individual. Compliance holds are taught at the academy and are allowed to be used by officers. However, these techniques are not re-enforced in training beyond the academy. Examples of compliance holds are the come-along and pressure points. Positional holds are encouraged over compliance holds due to overall effectiveness and lessen the reliance on temporary sensory overload as a means to establish control.

**“Come-Along” Compliance Hold:** The come-along compliance hold is more commonly referred to as a “wrist lock” technique. In the recruit academy, this is a trained option for safely escorting a person from one location to another. A proper application of this technique places the individual into a position which causes discomfort when they attempt to resist the directions of the officer – essentially “locking” the wrist into a fixed position. The goal is to limit uncontrolled movement and discourage physical resistance.




A variation of this hold is done to keep a person in a stationary position, such as the ground or against another solid surface, when an officer needs to apply handcuffs. While this position was often staged (ready to use if needed) by officers, the application was infrequent. Table 21 shows the frequency of use between 2010 and 2019.

Compliance Hold – Come-Along (Wrist Lock)										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
2010-2014 Average 0.4 (0.65%)					2015-2019 Average 0.4 (0.69%)					0.4
0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	4
0.00%	3.57%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.82%	0.00%	0.67%

Table 21

Between 2010 and 2019, just four individuals were held in position with a come-along compliance hold. These were two individuals in 2011 and two more in 2018. That equates to less than one percent of all individuals who experienced a use of force. As an average, the Appleton Police Department utilized this technique less than once every other year.

**Pressure Points:** The second trained compliance hold is commonly referred to as a “pressure point” control. The State of Wisconsin includes two primary pressure points in the recruit academy training – the mandibular angle and the hypoglossal. Much like the come-along compliance hold, these pressure points create a temporary sensory overload to help an officer establish control when an individual is passively resisting. However, they are more often used when an individual is actively resisting such as pulling away from officers or trying to get up off the ground during an arrest. Table 22 shows pressure points were used more frequently than wrist locks, but still at a relatively low frequency. Officers understand the use of a pressure point causes increased tension in the individual (due to discomfort) which may be mistaken for continued resistance.



Compliance Hold – Pressure Point										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
2010-2014 Average 0.8 (1.29%)					2015-2019 Average 0.8 (1.39%)					0.8
1	1	2	0	0	2	0	1	0	1	8
2.04%	1.79%	2.90%	0.00%	0.00%	4.08%	0.00%	1.89%	0.00%	1.52%	1.34%

Table 22

Between 2010 and 2019, a pressure point compliance hold was used on eight individuals. During that time, at least one pressure point was used in six of the 10 years. The most in any calendar year were two, which occurred in both 2012 and 2015. In 2019, there was one mandibular angle utilized. Both the 5-year and 10-year averages are nearly identical in frequency of usage (1.39% and 1.34% respectively) and both were used on individuals on average just under one per year.

**Overview of Positional Holds:** The Appleton Police Department recognized the need for a grouping of techniques between compliance holds and control devices such as electronic control devices (TASER) and oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray. When an officer has a position of advantage, it is imperative the position isn’t lost. Each lost position of advantage prolongs an individual’s ability to resist and increases the likelihood of injury to themselves or the officer.

A positional hold cannot be dependent on an officer’s strength or level of fitness. Factors such as size, strength, or fatigue may not work in the officer’s favor if the subject is bigger, stronger, younger, or more aggressive. The use of an officer’s body positioning can negate factors where the individual has an advantage over the officer. The primary positional holds involving “pinning” a person against a stable surface such as the ground.

**3-Point Shin-on-Top:** The 3-Point Shin-on-Top is a trained positional hold that is based on a common martial art moved called “knee on stomach” in Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu. The term knee on stomach carried over as it was implemented into training despite the technique being modified to

be more applicable for law enforcement purposes. Starting in 2021, the term knee on stomach will no longer be used for reporting purposes to avoid confusion.

The 3-Point Shin-on-Top differs from the martial art technique in a number of different ways. The officers are trained to keep two feet on the ground so body weight can be easily shifted from feet to the officer’s shin based on the level of resistance of the individual. As the level of resistance increased, the officer can shift weight to offset an individual’s size and strength advantage. As the level of resistance decreases, the officer can shift weight back off of the person while still maintaining positive control.

Target placement of the officer’s shin is over a portion of the individual’s body with skeletal support. Examples with proper support include hips and shoulders. Officers are not trained to place their shins or body weight on a person’s neck or chest in any way prolonged way that may impede breathing.

<b>Positional Hold – 3-Point Shin-on-Top</b>										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
<b>2010-2014 Average 1.6 (2.58%)</b>					<b>2015-2019 Average 7.4 (12.85%)</b>					<b>4.5</b>
<b>1*</b>	<b>0*</b>	<b>4*</b>	<b>1*</b>	<b>2*</b>	<b>1*</b>	<b>6*</b>	<b>4*</b>	<b>10*</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>45</b>
2.04%	0.00%	5.80%	1.69%	2.60%	2.04%	12.24%	7.55%	14.08%	24.24%	7.53%

The (\*) references years where the position was not formally tracked.


Table 23

The use of 3-Point Shin-on-Top was not formally tracked until the use of force form was updated in 2018. Prior to 2018, the use of this position was tracked informally through body camera footage and officer narratives. The 2019 data represented the first full year of formally tracked utilization. In 2019, officer’s used a 3-Point Shin-on-Top on 16 of 66 (24.24%) individuals. Without the ability to utilize this position, the length of each physical encounter would almost certainly be extended and officers would need to use more hand, elbow, and knee strikes to maintain positive control – ultimately leading to an increase in injury.

## Decentralizations

Decentralizations (more commonly known as “takedowns”) are by far the most common force option used. When someone is decentralized it means they were taken off-balance and brought to the ground for better control. As a general concept, individuals have a decreased ability to actively resist the closer they are to the ground. As an example, imagine sports typically played on the feet like football, basketball, or soccer and have them play on their knees. Then imagine again those sports played with the athletes on their stomach. Decentralizations are often the transition between an escort hold and a positional control. Officers are trained to control the individual’s rate of decent and protect the head and neck as much as possible throughout the dynamic movement.

The Wisconsin State Model includes four decentralization techniques: secure the head, hug-yourself, lower-your-center, and push-in/pull-down. Over the years, APD has taught numerous additional options to officers. This is in large part due to the vast number of situational factors



that may require different angles and directional controls. The most recent formal additions to Appleton Police Department training include “seat belt” and “leg wheel” decentralization techniques.

Chart 23 above shows the overall number of individuals who were decentralized between 2010 and 2019. Included are the 5-year and 10-year averages for decentralizations. It also shows decentralizations compared to overall use of force numbers. Table 24 below presents the same statistical information since 2015 with percentages for each year. The specific types of decentralization used are detailed further on page 87 in the officer section of this report.

Passive Countermeasure - Decentralization										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
<b>2010-2014 Average 47.2 (76.13%)</b>					<b>2015-2019 Average 40.8 (70.83%)</b>					<b>44.0</b>
37	47	52	41	59	37	34	36	47	50	440
75.51%	83.93%	75.36%	69.49%	76.62%	75.51%	69.39%	67.92%	66.20%	75.76%	73.58%

Table 24

Between 2010 and 2019, Appleton Police Officers decentralized 440 individuals. This represents 73.58% of all individuals who experienced a use of force. Over those years, the percentage of individuals taken to the ground went as low as 66.2% (47) in 2018 and as high as 83.93% (47) in 2011. Despite the high frequency of utilization, low numbers of resulting injuries show officers properly controlled (to the extent possible) the rate of decent and protected individuals head/neck area.

The 5-year average of individuals decentralized was 70.49% (40.6) while the 10-year average was slightly higher at 73.58% (44.0). In 2019, the 75.76% (50) average was higher than both and nearly 10% higher than the previous year. However, 2018 was the 10-year low of the analysis and 2019 was still easily within the standard deviation based on averages.

## Active Countermeasures

The goal of active countermeasures is to create temporary dysfunction when a person is actively resisting or being assaultive. The intent is to interrupt a person’s ability to resist and enabling an officer to get to a handcuffing position. Active countermeasures are essential options for officers when taking someone into custody. However, there are important factors that need to be considered. Officers and resisting/assaultive individuals have been injured during the use of active countermeasures. Officers also experienced varying levels of success with these options.

Generally, when active countermeasures are not effective in creating temporary dysfunction, an officer must decide whether to continue with additional active countermeasures or transition to a tool such as baton or TASER. In either case, the continuation of force can be unsettling for the public to view. The phrase often associated is, “continued ineffective force looks like excessive force.” Officers are aware of this optic and are trained to resolve the physical conflict as safely and efficiently as possible.

**Vertical and Ground Stuns:** The purpose of a vertical stun and/or a ground stun is to create a temporary dysfunction by forcefully directing a person into a hard surface. Examples of a hard surface include a wall or against a part squad car. The added benefit to either technique is then having a barrier which limits a person’s ability to run or continue resistive efforts.




Chart 24 above shows the overall number of individuals who received a vertical or ground stun between 2010 and 2019. Included are the 5-year and 10-year averages for vertical or ground stun techniques. It also shows vertical or ground stuns compared to overall use of force numbers. Table 25 on the next page presents the same statistical information since 2015 with percentages for

each year. The number of officers who utilized these techniques are detailed further on page 88 in the officer section of this report.

Active Countermeasure – Vertical (Tactical SPEAR) and Ground Stun										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
2010-2014 Average 5.6 (9.03%)					2015-2019 Average 3.0 (5.21%)					4.3
0	5	7	7	9	2	2	4	4	3	43
0.00%	8.93%	10.14%	11.86%	11.69%	4.08%	4.08%	7.55%	5.63%	4.55%	7.19%

Table 25

Between 2010 and 2019, a vertical or ground stun was used on 43 (7.19%) of 598 individuals. The highest year was 2014 when nine individuals (11.69%) were vertically stunned. No one that year was ground stunned. The lowest number of vertical/ground stuns was in 2010 when no officers utilized either technique.

The 5-year average of individuals who were vertical/ground stunned was 5.21%. The 10-year average was higher at 7.36%. In 2019, the percentage was lower than both averages at 4.55%. It is important to note, that the physical number of involved individuals remained relatively consistent over the past 5-years with no observed trends.


**Hand Strikes:** Like vertical or ground stuns, the purpose of a focused strike was to create dysfunction. However, a vertical/ground stun had energy dispersed over a large portion of the individual’s body. A focused strike, such as a hand strike, was directed toward a specific target area.

The DAAT system identified eight focused strikes in the Wisconsin State Model. Those included reaction hand strike, reaction forearm strike, strong hand strike, strong forearm strike, reaction front kick, reaction knee strike, strong angle knee strike and strong angle kick. In data tracking, the Appleton Police Department does not differentiate between reaction side and strong side strikes. In addition, a number of technique terminology has been modified to better reflect in-house training methods. This analysis identified a hand strike as any strike delivered with a closed or open hand either strong side or reaction side.

Active Countermeasure – Hand Strike										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
2010-2014 Average 9.2 (14.84%)					2015-2019 Average 7.6 (13.19%)					8.4
8	7	6	14	11	8	5	6	10	9	84
16.33%	12.50%	8.70%	23.73%	14.29%	16.33%	10.20%	11.32%	14.08%	13.64%	14.05%

Table 26

Chart 25 on the next page shows the overall number of individuals who struck with an officer’s hand between 2010 and 2019. Included are the 5-year and 10-year averages for hand strike techniques. It also shows hand strikes compared to overall use of force numbers. Table 26 above presents the same statistical information since 2015 with percentages for each year. The number of officers who utilized these techniques are detailed further on page 88 in the officer section of this report.



Between 2010 and 2019, a total of 86 individuals (14.38%) were struck by an officer with a hand strike. The 5-year average of 7.8 (13.54%) was slightly lower than the 10-year average of 8.6 (14.38%). The highest number of individuals struck was 14 (23.73%) in 2013. The lowest number was five (10.20%) in 2016.

In 2019, the total individuals struck with a hand by officers was nine (13.64%). The nine individuals were just above the typical 5-year average and within expectations for based on the 10-year average. Despite the higher physical numbers, the percentages in 2019 were lower than the 10-year average and nearly the same as the 5-year average.

**Elbow Strikes:** The Wisconsin State Model teaches both strong-side and reaction-side forearm strikes. Like with other focused strikes, the intent of a forearm strike is to create dysfunction and disrupt the individual’s ability to continue resistive or assaultive behavior. The trainers at the Appleton Police Department determined forearm strikes were important, but officers needed the ability to deliver a focused strike with the triceps side of the elbow as well. Therefore, the term forearm strike was replaced with a more generic term “elbow strike” even though the elbow itself is not intended to be an actual surface used to strike an individual. Officers are trained to avoid using the tip of the elbow on dangerous areas such as an individual’s spine.




Chart 26 above shows the overall number of individuals who struck with an officer’s elbow between 2010 and 2019. Included are the 5-year and 10-year averages for elbow strike techniques. It also shows elbow strikes compared to overall use of force numbers. Table 27 below presents the same statistical information since 2015 with percentages for each year. The number of officers who utilized these techniques are detailed further on page 88 in the officer section of this report.

Active Countermeasure – Elbow Strike										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
<b>2010-2014 Average 1.8 (2.90%)</b>					<b>2015-2019 Average 0.6 (1.04%)</b>					<b>1.2</b>
4	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	1	2	12
8.16%	1.79%	1.45%	3.39%	1.30%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.41%	3.03%	2.01%

Table 27

Over the 10-year span of this analysis, there were 12 (2.01%) individuals struck by officers with an elbow. The most elbow strikes against an individual in one year was four (8.16%). Conversely, Appleton Police Department officers went three years (2015-2017) without a single elbow strike used against someone.

Prior to 2019, the data showed a declining trend in elbow strike utilization. The 5-year average (1.04%) was half of the 10-year average (2.01%). The lower 5-year average was due to three years of no elbow strikes and just one elbow strike used in 2018. In 2019, officers used two elbow strikes – the most in the 5-year period.

**Defused Strikes:** Defused strikes fall within the category of incapacitating techniques outlined in the Wisconsin State model. The purpose of an incapacitating technique is the cause the immediate, temporary cessation of violent behavior. Properly done, this technique has potential to render a person temporarily unconscious.



Between 2010 and 2019, the Appleton Police Department has not done, or even attempted, this strike on an individual. However, it is important to document in this report because it is one of the nine techniques that would require a use of force report if done to an individual.

Active Countermeasure – Defused Strike										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
<b>2010-2014 Average 0.0 (0.00%)</b>					<b>2015-2019 Average 0.0 (0.00%)</b>					<b>0.0</b>
<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

Table 28

There are several reasons why this technique has not been done since at least 2010 (and likely longer). One reason is that this technique is designed to be used to end violent behavior. Over the past 10-years Appleton officers only experienced violent, assaultive behavior that resulted in a use of force 129 times. Relatively speaking, the opportunity to apply the technique did not happen often, and it is likely officers were seldom in a good position to safely attempt a defused strike.

The second reason defused strikes were likely not used is they are not covered in training after the recruit academy. DAAT trainers have identified safer options for officers that do not require a strike to the individual’s brachial plexus on the side of their neck. However, officers are not discouraged from utilizing the technique if they felt the situation required a defused strike.

**Knee Strikes:** Another active countermeasure focus strike option for an officer is a knee strike. Academy students are taught the reaction knee strike as a way to stop an individual’s forward momentum and transition to other options. The trained target zone is the lower abdominal area. Appleton officers are trained to use knee strikes from additional positions and to create the same temporary dysfunction of other active countermeasures.

Academy also teaches a strong angle knee kick which is designed to stop more violent levels of resistance or assaultive behavior. For the analysis, all versions of a knee strike are compiled into the data shown in table 29 on the next page.




Chart 27 above shows the overall number of individuals who struck by an officer’s knee between 2010 and 2019. Included are the 5-year and 10-year averages for knee strike techniques. It also shows knee strikes compared to overall use of force numbers. Table 29 below presents the same statistical information since 2015 with percentages for each year. The number of officers who utilized these techniques are detailed further on page 89 in the officer section of this report.

Active Countermeasure – Knee Strike										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
<b>2010-2014 Average 4.4 (7.10%)</b>					<b>2015-2019 Average 5.8 (10.07%)</b>					<b>5.1</b>
6	6	1	4	5	2	6	10	5	6	51
12.24%	10.71%	1.45%	6.78%	6.49%	4.08%	12.24%	18.87%	7.04%	9.09%	8.53%

Table 29

During the 10-years of this analysis, a total of 51 individuals (8.53%) were struck by a knee during detainment or arrest. The highest number of knee strikes was 10 (18.87%) in 2017. Overall, a gradual upward trend is shown in the data due in part to the 2017 outlier. The lowest number of knee strikes was one (1.45%) in 2013.

In 2019, the six individuals (9.09%) was right between the 5-year and 10-year averages. It was also one of four years (2010, 2011, 2016, and 2019) six individuals were struck by an officer’s knee. This data further confirms 2019 was right on average with the 10-year totals.

**Leg Kicks:** Wisconsin State Model offers two versions of leg kicks. The first is a reaction front kick intended to stop an individual’s forward momentum and create time to either disengage or transition to another technique. The second leg kick is the strong angle kick used to stop an individual’s advance, violent resistance, or assaultive behavior. For data collection, the Appleton Police department compiled all kicks into one category. Refer to table 30 for a detailed breakdown of leg kicks.



Officers are trained not to kick an individual above their waistline. The higher an officer attempts to kick the more dangerous the technique becomes for the officer. If the individual is on the ground, there are more effective techniques available than kicks for an officer to control someone.

Active Countermeasure – Leg Kick										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
<i>2010-2014 Average 0.4 (0.65%)</i>					<i>2015-2019 Average 0.4 (0.69%)</i>					<b>0.4</b>
<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>
<i>0.00%</i>	<i>0.00%</i>	<i>0.00%</i>	<i>1.69%</i>	<i>1.30%</i>	<i>0.00%</i>	<i>0.00%</i>	<i>0.00%</i>	<i>1.41%</i>	<i>1.52%</i>	<i>0.67%</i>

Table 30

Between 2010 and 2019, a total of 4 individuals (0.67%) were kicked by an Appleton Police Department officer. In six years (2010-2012 and 2015-2017), no individuals were kicked during detainment/arrest. The 5-year average (0.69%) and 10-year average (0.67%) were nearly identical and represented less than one person every two years.

In 2019, one individual was kicked by an officer. As a yearly percentage, that was over twice the 5-year and 10-year averages. However, with the low number of actual individuals, just one instance can represent a significant difference in percentages. One involved individual is within the expected range of possible outcomes.

### Less than Lethal Tools

The Appleton Police Department utilizes five less than lethal tools to assist in self-defense and detainment/arrest situations. Two of these tools are categorized as control alternatives (electronic control device and OC spray) and are categorized as protective alternatives (baton, kinetic energy weapon, and canine apprehension).

Officers are encouraged to attempt “hands-on” control of an individual before a tool is utilized. Tools can fail and even worse can be taken from officers when an individual is violently resisting. Any time an officer is disarmed, even with a less than lethal tool, the level of danger increases drastically.

**Electronic Control Device (TASER):** Electronic control devices are a control alternative option in the Wisconsin State Model. Between 2010 and 2019, the Appleton Police Department issued officers the electronic control device brand TASER for on-duty carry. Early models were the X26 with officers eventually transitioning to the X2 TASER. In 2020, officers transition again to a TASER

7 model for on-duty carry. Officers only carry a TASER on their support side to avoid confusion under stress between lethal and less than lethal options.

Less than Lethal Tool – Electronic Control Device (TASER)										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
2010-2014 Average 11.8 (19.03%)					2015-2019 Average 13.4 (23.26%)					12.6
7	4	13	13	22	14	13	12	16	12	126
14.29%	7.14%	18.84%	22.03%	28.57%	28.57%	26.53%	22.64%	22.54%	18.18%	21.07%

Table 31

Table 31 above shows the number and percent of individuals who had a TASER used on them as a use of force. However, the table does not show the total number of TASER deployments. This is because some calls for service required multiple deployments before officers achieved the desired effect or transitioned to another option. Chart 28 below shows the number of individuals who experienced neuro-muscular incapacitation (NMI) as a result of a TASER. The number of officers who utilized an electronic control device are detailed further on page 89 in the officer section of this report.





Chart 28

It should be noted that there are times the initial TASER deployment was not effective, but a “drive-stun follow-up” completed the circuit. The resulting neuro-muscular incapacitation was recorded as a successful utilization.

Between 2010 and 2019, there were 126 individuals (21.07%) who had an electronic control weapon (TASER) used on them during a detainment or arrest. The highest number of individuals who experienced a TASER deployment was 22 (28.57%) in 2014. The lowest number of people who had a TASER used on them was four (7.14%) in 2011.

Overall, the number of individuals who had a TASER used on them remained relatively flat in eight of 10 years in the analysis. That exceptions were in the data from 2011 which showed a low outlier while the data from 2014 showed a high outlier. In 2019, the 12 individuals was marginally lower than the 5-year average (13.4) and right on the 10-year average (12.7). While there was a decline in usage from 2018 to 2019, the overall numbers support an even trend.

**Baton Strike:** The baton is considered an intermediate weapon in the Wisconsin DAAT system. The goal of an intermediate weapon, such as baton, is to impede a person’s ability to continue resistive, assaultive, or otherwise dangerous behavior. Appleton Police Department policy mandates officers are to have a baton with them on duty. The most common baton carried is an expandable metal baton carried on the duty belt. Officers also have the option of carrying a wooden baton hung from a belt loop.




The target zone for a baton strike is the individual’s arms, legs, or lower abdominal area. Officers are not trained to strike an individual in the head. However, an officer would be allowed to utilize a strike to the head if deadly force criteria were met and an officer was not able to use a firearm.

Less than Lethal Tool – Baton Strike										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
<b>2010-2014 Average 0.0 (0.00%)</b>					<b>2015-2019 Average 0.0 (0.00%)</b>					<b>0.0</b>
<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

Table 32

Although officers have received on-going training, a baton strike was not used on any individual between 2010 and 2019. However, there were times its use would have been appropriate. Secondary factors such as environment, proximity of bystanders, and better tactical options precluded the use of a baton.

**OC Spray:** According to Wisconsin State Model, the use of oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray is to overcome active resistance or its threat. OC spray (also called “pepper spray”) is intended to create a variety of physical effects which can cause the individual temporary confusion and disorientation. The spray is an inflammatory agent delivered in the form of an oily resin from distance. For training purposes, all Appleton Police officers have been exposed to the effects of OC spray.



The decision to use, or not use, OC Spray is important tactically. Once OC is in the air, it has the potential of affecting the officers as much as the intended individual. Wind direction, confined spaces, and proximity are all factors in the decision to spray. Any individual who comes in contact with OC Spray will need to go through a decontamination process before being released or turned over to the jail.

Less than Lethal Tool – Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Spray										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
2010-2014 Average 0.0 (0.00%)					2015-2019 Average 0.0 (0.00%)					0.0
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

Table 33

Although officers have received on-going training, OC spray was not used on any individual between 2010 and 2019. However, there were times its use would have been appropriate.

**Kinetic Energy Weapon:** The Appleton Police Department utilizes a “bean bag” shotgun as a less than lethal tool for officers. A small, non-penetrating fabric bag weighing 1.4 oz is fired from a specially manufactured shotgun. The guns are made specifically to not allow a lethal round to be fired. The purpose of the kinetic energy weapon is to cause minimum long-term trauma but still impede dangerous behavior that has not reached the level of deadly force.

Less than Lethal Tool – Kinetic Energy Weapon (Bean Bag)										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
2010-2014 Average 0.2 (0.32%)					2015-2019 Average 0.8 (1.39%)					0.5
0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	5
0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.30%	0.00%	2.04%	1.89%	1.41%	1.52%	0.84%

Table 34

Kinetic Energy Weapons were utilized on five individuals (0.84%) between 2010 and 2019. No more than one person was struck with a bean bag round in any year since 2010. Both the 5-year average (1.39%) and 10-year average (0.84%) represent less than one person a year shot with a kinetic energy weapon.

In 2019, one individual (1.52%) was struck with a bean bag round. This was consistent with a marginally increasing trend observed in the data. The physical number of people struck has grown incrementally since 2014. The 10-year average is one person every other year. The 5-year average is higher with nearly one person each year. That average is bolstered by one person being struck each year since 2016.

**Canine Bite Apprehension:** The Appleton Police Department started its first canine program in the 1980s. The initial program ended in 1993 and remained dormant for approximately 13 years. The program restarted in 2006 and by the end of this analysis period (2019) featured three active canines. The use of canines consisted of drug detection, bomb detection, subject tracking, and subject apprehension. Subject apprehension, specifically when a dog bites an individual, is considered a use of force and is tracked along with the officer data. Non-bite apprehensions (a person becoming cooperative because of the dog) are not a use of force.

Less than Lethal Tool – Canine Bite Apprehension										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
2010-2014 Average 0.2 (0.32%)					2015-2019 Average 0.0 (0.00%)					0.1
0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.30%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.17%

Table 35

The canine program was an integral part of patrol. Between 2010 and 2019, the Appleton Police Department had hundreds canine deployments. After all those deployments, just one (in 2014) resulted in an individual being bitten.

## Deadly Force

Deadly force is always an officer’s last resort. To be justified, a number of important factors need to exist. First, the individual needs to exhibit behavior which has caused or imminently threatens to cause death or great bodily harm to the officer or another person. To meet the imminent threat criteria the person must have a weapon, intent, and a delivery system. Great bodily harm is defined as bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes a serious permanent disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or other serious bodily injury.

The officer is trained to stop the threat with an intentional use of a firearm. Deadly force is defined as the intentional use of a firearm or other instrument that creates a high probability of death or great bodily harm. That definition leads to the second important factor. The officer needs to reasonably believe all other options to stop the threat have either been exhausted or would be ineffective. This is true even if it poses a risk to other people in the area. The State of Wisconsin recognizes the greater danger exception. Are the consequences of not stopping the threat worse than the possibility of shooting an innocent person? If the answer is yes, the threat still needs to be stopped.




Chart 29 on the previous page shows the overall number of individuals with behavior which required a deadly force response between 2010 and 2019. Included are the 5-year and 10-year averages for deadly force. It also shows deadly force responses compared to overall use of force numbers. Table 36 below presents the same statistical information since 2015 with percentages for each year. The number of officers who were required to use deadly force are detailed further on page 90 in the officer section of this report.

Deadly Force – Intentional Use of a Firearm on an Individual										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
2010-2014 Average 0.6 (0.97%)					2015-2019 Average 0.6 (1.04%)					0.6
1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	6
2.04%	0.00%	1.45%	0.00%	1.30%	0.00%	0.00%	1.89%	1.41%	1.52%	1.00%

Table 36

The Appleton Police Department has never shot more than one individual in a calendar year. The 5-year average (0.6) and 10-year average (0.6) are identical. Between 2010 and 2014, an individual was shot once every two years. In 2015 and 2016, no individuals were shot by the Appleton Police Department. Then in 2017, as well as 2018 and 2019, one individual was shot per year. All officer involved shootings were investigated by an independent agency. Once completed, all investigations were reviewed by the district attorney’s office and found to be justified. The investigations were then reviewed internally to ensure the officer’s actions were in policy.

### Use of Force on Physically Detained Individuals


When a person is detained in handcuffs, they can still pose a risk themselves or others. Individuals still have the ability to kick, knee strike, spit, strike with their head, flee from officers, or even harm themselves. Officers are responsible for the safety on all individuals in our custody. At times, that responsibility means a use of force on someone who is in handcuffs.

After an individual has been stabilized and handcuffed, physical contact must be maintained with the person. This is to protect them in case they were to trip or stumble. Is also to protect the officer from being assaulted or to prevent escape. Just because someone is in handcuffs does not mean they can’t hurt themselves or someone else.

Use of Force on Physically Detained Individual										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
2010-2014 Average 6.4 (10.32%)					2015-2019 Average 5.0 (8.68%)					5.7
2	7	5	9	9	5	4	5	6	5	57
4.08%	12.50%	7.25%	15.25%	11.69%	10.20%	8.16%	9.43%	8.45%	7.58%	9.53%

Table 37

Table 37 above presents the statistical information regarding use of force after handcuffing since 2015 with percentages for each year. Chart 30 on the next page shows the overall number of individuals who had force used on them while handcuffed between 2010 and 2019. Included are the 5-year and 10-year averages for this situation. It also shows use of force while handcuffed compared to overall use of force numbers.



The vast majority of times force was used on a handcuffed individual it was a decentralization done at a slow, controlled rate. These decentralizations were often done in an attempt to gain extra control of an actively resisting or assaultive person. Once control was re-established, added control such as a hobble or spit hood could be applied.

Between 2010 and 2019, handcuffed individuals had force used on them a total of 57 times. That equates to just under 10% (9.53%) of all use of force. The years 2013 and 2014 both had nine occurrences while the low (2) was in 2010.

## Situational Analysis

Situational analysis is a critical component to understanding the appropriateness of a use of force. It also plays an important role for future strategic planning (resource deployment, projecting future department needs, etc.) and providing effective, realistic training (scenario building, time allocation, etc.). Situational analysis is the officer's perception of environmental factors, the comprehension of their relevance or threat, and how the environment will play a role throughout the contact. Each situation presents a unique challenge to officer safety.

This 10-year analysis looks at a number of situational factors in regards to calls for service that resulted in a use of force.


- Initial Dispatch
- Situational Factors
- Location Specifics
- Type of Surface
- Low Light / Dark Environments
- Proximity to Weapons
- Recorded Incidents
- Time of Day
- Day of Week
- Month of Year

Not all situational aspects were formally tracked until mid-2018. Those that were have the full 10 years of data for this analysis. Those that weren't will show 2019 only. In addition, unlike potential threat observations, there will always be at least one situational factor. An officer can be ambushed with no pre-assault indicators seen. However, at a minimum there will always be location factors surrounding a use of force.

### Initial Dispatch

The initial dispatch provides officers with their first piece of on-scene intelligence. Officers are trained to use the initial information to pre-plan their response. However, officers understand that initial dispatches are often inaccurate or incomplete. Pre-planned responses need to be flexible and verified through proper investigation.

Officers are dispatched for a wide range of behaviors and situations which require law enforcement intervention. Initial dispatches were not tracked in regards to use of force until mid-2018. In 2019, the Appleton Police Department responded to 65 calls for service that ultimately led to a use of force. During those 65 calls for service, 66 individuals were not compliant with officers. The vast majority of use of force instances originated from a disturbance or fight. Other dispatches included welfare checks, agency assists, traffic stops, retail thefts, and a number of other specific incidents. Refer to chart 31 on the next page for a visual breakdown of the data.



In 2019, every call for service had its own aspects which made it unique. In general, the incidents which resulted in a use of force could be broken down into 13 categories:

- Fights/Disturbances **(30)**                      45.45%
- Welfare Checks **(9)**                              13.64%
- Agency Assists **(6)**                              9.09%
- Retail Thefts **(4)**                                 6.06%
- Traffic Stops **(4)**                                 6.06%
- Trespass Complaints **(3)**                        4.55%
- Drug Complaints **(2)**                             3.03%
- 911 Open Lines **(2)**                             3.03%
- Medical Calls **(2)**                                3.03%
- Warrant Pick-up **(1)**                            1.52%
- Sex Offense **(1)**                                 1.52%
- Burglary **(1)**                                     1.52%
- Weapon Complaint **(1)**                        1.52%

Analytical work for subsequent years will likely expand beyond the 13 categories listed above. However, the generic nature of initial dispatches (due to a lack of information) will ultimately limit the total number of category options.

## Situational Factors

Officers have long been trained to be vigilant of their surroundings. In recent years, general vigilance has been refined to understanding more specific situational factors. As with behaviors, no one specific situational factor guarantees a use of force will occur or be more dangerous than another. However, the more overlapping situational factors exist the more complex, dynamic, and potentially dangerous the encounter.




Chart 32 above shows the top five situational factors encountered by officers in 2019 when involved in a use of force. Table 38 below presents the same statistical information with percentages for each of the top factors.

Top-5 Situational Factors Observed in 2019			
	Observed	Incidents	Percent
Subject Pulling Away	43	66	65.15%
Rapidly Evolving Situation	31	66	46.97%
Outdoor Urban Area	28	66	42.42%
Presence of Bystanders	28	66	42.42%
Evading Arrest by Flight	24	66	36.36%
<b>Total Situational Factors Observed</b>	<b>295</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>4.5 : 1</b>

Table 38

Situational factors were not formally tracked until mid-2018. The revised use of force form has identified 31 options for officers to select from when they complete their report. Unlike potential threat observations (which can be zero), there is always at least one situational factor. Most calls for service included multiple situational factors which overlapped.

In 2019, 295 specific situational factors were observed by officers during the calls for service that resulted in a use of force. With 66 individuals involved in a use of force, that equaled a ratio of approximately 4.5 situational factors for each use of force.

### Location Specifics

The one situational factor which is guaranteed with each citizen contact is location. Specifically, whether the contact was indoor residential, indoor public, outdoor urban, or outdoor rural. Ultimately, use of force options can be limited based on the environment at the time an individual is resistive or assaultive. Officers are trained to recognize their environment and take it into account when pre-planning response options and determining their course of action.




Chart 33 above shows the locations where a use of force occurred between 2010 and 2019. Table 39 on the next page presents the same statistical information with percentages for each location.

Between 2010 and 2019, the most common location for a use of force to occur was in an outdoor urban setting. Over the 5-year and 10-year averages, over half of all uses of force happened outdoors in a city setting.

Locations Specifics Involving a Use of Force											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
Indoor Residential	2010-2014 Average 9.8 (15.81%)					2015-2019 Average 8.8 (15.28%)					9.3
	7	9	11	8	14	9	6	9	5	15	93
	14.29%	16.07%	15.94%	13.56%	18.18%	18.37%	12.24%	16.98%	7.04%	22.73%	15.55%
Indoor Public	2010-2014 Average 10.0 (16.13%)					2015-2019 Average 15.6 (27.08%)					12.8
	7	7	11	10	15	14	14	13	15	22	128
	14.29%	12.50%	15.94%	16.95%	19.48%	28.57%	28.57%	24.53%	21.13%	33.33%	21.40%
Outdoor Urban	2010-2014 Average 41.8 (67.42%)					2015-2019 Average 32.0 (55.56%)					36.9
	34	40	47	41	47	26	28	30	48	28	369
	69.39%	71.43%	68.12%	69.49%	61.04%	53.06%	57.14%	56.60%	67.61%	42.42%	61.71%
Outdoor Rural	2010-2014 Average 0.4 (0.69%)					2015-2019 Average 1.2 (2.08%)					0.8
	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	3	1	8
	2.04%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.52%	0.00%	2.04%	1.89%	4.23%	1.52%	1.34%

Table 39

**Indoor Residential:** Indoor residential settings are any use of force that occurred inside a house, apartment, or residential garage. These settings provide elevated risk to officers because the individuals typically have a better working knowledge of the environment. Individuals within their own home know best escape routes or where any potential weapons may be hidden.

Between 2010 and 2019, there were 93 individuals involved in a use of force inside a residential setting. The most during this time period was 15 (22.73%) in 2019. That was three times higher than the previous year (the lowest from this time period) and well above the 5-year and 10-year averages. A similar high number was seen in 2014 when 14 use of force incidents occurred inside a residence. As stated previously, 2018 had the fewest (5) residential uses of force.

**Indoor Public:** Indoor public settings are any use of force that occurred inside a commercial business, government building, or other non-residential location. During this 10-year analysis period, there were 128 individuals involved in a use of force inside a non-residential setting. As with residential, 2019 was the highest year for indoor public uses of force. In 2019, a total of 22 individuals had force used on them within an indoor public setting. The fewest occurred in 2011 with seven incidents. Both the high and low numbers were well outside the standard deviations from the 5-year and 10-year averages.

**Outdoor Urban:** Outdoor urban settings are any use of force that occurred outside within a city setting. These encompass the majority of Appleton use of force locations. Outdoor urban includes both business and residential areas.

Between 2010 and 2019, there were 369 individuals involved in a use of force in an outdoor urban environment. The highest year was in 2018 with 48 (67.61%) uses of force. That year correlated with the 10-year lows for indoor residential and indoor public totals. Despite a high in 2018, the declines seen in the 10-year to 5-year averages, along with a near record low in 2019, a clear downward trend had developed.

The lowest year was in 2015 with 26 (53.06%) uses of force in an outdoor urban setting. There was only one year (2019) which finished with less than 50% of uses of force outdoor in an urban environment.

**Outdoor Rural:** Outdoor rural settings are any use of force that occurred away from a city street in an area that is predominately wooded or open spaced. Examples include large city parks, the Newberry trail, or undeveloped areas of the city. During this 10-year analysis period, just eight uses of force occurred in an outdoor rural environment. Three of those occurred in 2018.

## **Type of Surface**

Approximately three out of every four use of force incidents involve a decentralization. During this 10-year analysis period, there were also 98 effective TASER deployments which contributed to individuals falling. Any time an individual is taken to the ground, the type of surface needs to be taken into consideration. The condition of the surface (cluttered, snow covered, vehicle traffic, etc.) needs to be taken into account as well.

The actual type of surface is not formally documented on the APD\_103 use of force form. When relevant, the conditions of the surface are detailed in the narrative. However, for the purpose of this analysis, the 2019 narratives were re-read and the types of surface were documented (as accurately as possible) to provide a general understanding.

In 2019, there were 29 (43.94%) use of force incidents that occurred over a hard outdoor surface. Typically it was the concrete of a street or sidewalk. In two of those incidents the use of force started in a vehicle before being redirected to the concrete.

There were also 24 (36.36%) use of force incidents that occurred over a hard indoor surface. Examples included tile floors, wood floors, and indoor cement surfaces. While these surfaces are typically smoother (less small rocks, broken glass, etc.), they often have more clutter. Officers and individuals risk injury from tripping or falling into objects in close proximity.


Softer surfaces were much less frequent. Indoor residential (carpet) accounted for eight (12.12%) of the use of force incidents. Outdoor dirt or grassy areas were just five (7.58%) of the use of force surfaces.

The majority of the 2019 use of force incidents resulted in no subject injuries. The surface likely played a role in approximately 16 abrasions. An individual falling did account for one confirmed broken bone and one claimed broken bone. The individual who claimed a broken nose was taken to the hospital and released to the jail. It is not uncommon for individuals to claim injury as an attempt to avoid confinement.

## Low Light / Dark Environments

Officers face an increased risk when working in a low light or dark environment. The danger is increased when working in areas that limit officer's ability to see pre-assault indicators or properly recognize important situational factors. In addition, the necessity of a flashlight can impede an officer's ability to transition through levels of force.


In 2019, officers were required to use force against 21 (31.82%) individuals in low light or dark environments.



## Weapon Involvement

When an individual has a weapon, or an item that can immediately be turned into a weapon (for example a baseball bat), the situation becomes much more dangerous. The Wisconsin DAAT system refers to this as a special circumstance.

Weapons in close proximity increase a person's ability to escalate their force rapidly. Even if an individual decides not to attack, their ability to quickly do so should affect the officer's threat assessment.



The Appleton Police Department did not formally track individuals in close proximity (or armed) until mid-2018. In 2019, nine of 66 uses of force (13.64%) were on people close to a weapon. Eight of those individuals were taken safely into custody. One individual's behavior required a deadly force response from officers.

## Recorded Incidents

There are a lot of different ways a call for service can be recorded. Incidents early in this analysis were primarily recorded with dashboard mounted cameras. Over the years, recordings transitioned to body worn cameras. In addition to the officer's video, supplemental recordings are sometimes available from traffic cameras, security cameras, and cell phone videos. Each source provides

unique benefits in terms of perspective and level of detail. It is important to note that we want to record as many incidents as possible. However, we will never be able to reach 100% of all use of force incidents recorded. Factors such as camera battery life, HIPAA laws, sudden assaults, and human error (just to name a few examples) cause some use of force incidents to go unrecorded.




Chart 36 above shows the number incidents recorded by officers in 2019 when involved in a use of force. Table 40 below presents the same statistical information with percentages.

Use of Force Incidents Recorded										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
<b>2010-2014 Average 47.6 (80.41%)</b>					<b>2015-2019 Average 51.8 (91.52%)</b>					<b>49.7</b>
39	46	42	49	62	41	45	50	61	62	497
79.59%	85.19%	60.87%	89.09%	89.86%	87.23%	93.75%	94.34%	88.41%	93.94%	85.84%

Table 40

In 2010, officers recorded 39 of 49 use of force incidents. Those recordings were a mix of supplemental sources and dash camera videos that often caught just the audio of the incident. As dashboard cameras were being phased out and body cameras were still being phased in, the percentage of incidents recorded dropped. In 2012, a total of 42 of 69 incidents (60.87%) were recorded. As more body cameras became available and officers became more comfortable with the technology, the percentage increased dramatically.

In 2013, use of force recordings increased approximately 28% from the previous year. Since then, recorded incidents have not dropped below 87%. The best year was 2017 with 50 of 53 incidents (94.34%) were recorded. The numbers in 2019 were very comparable with 62 of 66 (93.94%) uses of force recorded.

## Time of Day

Understanding how the time of day factors into use of force statistics is important for a number of reasons. One is that time of day contributes to better understanding and individual's situation and behavior. A second reason is to ensure staffing levels and resource allocations accurately match what is needed throughout the day.




Chart 37 above compares the daytime, afternoon, and overnight incidents which included a use of force. Table 41 below presents the same statistical information with percentages for each time category for the most recent five years.

Time of Day with a Use of Force											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
0600-1400	2010-2014 Average 12.0 (19.35%)					2015-2019 Average 14.4 (25.00%)					13.2
	8	8	14	9	21	15	9	10	19	19	132
	16.33%	14.29%	20.29%	15.25%	27.27%	30.61%	18.37%	18.87%	26.76%	28.79%	22.07%
1400-2200	2010-2014 Average 18.8 (30.32%)					2015-2019 Average 24.0 (41.67%)					21.4
	13	16	21	21	23	18	19	23	30	30	214
	26.53%	28.57%	30.43%	35.59%	29.87%	36.73%	38.78%	43.40%	42.25%	45.45%	35.79%
2200-0600	2010-2014 Average 31.2 (50.32%)					2015-2019 Average 19.2 (33.33%)					25.2
	28	32	34	29	33	16	21	20	22	17	252
	57.14%	57.14%	49.28%	49.15%	42.86%	32.65%	42.86%	37.74%	30.99%	25.76%	42.14%


Table 41

Between 2010 and 2014, the overnight time period (2200-0600) had more uses of force than the daytime or afternoon. In 2015, a dramatic shift began when the overnight use of force numbers dropped by nearly 50% and was overtaken by the afternoon (1400-2200) time period. That began a five year upward trend of afternoon uses of force while the overnight has remained relatively flat. Daytime uses of force had remained lower than either of the other two time periods until

2019 when it overtook the overnight numbers. A spike had been seen with daytime numbers in 2014 before gradually returning to previous averages. A second spike was seen in 2018 with a nearly 50% increase. That spike carried over into 2019 with the same number of use of force incidents (19 each year).

**Daytime 0600-1400:**


Between 2010 and 2019, a total of 132 individuals were involved in a use of force. The highest number came in 2014 when 21 individuals (27.27%) were resistive or assaultive. The second highest totals were in 2018 and 2019 when 19 individuals each year



were in a use of force. These coincide with an overall upward trend in numbers. The 10-year average (13.2) was lower than the 5-year average (14.4) while both averages were well below the 2018 and 2019 numbers. The lowest numbers were in 2010 and 2011 when eight individuals each year were involved in a use of force.


**Afternoon 1400-2200:**

Similar to the daytime, the afternoon hours had an upward trend in uses of force during this analysis period. In total, 214 individuals were involved in a use of force. The highest numbers were in 2018 and 2019 when 30 individuals each year were resistive or




assaultive. The previous high numbers had been in 2014 and 2017 with 23 individuals each year. The 10-year average (21.4) was lower than the 5-year average (24.0) and substantially lower than the most recent years (30) of this analysis. The fewest number of individuals involved in a use of force during the afternoon was 13 (26.53%) in 2010.

**Overnight 2200-0600:** Between 2010 and 2019, a total of 252 individuals were involved in a use of force. This represents the most of the three time periods. However, if recent trends were to continue, the afternoon time period has potential of overtaking overnights within a few years.



The highest number came in 2014 when 33 (42.86%) people were involved in a use of force. However, since then the highest year was in 2018 with 22 individuals (30.99%). The 10-year average (25.2) is well above the 5-year average (19.2) and 2019 (17) of use of force incidents. The lowest numbers came in 2015 with a dramatic decline from the previous year. This went with an overall drop in use of force numbers (77 in 2014 to 49 in 2015).



Specific to 2019, chart 41 shows a breakdown of use of force incidents in an hour-by-hour basis. The data shows the most uses of force occurred between 1400-1500 hours, followed by the 1200-1300 timeframe.

## Day of Week

The day of the week information is compiled based on the start of the officer’s shift and not necessarily based on the actual day of the use of force – meaning if a use of force occurs at 0200 on Sunday, it would be counted as a Saturday in the data. This provides data which is more helpful in determining staffing needs and more consistent with how most people view a “night out” which extends past midnight.

This way of tracking data is a change that was implemented after 2015. Prior to the change, days of the week were counted more literally. As an example, if a use of force occurred on Sunday at 0100, it would be counted as a Sunday rather than a carryover from Saturday overnight staffing. Therefore, data collected between 2016 and 2019 cannot be reliably compared to prior years. However, the information is still close enough to draw general conclusions.




Chart 42 above shows the data from 2019 in a Sunday through Saturday format. Included with the 2019 numbers are the 5-year and 10-year averages. Table 42 on the next page presents the same statistical information with percentages for each time category for the most recent five years.

Between 2010 and 2019, the weekends had the most uses of force. Saturday had the most with a 10-year average of 12.3 (20.57%) per year. Friday had the second most with a 10-year average of 10.6 (17.73%) uses of force each year. However, the gap between weekend averages and other days of the week closed by the end of the analysis period. The 5-year averages for Friday and Saturday are nearly identical. In addition, Tuesday and Thursday both had more use of force incidents in 2019 than either Friday or Saturday.

Day of Week with a Use of Force											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
Sunday	2010-2014 Average 5.6 (9.03%)					2015-2019 Average 7.2 (12.50%)					6.4
	7	4	5	7	5	6	11	3	10	6	64
	14.29%	7.14%	7.25%	11.86%	6.49%	12.24%	22.45%	5.66%	14.08%	9.09%	10.70%
Monday	2010-2014 Average 10.2 (16.45%)					2015-2019 Average 7.8 (13.54%)					9.0
	6	6	13	7	19	8	3	8	11	9	90
	12.24%	10.71%	18.84%	11.86%	24.68%	16.33%	6.12%	15.09%	15.49%	13.64%	15.05%
Tuesday	2010-2014 Average 8.4 (13.55%)					2015-2019 Average 8.0 (13.89%)					8.2
	5	7	7	10	13	4	7	8	6	15	82
	10.20%	12.50%	10.14%	16.95%	16.88%	8.16%	14.29%	15.09%	8.45%	22.73%	13.71%
Wednesday	2010-2014 Average 7.6 (12.26%)					2015-2019 Average 6.0 (10.42%)					6.8
	10	8	9	6	5	6	3	7	7	7	68
	20.41%	14.29%	13.04%	10.17%	6.49%	12.24%	6.12%	13.21%	9.86%	10.61%	11.37%
Thursday	2010-2014 Average 5.8 (9.35%)					2015-2019 Average 7.2 (12.50%)					6.5
	6	2	5	8	8	7	4	4	10	11	65
	12.24%	3.57%	7.25%	13.56%	10.39%	14.29%	8.16%	7.55%	14.08%	16.67%	10.87%
Friday	2010-2014 Average 10.6 (17.10%)					2015-2019 Average 10.6 (18.40%)					10.6
	8	14	8	9	14	9	13	9	13	9	106
	16.33%	25.00%	11.59%	15.25%	18.18%	18.37%	26.53%	16.98%	18.31%	13.64%	17.73%
Saturday	2010-2014 Average 13.8 (22.26%)					2015-2019 Average 10.8 (18.75%)					12.3
	7	15	22	12	13	9	8	14	14	9	123
	14.29%	26.79%	31.88%	20.34%	16.88%	18.37%	16.33%	26.42%	19.72%	13.64%	20.57%

Table 42

**Sunday:** The most uses of force on a Sunday was 11 (22.45%) in 2016. The fewest uses of force on a Sunday was three (5.66%) in 2017. Total uses of force on a Sunday was 64 during this analysis period. The 5-year average was 7.2 (12.71%) while the 10-year average was 6.4 (10.70%). Overall, no clear trend can be seen for Sunday. The year-by-year comparisons show wide fluctuations between 2015 and 2019.

**Monday:** The most uses of force on a Monday was 19 (24.68%) in 2014. The fewest uses of force on a Monday was three (6.12%) in 2016. Total uses of force on a Monday was 90 during this analysis period. The 5-year average was 7.8 (13.54%) while the 10-year average was 9.0 (15.05%). Overall, no clear trend can be seen for Monday. With the exception of 2014 which was a major outlier (and to some extent 2016 the other direction), the rest of the data remained consistent.

**Tuesday:** The most uses of force on a Tuesday was 15 (22.73%) in 2019. The fewest uses of force on a Tuesday was four (8.16%) in 2015. Total uses of force on a Tuesday was 82 during this analysis period. The 5-year average was 8.0 (13.89%) while the 10-year average was 8.2 (13.71%). Overall, the numbers had been relatively consistent until 2019. The uses of force more than doubled from 2018-2019.

**Wednesday:** The most uses of force on a Wednesday was 10 (20.41%) in 2010. The fewest uses of force on a Wednesday was three (6.12%) in 2016. Total uses of force on a Wednesday was 68 during this analysis period. The 5-year average was 6.8 (11.37%) while the 10-year average was 6.0 (10.42%). Overall, Wednesday was the most consistent day of the week. From 2017-2019, each year had seven uses of force, which was nearly identical to the 10-year average.

**Thursday:** The most uses of force on a Thursday was 11 (16.67%) in 2019. The fewest uses of force on a Thursday was two (3.57%) in 2011. Total uses of force on a Thursday was 65 during this analysis period. The 5-year average was 7.2 (12.50%) while the 10-year average was 10.87%. Overall, Thursday finished with the fewest uses of force. Even though the numbers finished similar with Wednesday, Thursday has shown a significant upward trend. Uses of force more than doubled from 2017 to 2018. The 2019 totals increased further and finished nearly double the 10-year average.

**Friday:** The most uses of force on a Friday was 14 in 2011 (25.00%) and again in 2014 (18.18%). The fewest uses of force on a Friday was eight in 2010 (16.33%) and 2012 (11.59%). Total uses of force on a Friday was 106 during this analysis period. The 5-year average was 10.6 (18.40%) while the 10-year average was 10.6 (17.73%). Overall, Friday had the second most uses of force during the week. Interestingly, the 5-year and 10-year averages were identical, but actual yearly totals never finished on the average.

**Saturday:** The most uses of force on a Saturday was 22 (31.88%) in 2012. The fewest uses of force on a Saturday was seven (14.29%) in 2010. Total uses of force on a Saturday was 123 during this analysis period. The 5-year average was 10.8 (18.75%) while the 10-year average was 12.3 (20.57%). Overall, Saturday had the most frequent uses of force. A slight downward trend is shown in the numbers, but that is likely due to the 2012 outlier. The past five years have been very similar Friday levels.

## Month of Year


The month of the year does not appear to be a major factor in uses of force. An assumption could be made that there would be more use of force numbers in the summer months. School resource officers are out of the schools. Summer details are created to provide targeted patrol. The nice weather tends to bring more people downtown to enjoy the entertainment district. However, despite these summertime changes, the use of force numbers are fairly flat.

Chart 43 on the next page shows 2019 data compared to the 5-year and 10-year averages. Table 43 on page 75 presents the same statistical information with percentages for each time category for the most recent five years.

**January:** The most uses of force in January was nine (16.07%) in 2011. The fewest uses of force in January was two in 2010 (4.08%) and 2017 (3.77%). Total uses of force in January was 50 during this analysis period. The 5-year average was 4.6 (7.99%) while the 10-year average was 5.0 (8.36%). Overall, the data shows a slight downward trend for January. The three uses of force in 2019 was half of the previous year and below the both averages.

**February:** The most uses of force in February was 11 (15.49%) in 2018. The fewest uses of force in January was one in 2011 (1.79%), 2012 (1.45%), and 2016 (2.04%). Total uses of force in February was 39 during this analysis period. The 5-year average was 5.0 (8.68%) while the 10-year average was 3.9 (6.52%). Overall, February had the fewest uses of force between 2010 and 2019. A look at

the averages would suggest an upward trend. However, the higher 5-year average was caused in part by the spike in 2011 numbers. Use of force numbers nearly tripled in 2011, before dropping down to just two in 2019.



**March:** The most uses of force in March was eight (16.33%) in 2016. The fewest uses of force in March was one (2.04%) in 2015. Total uses of force in March was 55 during this analysis period. The 5-year average was 5.2 (9.03%) while the 10-year average was 5.5 (9.20%). Overall, the use of force numbers have remained relatively steady in March. The total in 2015 is an outlier on the low end, but otherwise the totals remained relatively steady.

**April:** The most uses of force in April was nine (16.98%) in 2017. In 2013, there were no uses of force in April. The total uses of force in April was 54 during this analysis period. The 5-year average was 5.8 (10.07%) while the 10-year average was 5.4 (9.03%). April 2013 was the only month in the entire analysis that did not record a use of force. The most recent five years have fluctuated up and down more than the previous five year period, but overall no actual trend was identified.

**May:** The most uses of force in May was 13 (18.84%) in 2012. The fewest uses of force in May was one in 2011 (1.79%) and 2015 (2.04%). The total uses of force in May was 49 during this analysis period. The 5-year average was 3.4 (5.90%) while the 10-year average was 4.9 (8.19%). Overall, a downward trend was observed between 2010 and 2019. The trend was amplified with the 2012 with a significant outlier. Use of force numbers went from one (2011) to 13 (2012) then back down to five (2013).

**June:** The most uses of force in June was eight (10.39%) in 2014. The fewest uses of force in June was two (2.80%) in 2018. The total uses of force in June was 45 during this analysis period. The 5-year average was 3.8 (6.60%) while the 10-year average was 4.5 (7.51%). Overall, May and June

are very similar. If May 2012 had been an average month, the comparison would be even closer. The year-to-year fluctuations in June were less pronounced compared to May.

Month of Year with a Use of Force											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
January	2010-2014 Average 5.4 (8.71%)					2015-2019 Average 4.6 (7.99%)					5.0
	2	9	4	8	4	8	4	2	6	3	50
	4.08%	16.07%	5.80%	13.56%	5.19%	16.33%	8.16%	3.77%	8.45%	4.55%	8.36%
February	2010-2014 Average 2.8 (4.52%)					2015-2019 Average 5.0 (8.68%)					3.9
	4	1	1	3	5	7	1	4	11	2	39
	8.16%	1.79%	1.45%	5.08%	6.49%	14.29%	2.04%	7.55%	15.49%	3.03%	6.52%
March	2010-2014 Average 5.8 (9.35%)					2015-2019 Average 5.2 (9.03%)					5.5
	4	7	5	7	6	1	8	6	5	6	55
	8.16%	12.50%	7.25%	11.86%	7.79%	2.04%	16.33%	11.32%	7.04%	9.09%	9.20%
April	2010-2014 Average 5.0 (8.06%)					2015-2019 Average 5.8 (10.07%)					5.4
	5	6	6	0	8	8	4	9	2	6	54
	10.20%	10.71%	8.70%	0.00%	10.39%	16.33%	8.16%	16.98%	2.82%	9.09%	9.03%
May	2010-2014 Average 6.4 (10.32%)					2015-2019 Average 3.4 (5.90%)					4.9
	6	1	13	5	7	1	3	3	5	5	49
	12.24%	1.79%	18.84%	8.47%	9.09%	2.04%	6.12%	5.66%	7.04%	7.58%	8.19%
June	2010-2014 Average 5.2 (8.39%)					2015-2019 Average 3.8 (6.60%)					4.5
	3	4	6	5	8	3	5	4	2	5	45
	6.12%	7.14%	8.70%	8.47%	10.39%	6.12%	10.20%	7.55%	2.82%	7.58%	7.53%
July	2010-2014 Average 4.8 (7.74%)					2015-2019 Average 4.6 (7.99%)					4.7
	4	4	4	8	4	1	2	7	10	3	47
	8.16%	7.14%	5.80%	13.56%	5.19%	2.04%	4.08%	13.21%	14.08%	4.55%	7.86%
August	2010-2014 Average 4.2 (6.77%)					2015-2019 Average 4.8 (8.33%)					4.5
	3	5	4	3	6	1	5	3	10	5	45
	6.12%	8.93%	5.80%	5.08%	7.79%	2.04%	10.20%	5.66%	14.08%	7.58%	7.53%
September	2010-2014 Average 7.4 (11.94%)					2015-2019 Average 4.6 (7.99%)					6.0
	4	4	12	7	10	1	6	5	2	9	60
	8.16%	7.14%	17.39%	11.86%	12.99%	2.04%	12.24%	9.43%	2.82%	13.64%	10.03%
October	2010-2014 Average 6.4 (10.32%)					2015-2019 Average 5.8 (10.07%)					6.1
	4	7	8	8	5	2	7	3	7	10	61
	8.16%	12.50%	11.59%	13.56%	6.49%	4.08%	14.29%	5.66%	9.86%	15.15%	10.20%
November	2010-2014 Average 4.8 (7.74%)					2015-2019 Average 5.4 (9.38%)					5.1
	6	5	1	3	9	8	2	3	8	6	51
	12.24%	8.93%	1.45%	5.08%	11.69%	16.33%	4.08%	5.66%	11.27%	9.09%	8.53%
December	2010-2014 Average 3.8 (6.13%)					2015-2019 Average 4.6 (7.99%)					4.2
	4	3	5	2	5	8	2	4	3	6	42
	8.16%	5.36%	7.25%	3.39%	6.49%	16.33%	4.08%	7.55%	4.23%	9.09%	7.02%

Table 43

**July:** The most uses of force in July was 10 (14.08%) in 2018. The fewest uses of force in July was one (2.04%) in 2015. The total uses of force in July was 47 during this analysis period. The 5-year average was 4.6 (7.99%) while the 10-year average was 4.7 (7.86%). Overall, July and August are very similar. The three in 2019 stopped an upward trend which started in 2015 and went through the 10-year high of 10 in 2018.

**August:** The most uses of force in August was 10 (14.08%) in 2018. The fewest uses of force in August was one (2.04%) in 2015. The total uses of force in August was 45 during this analysis period. The 5-year average was 4.8 (8.33%) while the 10-year average was 4.5 (7.53%). Overall,

August was very similar to July. The averages were nearly identical, and the 10-year highs and lows both occurred in the same years for each month.

**September:** The most uses of force in September was 12 (17.39%) in 2012. The fewest uses of force in September was one (2.04%) in 2015. The total uses of force in September was 60 during this analysis period. The 5-year average was 4.6 (7.99%) while the 10-year average was 6.0 (10.03%). Overall, the data for September was similar to October. Both finished with total percentages less than 0.2% from each other. A spike was seen in 2019, but did not reach the same highs as 2012 and 2014.

**October:** The most uses of force in October was 10 (15.15%) in 2019. The fewest uses of force in October was two (4.08%) in 2015. The total uses of force in October was 61 during this analysis period. The 5-year average was 5.8 (10.07%) while the 10-year average was 6.1 (10.20%). Overall, the data for October was similar to September, but with more of an upward trend. Three of the five most recent years had use of force numbers higher than both averages. This is despite the 10-year average being slightly higher than the 5-year average.

**November:** The most uses of force in November was nine (11.69%) in 2014. The fewest uses of force in November was one (1.45%) in 2012. The total uses of force in November was 51 during this analysis period. The 5-year average was 5.4 (9.38%) while the 10-year average was 5.1 (8.53%). Overall, a gradual upward trend was seen in the numbers with no major spikes.

**December:** The most uses of force in December was eight (16.33%) in 2015. The fewest uses of force in December was two in 2013 (3.39%) and 2016 (4.08%). The total uses of force in December was 42 during this analysis period. The 5-year average was 4.6 (7.99%) while the 10-year average was 4.2 (7.02%). Overall, December has fewer uses of force November and January. This is likely due to the holiday season.

Major holidays did not seem to be a factor in the use of force distribution for any month. Larger events held over weekends, such as Oktoberfest and Mile of Music, also did not appear to significantly add to the use of force numbers.

## Involved Officer Analysis

A true understanding of use of force incidents requires knowledge of three specific aspects; the individual, the situation, and the officer(s). This section will focus specifically on the involved officer analysis. Topics include:

- Officers Training
- Officers Directly Involved
- Officers in Close Proximity
- Average Work Experience
- Average Age of Officer
- Uses of Force Per Officer
- Types of Force Used
- Injuries to Officers
- Assigned Work Group
- Patrol Districts

In regards to the types of force used, it is important to remember that the totals will appear different than those in the involved individuals section. There were more officers than individuals involved in uses of force which will change the totals and percentages. For example, if an officer deploys an ineffective ECD it counts as a use of force. If a second officer deploys a second ECD that is effective, it still counts as one individual who had force used on them. However, in the officer analysis it counts as two deployments. This allows for a more accurate understanding of effectiveness and officer decision making in use of force situations.


### Officer Training

Appleton Police Department policy and Wisconsin Department of Justice DAAT training requires officers to use only the amount of objectively reasonable force necessary to gain control of a suspect or individual. However, this does not necessarily mean “going light” with application.

It is taught that the first effort at control should be at 100 percent speed and power. Research shows that if the first effort to control a resisting individual is not successful, risk of injury to that person and the officer grows. As officers transition from a lower level of force to a higher level, it is because an individual is actively resisting efforts to be controlled. The early evaluation of a person’s behavior is a key component to successful interactions that will be stressed in all training.

The Use of Force Wheel has helped officers visualize the dynamic and fluid nature of use of force confrontations. See Graphic A on the next page. The wheel allows for officers to analyze the individual’s observed behaviors (grey) and counter with an appropriate force option (white to red). Refer to the appendix for a larger version of the wheel illustration.

The Wisconsin DAAT system requires officers to stay one level of force above the person's behavior. The key to this effort, for officers, is the early recognition of the cues displayed by a potentially resistive individual. The defensive tactics cadre consistently taught that distance, calming tones, and patience can be the difference between a use of force and a cooperative encounter. Use of these principles and other efforts to de-escalate will continue to be a key element in training.



Graphic A

Starting in 2018, a five-year training cycle was instituted to ensure officer's had a measured and balanced

exposure to the various techniques taught in the DAAT system. The spring 2019 session represented year two of the training cycle. Techniques included general striking, decentralizations, baton, OC spray, SPEAR, and cooperative team handcuffing in low-light conditions. Along with the defensive tactics block, officers received firearms 'live-fire' training in the Appleton Police Department range.

The fall 2019 session was broken up into four segments. Segment one consisted of a lecture and PowerPoint presentation discussing 'Left of Bang' concepts. The concepts were derived in large part from the book 'Left of Bang' by Patrick Van Horne and Jason A. Riley. This classroom portion covered pre-assault cues, subject behaviors, and environmental factors that could be precursors to an attack. The goal was to mentally prepare officers for various scenarios later in the training.

Segment two consisted of a traffic stop scenario which required each officer to make a quick decision based solely on subject behavior. Segment three was comprised of multiple 'rapid-fire' scenarios collectively called the 'hood drill.' Officers had their vision obstructed briefly as each scenario was created by the role players. The hood was then removed – inserting the officer directly into a situation that required a quick decision. Once the decision was made, the hood was replaced and a new scenario was created.

The fourth and final segment was a single officer scenario that attempted recreate many of the discussion points from the lecture and PowerPoint. The role player displayed cues for the officer to recognize, then react to, in order to maintain a tactical advantage. Statistical results from the scenarios were collected, analyzed, and will be a key component for future training development.

Training in 2020 will focus on the identified needs of year three in the department's training cycle. Unfortunately, the planned spring training was cancelled due to the nationwide Covid-19

outbreak. Plans are in development to compensate for the lost training time and to prepare for the possibility of further training interruptions.

### Officers Directly Involved

Officers are discouraged from attempting to detain or arrest an individual without assistance from a second officer. With multiple officers involved in the handcuffing process, it is understandable how the number of officers involved in uses of force are higher than the number persons involved. The presence of multiple officers increases the safety for everyone involved as it typically allows for faster and improved control of the individual. Officers directly involved count all officers who used force on an individual. Any officer who was involved but did not use force is counted with the officers in close proximity data on page 80.




Chart 44 above compares total officers directly involved in a use of force in a year-over-year format. Table 44 below presents the same statistical information with percentages for each time category for the most recent five years.

Officers Directly Involved in a Use of Force											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
Officer	2010-2014 Average 83.6					2015-2019 Average 75.6					79.6
	69	77	89	78	105	61	67	70	91	89	796
Individual	2010-2014 Average 62.0					2015-2019 Average 57.6					59.8
	49	56	69	59	77	49	49	53	71	66	598
Ratio	1:1.4	1:1.4	1:1.3	1:1.3	1:1.4	1:1.2	1:1.4	1:1.3	1:1.3	1:1.3	1:1.3

Table 44

Between 2010 and 2019, there were 796 officers involved in a use of force while detaining or arresting 598 individuals. The overall ratio was 1.3 officers directly involved in a use of force for every one individual. Over the analysis period, the ratio ranged as low as 1.24:1 (2015) to 1.41:1 (2010). This is an important statistic in that it demonstrates officers used caution and discretion when deciding if force was necessary.

The most officers directly involved in a use of force was 105 in 2014. That coincided with the most individuals (77) involved in a use of force. Therefore, despite the high number of officers involved, the ratio (1.4:1) was just over the 5-year and 10-year averages.

### Officers in Close Proximity

As stated earlier, officers are discouraged from detaining or arresting an individual without the assistance backup officers. However, not every officer in close proximity becomes directly involved in the use of force. Some work to protect the scene from outside interference. Others are there if needed but avoid unnecessary uses of force.




Chart 45 above compares the number of officers in close proximity of a use of force in a year-over-year format. Table 45 on the next page presents the same statistical information with percentages for each time category for the most recent five years.

Wisconsin State Model refers to the importance of team tactics. Officers are trained to use a contact officer and have at least one cover officers for more volatile or dangerous situations. When a detainment or arrest is made, at least two officers should be involved. As a general rule, the more potentially dangerous a situation becomes the more officers come to assist.

Officers in Close Proximity of a Use of Force											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
Officer	2010-2014 Average 132.8 (1:2.1)					2015-2019 Average 132.0 (1:2.3)					132.4
	98	112	151	144	159	103	111	114	174	158	1,324
Individual	2010-2014 Average 62.0 (1:2.1)					2015-2019 Average 57.6 (1:2.3)					59.8
	49	56	69	59	77	49	49	53	71	66	598
Ratio	1:2.0	1:2.0	1:2.2	1:2.4	1:2.1	1:2.1	1:2.3	1:2.2	1:2.5	1:2.4	1:2.2

Table 45

During the 2010 to 2019 analysis period, 1,324 officers were in close proximity when force was used on 598 individuals. That is a ratio of 2.2 officers for each individual who had force used on them. The highest individual year was 174 (2.45:1) in 2018 while the lowest was 98 (2.0:1) in 2010. Data indicates a slight upward trend in the number of officers in close proximity. It is important to note that the additional officers on scene in recent years did not lead to an increased ratio in officers using force.

### Average Work Experience

The amount of experience an officer has at the time force was used is an important situational factor. Generally the more experience an officer has the faster and more accurately scene safety and an individual’s behavior can be assessed. While these numbers provide important insight, they do not account for officers who came to the Appleton Police Department with prior experience. The compiled data is based on hire date, not total time in law enforcement.




Chart 46 on the previous page shows how much experience each officer had at the Appleton Police Department at the time force was used. Table 46 below presents the same statistical information with percentages for each time category for the most recent five years.

Average Officer Experience at Appleton Police Department when Force was Used										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
2010-2014 Average 8.9					2015-2019 Average 9.1					9.0
7.0	7.3	10.4	10.0	9.9	10.7	8.7	9.7	8.4	8.0	9.0

Table 46

Between 2010 and 2019, the average officer had 9.0 years of experience in Appleton at the time they used force. This data was compiled in such a way that it readjusted officer’s experience level after each month. Meaning if an officer used force in March, and then again in April, the process would recognize the officer is more experienced from one month to the next.

During the analysis period, the most experienced officer to have a use of force had 29.3 years of service with the Appleton Police Department. The least experienced officer had 0.3 years of service at the department. The 5-year average (9.1) was nearly identical to the 10-year (9.0) average. The year-over-year average range did not vary more than two years off the average.

### Average Age of Officer

The average age of an officer at the time force was used is typically not as important as an officer’s experience. It is common for officers to enter law enforcement with prior life experience to include military, college, or a previous unrelated career. The goal of trainers is to ensure all officers, regardless of age or experience, have the knowledge and confidence to apply force when needed with as low of chance for injury as possible.


Average Age of Officer at the Appleton Police Department when Force was Used										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
2010-2014 Average 34.1					2015-2019 Average 34.6					34.3
31.9	32.7	35.4	35.4	35.0	35.9	34.6	34.6	34.2	33.7	34.3

Table 47

Chart 47 on the next page shows the age of each officer at the time force was used. Table 47 above presents the same statistical information with percentages for each time category for the most recent five years.

Between 2010 and 2019, the average officer was 34.3 years old at the time they used force. This data was compiled in such a way that it readjusted officer’s age after each month. Meaning if an officer used force in March, and then again in April, the process would recognize the officer is older from one month to the next.

During the analysis period, the oldest officer to have a use of force was 54.8 years old. The youngest officer was 22.3 years old. The 5-year average (34.6) was nearly identical to the 10-year (34.3) average.



### Uses of Force for Each Officer

The Appleton Police Department has built a number of safeguards into tracking use of force to protect the public from excessive force and/or aggressive officers. One of these safeguards is to track how many uses of force each officer had in a calendar year. Any time an officer had five or more uses of force, each of his or her incidents are reviewed a second time. The secondary review is done collectively to look for patterns of excessive force or officers who may be too aggressive.

It is important to understand the total number of officers who used force is lower than the total use of force incidents. This is because some officers used force more than once throughout each year. Between 2010 and 2019, there were a total of 162 sworn officers who worked for the City of Appleton. They represented 1,113 years of experience during they analysis period. In total, 31 (19.14%) officers did not have any uses of force throughout their time working at the department during this time period.

Total Uses of Force for Each Sworn Officer											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
0 UOF	2010-2014 Average 65.8 (60.59%)					2015-2019 Average 68.4 (61.73%)					67.1
	66	67	63	69	64	73	77	68	61	63	671
	61.11%	62.04%	58.33%	63.30%	58.18%	66.36%	70.00%	61.82%	54.95%	55.75%	61.17%
1 UOF	2010-2014 Average 22.0 (20.26%)					2015-2019 Average 23.2 (20.94%)					22.6
	26	20	22	19	23	23	16	24	28	25	226
	24.07%	18.52%	20.37%	17.43%	20.91%	20.91%	14.55%	21.82%	25.23%	22.12%	20.60%
2 UOF	2010-2014 Average 10.2 (9.39%)					2015-2019 Average 12.2 (11.01%)					11.2
	10	12	9	12	8	9	11	12	11	18	112
	9.26%	11.11%	8.33%	11.01%	7.27%	8.18%	10.00%	10.91%	9.91%	15.93%	10.21%
3 UOF	2010-2014 Average 5.6 (5.16%)					2015-2019 Average 3.2 (2.89%)					4.4
	2	7	9	4	6	2	1	4	6	3	44
	1.85%	6.48%	8.33%	3.67%	5.45%	1.82%	0.91%	3.64%	5.41%	2.65%	4.01%
4 UOF	2010-2014 Average 2.6 (2.39%)					2015-2019 Average 1.2 (1.08%)					1.9
	3	0	3	2	5	1	1	0	3	1	19
	2.78%	0.00%	2.78%	1.83%	4.55%	0.91%	0.91%	0.00%	2.70%	0.88%	1.73%
5 UOF	2010-2014 Average 1.4 (1.29%)					2015-2019 Average 2.2 (1.99%)					1.8
	1	1	2	3	0	2	3	2	1	3	18
	0.93%	0.93%	1.85%	2.75%	0.00%	1.82%	2.73%	1.82%	0.90%	2.65%	1.64%
6 UOF	2010-2014 Average 0.4 (0.37%)					2015-2019 Average 0.2 (0.18%)					0.3
	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	3
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.82%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.90%	0.00%	0.27%
7 UOF	2010-2014 Average 0.4 (0.37%)					2015-2019 Average 0.2 (0.18%)					0.3
	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	3
	0.00%	0.93%	0.00%	0.00%	0.91%	0.00%	0.91%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.27%
8 UOF	2010-2014 Average 0.0 (0.00%)					2015-2019 Average 0.0 (0.00%)					0.0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
9 UOF	2010-2014 Average 0.2 (0.18%)					2015-2019 Average 0.0 (0.00%)					0.1
	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.91%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.09%
Total Sworn	108	108	108	109	110	110	110	110	111	113	109.7

Table 48

The remaining 131 officers accounted for 796 direct use of force involvements against 598 individuals. As policy outlined, all officers involved in a use of force 5+ times in a calendar year had their uses of force reviewed a second time, now collectively, to look for any concerning patterns or training deficiencies. During the 2010 to 2019 analysis period, these secondary reviews occurred 25 times. Specifically:

- Officers with **(5)** Uses of Force in One Year = **18 times** in the Analysis
- Officers with **(6)** Uses of Force in One Year = **3 times** in the Analysis
- Officers with **(7)** Uses of Force in One Year = **3 times** in the Analysis
- Officers with **(8)** Uses of Force in One Year = **0 times** in the Analysis
- Officers with **(9)** Uses of Force in One Year = **1 time** in the Analysis

No one officer accounted for more than three secondary reviews during the analysis period. The increased numbers of force used were most often due to officer assignment rather than an officer's response to behavior. Specifically, officers assigned to the Downtown District or the schools with EBD programs. Officers with the most uses of force over the 10-year period:

- **Officer "A"** had **(33)** uses of force between 2010 and 2019
- **Officer "B"** had **(31)** uses of force between 2010 and 2019
- **Officer "C"** had **(30)** uses of force between 2010 and 2019
- **Officer "D"** had **(26)** uses of force between 2010 and 2019
- **Officer "E"** had **(24)** uses of force between 2010 and 2019
- **Officer "F"** had **(24)** uses of force between 2010 and 2019

Considering not every officer has been at the Appleton Police Department since 2010, it is also important to look at yearly use of force averages. An officer with a high yearly average would show an upward trend earlier than overall numbers. Officers with the highest yearly average:

- **Officer "A"** averaged **(3.3)** uses of force each year since 2010 or hire date
- **Officer "B"** averaged **(3.1)** uses of force each year since 2010 or hire date
- **Officer "C"** averaged **(3.0)** uses of force each year since 2010 or hire date
- **Officer "G"** averaged **(3.0)** uses of force each year since 2010 or hire date
- **Officer "E"** averaged **(2.7)** uses of force each year since 2010 or hire date

Overall, the use of force numbers trended downward during this analysis period. There was a total of 378 uses of force between 2015 and 2019. That was a decline of 9.6% from the 418 uses of force between 2010 and 2015.

## Types of Force Used

It is important to account for the amount of force used on individuals. It is equally important to analyze the data from the perspective of officer utilization. Officers have options when they lawfully control and detain an individual. The decision on what level or type of force to use depends in part on factors such as size discrepancy, skill, experience, level of resistance, and number of officers on scene. Officers are trained to work as a team when taking someone into custody. While this will ultimately lead to multiple officers using force, it also reduces the need for higher, more dangerous uses of force. The ultimate goal is for safer, more frequent lower levels of force rather than resorting to striking or more dangerous options.

**Come-Along (Wrist Lock):** Between 2010 and 2019, a total of four officers (0.50%) used a come-along technique to control and individual when a reportable use of force occurred. Two of the uses were (2.60%) in 2011 and two (2.20%) were in 2018. That equals an average of less than one every other year. Officers are aware this technique is an option, but for various reasons choose other means of controlling an individual. The use of a come-along by itself is not a reportable use of force, but is tracked when a higher level of force is used in the same incident.

Officer Use of Compliance Holds											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
Come Along	2010-2014 Average 0.4 (0.48%)					2015-2019 Average 0.4 (0.53%)					0.4
	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	4
	0.00%	2.60%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.20%	0.00%	0.50%
Pressure Point	2010-2014 Average 0.8 (0.96%)					2015-2019 Average 0.8 (1.06%)					0.8
	1	1	2	0	0	2	0	1	0	1	8
	1.45%	1.30%	2.25%	0.00%	0.00%	3.28%	0.00%	1.43%	0.00%	1.12%	1.01%

Table 49

**Pressure Points:** Similar to the come-along technique, pressure point pain compliance techniques were seldom used in this analysis period. Out of 796 officers who used force, eight (1.01%) used a pressure point in an attempt to gain control of a resisting individual when a higher level of force was also used. There were two years (2012 and 2015) when two pressure points were used, and three years (2010, 2011, and 2017) when one pressure point was used. Four of the 10 years of this analysis did not have a pressure point technique utilized. The use of a pressure point by itself is not a reportable use of force, but is tracked when a higher level of force is used in the same incident.

Officer Use of Positional Hold – 3-Point Shin-on-Top											
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr	
2010-2014 Average 2.0 (2.39%)					2015-2019 Average 7.6 (10.05%)					4.8	
1*	0*	5*	2*	2*	1*	6*	4*	11*	16	48	
1.45%	0.00%	5.62%	2.56%	1.90%	1.64%	8.96%	5.71%	12.09%	17.98%	6.03%	

The (\*) references years where the position was not formally tracked.

Table 50

**3-Point Shin-on-Top:** Accurate, formal reporting of 3-Point Shin-on-Top positional holds did not start until mid-2018. Uses prior to mid-2018 were compiled if the position was described in the officer's report. Officers are taught to utilize this technique as a way to use body weight as a supplement when the individual is bigger or stronger than the officer. In training, they are shown to focus on areas of the body that are supported with a solid skeletal structure (hips, shoulders, etc.) and avoid areas that would impede breathing or risk injury to the subject's neck.

Based on the data available, 48 officers (6.03%) utilized this positional hold. Between 2010 and 2015, there were just 10 documented uses of this position. In the next five years, there were 38 documented uses. Frequent training and successful applications by patrol officers contributed to a continued upward trend. The highest year (2019) had 16 (17.98%) uses of a 3-Point Shin-on-Top position when a reportable use of force occurred. The use of any positional hold by itself is not a reportable use of force, but is tracked when a higher level of force is used in the same incident.

**Decentralizations:** Decentralizations are consistently the most utilized use of force. Actively resisting individuals are much harder to control while standing and present the greatest danger to officers. Because an individual's movements are much more dynamic while standing, the intended decentralization often turn into something similar but untrained. These are referred to as dynamic applications of the trained technique.

During the 2010 to 2019 analysis period, 531 officers (66.71%) used a decentralization. Some of the uses were done solo and some were done by officers working as a team. When multiple


officers worked together to accomplish the decentralization, this section documents each officers contribution.

The most decentralizations done in one year was 67 (63.81%) in 2014. However, the most decentralizations as a percentage was in 2011 when 83.12% (64) of officers chose this option. The lowest number was 39 (55.71%) in 2017. The 10-year average (53.1) was higher than the 5-year average (47.6) of decentralizations. However, both 2018 and 2019 were higher than both averages, suggesting more of an upward trend.

Officer Use of Passive Countermeasures										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
2010-2014 Average 58.6 (70.10%)					2015-2019 Average 47.6 (62.96%)					53.1
52	64	60	50	67	42	42	39	57	58	531
75.36%	83.12%	67.42%	64.10%	63.81%	68.85%	62.69%	55.71%	62.64%	65.17%	66.71%

Table 51

When the new use of force form was implemented in mid-2018, officers were able to document a “seatbelt” technique. Any mention of a seatbelt decentralization prior to mid-2018 would have been taken from the officer’s narrative. With the new category, seven formal options were available for officers to select on the use of force form, when an eighth as “other”.



In 2019, the “other” category was the most used form of decentralization. This is understandable given the dynamic nature of bringing an individual to the ground. The most frequently used decentralization as taught at the department was the leg wheel. The leg wheel is essentially a forceful trip while the officer maintains control of the individuals decent while still protecting the head and neck area. Officers used a leg wheel 14 times (24.14%) in 2019. The least utilized decentralization was the secure the head with just one (1.72%) use. Refer to back to chart 48 above for a full breakdown of decentralizations used in 2019.

**Vertical / Ground Stuns:** Vertical / Ground stuns were utilized in nine of the 10 years of this analysis. The only year not to have a documented stun was 2010. The most frequent stuns used in one year was 2014 when nine (8.57%) were utilized. In total, 43 (5.40%) used a stun technique between 2010 and 2019. The 10-year average of 4.3 (5.17%) is lower than the 5-year average of 2.6 (3.45%). With just two (2.25%) utilized in 2019, a downward trend in usage has been identified. This trend is understandable considering officer training has focused more on control based positioning rather than SPEAR or other striking options.

Officer Use of Hands-On Active Countermeasures											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
Stuns	2010-2014 Average 6.0 (7.18%)					2015-2019 Average 2.6 (3.44%)					4.3
	0	6	7	8	9	1	1	6	3	2	43
	0.00%	7.79%	7.87%	10.26%	8.57%	1.64%	1.49%	8.57%	3.30%	2.25%	5.40%
Hand Strikes	2010-2014 Average 10.6 (12.68%)					2015-2019 Average 8.2 (10.85%)					9.4
	8	9	6	16	14	8	5	6	11	11	94
	11.59%	11.69%	6.74%	20.51%	13.33%	13.11%	7.46%	8.57%	12.09%	12.36%	11.81%
Elbow Strikes	2010-2014 Average 2.0 (2.39%)					2015-2019 Average 0.6 (0.79%)					1.3
	5	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	1	2	13
	7.25%	1.30%	1.12%	2.56%	0.95%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.10%	2.25%	1.63%
Defused Strikes	2010-2014 Average 0.0 (0.00%)					2015-2019 Average 0.0 (0.00%)					0.0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Knee Strikes	2010-2014 Average 5.0 (5.98%)					2015-2019 Average 6.4 (8.47%)					5.7
	8	7	1	2	7	3	6	12	5	6	57
	11.59%	9.09%	1.12%	2.56%	6.67%	4.92%	8.96%	17.14%	5.49%	6.74%	7.16%
Leg Kicks	2010-2014 Average 0.4 (0.48%)					2015-2019 Average 0.4 (0.53%)					0.4
	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	4
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.28%	0.95%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.10%	1.12%	0.50%

Table 52

**Hand Strikes:** Hand strikes are the most commonly used active countermeasure. Since closed fist and open hand strikes have similar effect, they have been combined into one category. Between 2010 and 2019, officers used hand strikes 94 (11.81%) times on an individual. The most times a hand strike was used in one year was 16 (20.51%) in 2013. The fewest hand strikes were in 2016 when five (7.16%) officers chose this level of force. The 10-year average of 9.4 (11.75%) was higher than the more recent 5-year average of 8.2 (10.72%) hand strikes. Although this would suggest a downward trend, the number of hand strikes in 2018 and 2019 were higher than both averages.

**Elbow Strikes:** Elbow strikes account for any officer strike in a downward direction with either the forearm or triceps area of the arm. During the 10-year analysis period, officers used an elbow strike 13 (1.63%) times. The most recent 5-year average of 0.6 (0.79%) was lower than the 10-year average of 1.3 (1.63%) elbow strikes. However, the 10-year average is skewed because there were five (7.25%) elbow strikes used in 2010. The next highest in a year was two. If the 2010 outlier was removed, the 10-year average would be lower. Officers understand the risk of injury to the individual is higher when elbow strikes are used, so they are utilized much less often than hand strikes.

**Defused Strikes:** Defused strikes are taught at the recruit academy and are allowed by policy. However, because a defused strike is an impact to the individual’s neck, trainers at the Appleton Police Department strongly encourage officers to find other options when possible. Since formal tracking began in 2010, no officer has used a defused strike.

**Knee Strikes:** Knee strikes were used a total of 57 (7.16%) times by officers between 2010 and 2019. The most recent 5-year average of 6.4 (8.47%) knee strikes was higher than the 10-year average of 5.7 (7.16%). The most knee strikes utilized by officers was 12 (17.14%) in 2017. Conversely, the fewest knee strikes used by officers in a single year was one (1.12%) in 2012. The six (6.74%) officers who used a knee strike was right in the middle of both averages.

**Leg Kicks:** Aside from defused strikes, leg kicks were the least common active countermeasure used by officers during this analysis period. In total, just four (0.50%) officers utilized a leg kick between 2010 and 2019. No more than one officer used a leg kick in a single year. Leg kicks typically do not create as much dysfunction as a knee strike and often put the officer off balance. While trained, leg kicks are not often utilized.

**Total ECD Deployments:** The TASER (Electronic Control Device) was the most common tool used by officers during the 2010 through 2019 analysis period. The ECD is the only use of force that is tracked for both successful and unsuccessful deployments. Ineffective use of any other tool or hands-on skill are not differentiated from effective utilizations. Data is collected when an officer pulls the device trigger causing a deployment of the probes toward an individual. Pointing the device or using the ARC switch was not tracked.

Officer Use of Less than Lethal Tool – TASER										
Total ECD Deployments										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
<b>2010-2014 Average 14.4 (17.22%)</b>					<b>2015-2019 Average 15.6 (20.63%)</b>					<b>15.0</b>
10	4	17	17	24	15	16	15	18	14	150
14.49%	5.19%	19.10%	21.79%	22.86%	24.59%	23.88%	21.43%	19.78%	15.73%	18.84%
Effective ECD Deployments (Including Drive Stuns)										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
<b>2010-2014 Average 9.2 (63.89%)</b>					<b>2015-2019 Average 10.4 (66.67%)</b>					<b>9.8</b>
4	2	10	12	18	10	12	9	14	7	98
40.00%	50.00%	58.82%	70.59%	75.00%	66.67%	75.00%	60.00%	77.78%	50.00%	65.33%

Table 53

Between 2010 and 2019, a total of 150 (18.84%) officers deployed a TASER at 126 individuals. The overall success rate of the TASER was 65.33%. However, due to multiple attempts by officers, the success rate was 73.81% of all individuals who had a TASER used on them.

The highest total of officers to use a TASER in a single year was 24 (22.86%) in 2014. In 2011, just four (5.19%) officers used their TASER on an individual. The most recent 5-year average of 15.6 (21.08%) is just slightly higher than the 10-year average of 15.0 (18.89%) officers. With 14 (15.73%) utilizations in 2019, that was just one below the average. This demonstrates a fairly steady trend since the single year high in 2014.

Officer Use of Less than Lethal Tools – Additional Options											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
Baton	2010-2014 Average 0.0 (0.00%)					2015-2019 Average 0.0 (0.00%)					0.0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
OC	2010-2014 Average 0.0 (0.00%)					2015-2019 Average 0.0 (0.00%)					0.0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Kinetic Energy	2010-2014 Average 0.2 (0.24%)					2015-2019 Average 1.0 (1.32%)					0.6
	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	2	1	6
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.95%	0.00%	1.49%	1.43%	2.20%	1.12%	0.75%
Canine Bite	2010-2014 Average 0.2 (0.24%)					2015-2019 Average 0.0 (0.00%)					0.1
	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.95%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.13%

Table 54

**Baton Strikes:** Baton strikes are taught at the recruit academy and are allowed by policy. The proper use of batons are taught as part of the regular 5-year defensive tactics training cycle. However, officers are often hesitant to use a baton because of the negative images a baton strike can have in the general public. An ineffective baton strike still looks painful and drastic to an observer. Since formal tracking began in 2010, no officer has used a baton strike.

**OC Spray:** The use of OC spray is taught at the recruit academy and is allowed by policy. However, due to the high likelihood officers in the immediate area will also be affected, trainers at the Appleton Police Department strongly encourage officers to find other options when possible. Since formal tracking began in 2010, no officer has used OC spray.

**Kinetic Energy Impact Weapon:** The implementation of the current bean bag kinetic energy weapon did not begin until 2014. Officers are trained to use kinetic energy weapons only when there is a dangerous threat at distance that does not yet rise to deadly force. Most often this level of force used in an attempt to disarm an individual who is attempting self-harm.

Between 2010 and 2019, a total of six (0.75%) officers used a kinetic energy weapon. The most in a single year was two (2.20%) in 2018. At least one officer has utilized a kinetic energy weapon each year since 2016.

**Canine Bites:** The number of canine officers has varied between 2010 and 2019 due to the service life of the dogs and the time required to get a new dog and handler trained. Fully staffed the Appleton Police Department had three full-time handlers at the end of 2019. Despite thousands of deployments for tracking, drug sniffs, and apprehension assists, just one canine handler directed their dog to bite an individual during this analysis period (2014).

**Deadly Force:** Deadly force is the highest level of force available to an officer. To be utilized, the individual's behavior must present an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to an officer or another person. When multiple officers are on scene and observe deadly behavior, multiple officers are likely to respond with deadly force to stop the same threat.

Officer Use of Force										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
2010-2014 Average 1.0 (1.20%)					2015-2019 Average 1.6 (2.12%)					1.3
2	0	1	0	2	0	0	1	5	2	13
2.90%	0.00%	1.12%	0.00%	1.90%	0.00%	0.00%	1.43%	5.49%	2.25%	1.63%

Table 55

For example, in 2018 an individual armed with a firearm presented an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to officers. Five of the officers on scene recognized the threat and responded with deadly force to stop the threat. In a situation like this example, officers do not have time to coordinate a response or make an assumption on which officer may or may not stop the threat. Because of this, five officers were involved in a deadly force incident with only one individual involved.

Between 2010 and 2019, a total of 13 (1.63%) officers responded to six individual threats with deadly force.

## Injuries to Officers

Each time an officer takes someone into custody who is either actively resisting or showing assaultive behavior the situation is inherently dangerous. This is true for both the individual and the officers involved. Officers are trained to use appropriate levels of force to minimize the risk of injury. For analysis purposes, officer injuries and levels of treatment are both tracked.

Uses of Force Resulting in Officer Injury											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
None	2010-2014 Average 62.0 (74.16%)					2015-2019 Average 58.8 (77.78%)					60.4
	53	58	63	60	76	44	62	55	68	65	604
	76.81%	75.32%	70.79%	76.92%	72.38%	72.13%	92.54%	78.57%	74.73%	73.03%	75.88%
Claimed	2010-2014 Average 7.4 (8.85%)					2015-2019 Average 6.6 (8.73%)					7.0
	2	7	10	11	7	7	2	6	6	12	70
	2.90%	9.09%	11.24%	14.10%	6.67%	11.48%	2.99%	8.57%	6.59%	13.48%	8.79
Visible	2010-2014 Average 14.2 (16.99%)					2015-2019 Average 10.2 (13.49%)					12.2
	14	12	16	7	22	10	3	9	17	12	122
	20.29%	15.58%	17.98%	8.97%	20.95%	16.39%	4.48%	12.86%	18.68%	13.48%	15.33%


Table 56

Table 56 above presents statistical information with percentages for each injury category during the most recent five year period. Chart 49 on the next page shows officer injuries as a direct result of a use of force.

**None:** Between 2010 and 2019, a total of 604 (75.88%) of officers who were involved in a use of force said they were not injured. From a year-over-year comparison, the percentages in nine of the 10 years were fairly close to the 10-year average. The exception was in 2016 when 62 (92.54%) of officers who used force said they were not injured. Next closest to that high was 78.57% in 2017. The lowest percentage of non-injury was 70.79% in 2012.

## Uses of Force Resulting in Officer Injuries Year-Over-Year Comparison

Chart 49



**Claimed:** During this analysis period, a total of 70 (8.79%) claimed to have an injury that was not visible. Often these injuries were soreness and muscle strain. The most claimed officer injuries came in 2019 when 12 (13.48%) said they were injured. That is higher than both the 5-year average (8.73%) and 10-year average (8.79%). However, since 2017 and 2018 were both closer to the averages, there is no data to support an upward trend. The fewest claimed officer injuries was two, which occurred in both 2010 (2.90%) and 2016 (2.99%).

**Visible:** Visible injuries were more frequent than claimed injuries. Examples of these visible injuries included bruises, abrasions, and lacerations. Between 2010 and 2019, there were a total of 122 visible injuries to officers as a result of a use of force. The highest yearly total had 22 (20.95%) in 2014 while the lowest had three (4.48%) in 2016. Both the high and the low years were outliers from the typical averages. The most recent 5-year average was 10.2 (13.49%) and the 10-year average was 12.2 (15.33%). The 12 (13.48%) visible officer injuries fell right between the averages.

While tracking claimed and visible injuries is important, any tracking of officer injury data must also include required treatment. This is because the vast majority of “injuries” are minor and do not require medical treatment. The tracked treatment categories included; none, EMS waiver, first aid, transported to the hospital and released, transported to the hospital and admitted, and “other” to cover any miscellaneous treatment options.

**None:** Understandably, with “none” being the largest officer injury category, none was also the largest treatment category. In total, 734 of 796 officers (92.21%) did not seek medical treatment after a use of force. The year with the most officers involved who did not need treatment was 2014 with 91 (86.67%) officers. However, seven of the 10 years had percentages at 92% or higher. The safest year for officers as a percentage was 2013 with 97.44% not needing medical treatment.

The most recent 5-year average of 71.2 (94.18%) is lower than the 10-year average of 73.4 (92.21%). Conversely, the percentages of the 5-year average are higher than the 10-year average. This is due to fewer officer involvements in recent years while also sustaining fewer injuries.

Medical Treatment for Officers Involved in a Use of Force											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
None	2010-2014 Average 75.6 (90.43%)					2015-2019 Average 71.2 (94.18%)					73.4
	62	72	77	76	91	57	65	65	85	84	734
	89.86%	93.51%	86.52%	97.44%	86.67%	93.44%	97.01%	92.86%	93.41%	94.38%	92.21%
Waiver	2010-2014 Average 0.2 (0.24%)					2015-2019 Average 0.0 (0.00%)					0.1
	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.95%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.13%
First Aid	2010-2014 Average 5.6 (6.70%)					2015-2019 Average 2.8 (3.70%)					4.2
	7	4	7	1	9	2	1	4	5	2	42
	10.14%	5.19%	7.87%	1.28%	8.57%	3.28%	1.49%	5.71%	5.49%	2.25%	5.28%
Treated / Released	2010-2014 Average 2.0 (2.39%)					2015-2019 Average 1.0 (1.32%)					1.5
	0	1	4	1	4	2	0	0	1	2	15
	0.00%	1.30%	4.49%	1.28%	3.81%	3.28%	0.00%	0.00%	1.10%	2.25%	1.88%
Treated / Admitted	2010-2014 Average 0.2 (0.24%)					2015-2019 Average 0.4 (0.53%)					0.3
	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	3
	0.00%	0.00%	1.12%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.49%	0.00%	0.00%	1.12%	0.38%
Other	2010-2014 Average 0.0 (0.00%)					2015-2019 Average 0.0 (0.00%)					0.1
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.43%	0.00%	0.00%	0.13%

Table 57

**Waiver:** Between 2010 and 2019, just one officer (2014) was seen by medical staff and signed a waiver rather than go to the hospital. When there is uncertainty, the majority of officers will seek additional medical treatment.

**First Aid:** A total of 42 injured officers required first aid as their highest level of treatment. The highest year was 2014 when 9 (8.57%) officers needed first aid. The lowest years were 2013 and 2016 when one officer each was provided first aid. Since 2010, a clear downward trend has been observed. The most recent 5-year average of 2.8 (3.70%) is lower than the 10-year average of 4.2 (5.28%). In 2019, just two officers received first aid.

**Released:** There are a number of reasons an officer would require treatment at a hospital but not require admittance. Examples include more severe cuts and sprains, broken bones, or treatment for blood borne pathogen exposures. In total, 15 officers were treated and released at a hospital after a use of force between 2010 and 2019. The highest years were 2012 and 2014 when four officers each were brought in for treatment. In three of the years (2010, 2016, and 2017) no officers were treated and released.

Although the most recent average (1.0) is not much lower than the 10-year average (1.5), a clear downward trend was seen in the data. Two of the last three years did not require an officer to be treated and released from a hospital.


**Admitted:** While the number of officers admitted to the hospital overnight after a use of force remained relatively low, a slight upward trend could be seen between 2010 and 2019. Seven of the 10 years did not have an officer admitted for treatment. The admissions occurred in 2012,

2016, and 2019. Two of those were the result of an officer being shot. Thankfully, both officers were able to make a full recovery.

**Other:** Only one injury between 2010 and 2019 was placed in the “other” category. This occurred in 2014 when a school resource officer was treated for a minor injury at the school.

### Assigned Work Group

Officers at the Appleton Police Department are assigned into various working units. Examples include specialty units such as investigative services and school resource officers as well as more general patrol assignments. Within the patrol unit, officers are divided further into day-off groups (red and blue) and supervisors.



For comparative purposes, there are roughly 26 officers assigned to each patrol day-off group. The next largest group would be the 12 school resource officers assigned to AASD locations. The remainder of the officers involved in a use of force were from other smaller units or were supervisors.

The percentages for each group fluctuate year-over-year based on a number of different factors. Individual officers rotate assignments based on factors such as yearly shift selections, lateral transfers, and promotions. While district trends tend to be more stable, trends seen within work groups tend to be much more variable.

In 2019, the patrol Red Group had the most officers (41) involved in a use of force. The next largest was blue group with 26 officers directly involved in a use of force. To understand the 15

officer difference between groups, the number of individuals involved also needs to be taken into account.

The 41 red group officers used force against 33 individuals. The 26 blue group officers used force against 18 individuals. The 15 individual difference matches the 15 officer difference – which in turn provided similar ratios. The red group officer to individual ratio was 1:1.24 while the blue group ratio was 1:1.44 in 2019. This meant when a decision was made to use force, each group used similar numbers of officers. However, red group officers made that decision to engage in physical force more often.




Chart 51 above breaks down the groups between 2015 and 2019. Work group data prior to 2015 was not available for this analysis. Not included in the numbers shown are one from the CLO position in 2015 and two from an officer still in field training. There were no uses of force from an officer assigned to ISU.

For officers assigned to the avenue detail and special assignments over summer, those uses of force were included with the workgroup the officer is typically assigned. However, over the past five years there have been four officers from red group, four from the SRO unit, and three supervisors from these extra duties who had a use of force. In 2019, there were no uses of force specific to any avenue detail officers.

**Red Group:** Over the most recent five years, red group officers had more uses of force than any other group. Red group officers had a total of 163 (43.12%) uses of force over the five year period and led the other groups in three of those five years. In addition, the margins were much larger in the years red group had the most as opposed to smaller margins when blue group officers had more uses of force.

The 5-year average of 32.6 (43.12%) was consistent with three of the five years of the analysis. In 2015, red group officers accounted for a much lower 16 (26.23%). In 2019, the same group accounted for a much higher 41 (46.07%).

**Blue Group:** The blue group had a total of 117 (30.95%) uses of force between 2015 and 2019. This was the second highest group of officers with uses of force. Blue group officers finished higher than red group in 2015 (+5) and 2018 (+3). However, in the three years blue group officers had less than red group the difference was 60 to 114 (-54).

A small spike in numbers occurred in 2018 when blue group officer involvement in uses of force increased nearly 20% from the previous year. The total did drop back closer to the average in 2019, so no real trend was seen in the data.

5-Year Work Group Breakdown						
	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Totals
Red Group	2015-2019 Average 32.6 (43.12%)					NA
	16	37	36	33	41	163
	26.23%	55.22%	51.43%	36.26%	46.07%	43.12%
Blue Group	2015-2019 Average 23.4 (30.95%)					NA
	21	20	14	36	26	117
	34.43%	29.85%	20.00%	39.56%	29.21%	30.95%
Supervisor	2015-2019 Average 7.6 (10.05%)					NA
	4	1	13	12	8	38
	6.56%	1.49%	18.57%	13.19%	8.99%	10.05%
SRO	2015-2019 Average 8.4 (11.11%)					NA
	15	7	5	6	9	42
	24.59%	10.45%	7.14%	6.59%	10.11%	11.11%
SIU	2015-2019 Average 2.8 (3.70%)					NA
	4	2	2	3	3	14
	6.56%	2.99%	2.86%	3.30%	3.37%	3.70%
CLO	2015-2019 Average 0.2 (0.26%)					NA
	1	0	0	0	0	1
	1.64%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.26%
ISU	2015-2019 Average 0.0 (0.00%)					NA
	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
In FTO	2015-2019 Average 0.4 (0.53%)					NA
	0	0	0	1	1	2
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.10%	1.12%	0.53%

Table 58

**Supervisors:** Patrol supervisors are encouraged to respond early to incidents which have a higher likelihood of escalating in danger and may result in a use of force. Supervisors are also allowed to sign up for overtime shifts that assign them downtown on Friday and Saturday nights. Both of these factors are major contributors to supervisors being directly involved in a use of force.

Between 2015 and 2019, supervisors were involved in a total of 38 (10.05%) of uses of force. The numbers had reached a five year low in 2016 with just one (1.49%) use of force. However, in 2017 the numbers spiked to a five year high of 13 (18.57%). Since then, supervisor uses of force have trended slightly downward. In 2019, a total of eight (8.99%) supervisors used force on an

individual. That was a little higher than the 5-year average, but was the closest to the average of any one year in the analysis.

**SRO:** School Resource Officers had a total of 42 (11.11%) uses of force between 2015 and 2019. This was just slightly higher than the number of involved supervisors. The most uses of force were in 2015 when 15 (24.59%) school resource officers were involved. The total dropped by more than half the next year when 7 (10.45%) had a use of force. Since then, the numbers have remained fairly stable with an overall average of 8.4 (11.11%) between 2015 and 2019.

Further detailed analysis can be found in the SRO specific breakdown on page 131.

**SIU:** Officers assigned to the special investigations unit are often working investigations that specifically involve human trafficking, drugs, weapons, and warrant apprehensions. Despite the higher level of dangerousness associated with this criminal activity, the SIU unit had just 14 (3.70%) uses of force. A key factor in this low number was the high level of coordinated response within the unit to pre-plan tactical decisions and a ratio of officers to individuals that encouraged the subject to remain cooperative.

The most uses of force by SIU officers was in 2015 when 4 (6.56%) were directly involved. The fewest uses of force was two, which occurred in 2016 and 2017. The narrow range between high and low contributed to a consistent 2.8 (3.70%) average during the analysis period.

**CLO:** Between 2015 and 2019, a community liaison officer was directly involved in just one use of force. That occurred in 2015 and accounted for 1.64% of the 61 officers involved in a use of force that year.

**ISU:** During this analysis period, no one assigned to the investigative services unit (ISU) was involved in a use of force. This included during assigned investigative times, short-term patrol coverage, and overtime shifts.

**In FTO:** There were a total of 45 officers who went through field training between 2015 and 2019. During that time, one officer in training was involved in two uses of force. The first one occurred at the end of 2018 and the second occurred at the start of 2019. The officer had previous law enforcement experience prior to field training with the Appleton Police Department.

## **Patrol Districts**

An officer's assigned patrol district is an important factor when looking at use of force statistics. Regardless of who is assigned, those in the downtown district consistently have higher use of force numbers than either the northern or southern districts. This section will compare a few general statistics between the three districts. Detailed statistical information for specific districts can be found in the Specific Breakouts section starting at page 100.




Chart 52 above shows where each use of force occurred by district. Also included are eight uses of force outside the city by Appleton officers. Table 59 below presents the same statistical information with percentages for each time category for the most recent five years.

Use of Force Locations by District											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
Northern District	2010-2014 Average 12.0 (19.35%)					2015-2019 Average 9.0 (15.63%)					10.5
	10	12	12	15	11	6	8	10	10	11	105
	20.41%	21.43%	17.39%	25.42%	14.29%	12.24%	16.33%	18.87%	14.08%	16.67%	17.56%
Downtown District	2010-2014 Average 34.4 (55.48%)					2015-2019 Average 31.0 (53.82%)					32.7
	25	30	47	25	45	31	26	28	35	35	327
	51.02%	53.57%	68.12%	42.37%	58.44%	63.27%	53.06%	52.83%	49.30%	53.03%	54.68%
Southern District	2010-2014 Average 15.0 (24.19%)					2015-2019 Average 16.6 (28.82%)					15.8
	14	14	9	19	19	11	14	14	25	19	158
	28.57%	25.00%	13.04%	32.20%	24.68%	22.45%	28.57%	26.42%	35.21%	28.79%	26.42%
Out of City	2010-2014 Average 0.6 (0.97%)					2015-2019 Average 1.0 (1.74%)					0.8
	0	0	1	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	8
	0.00%	0.00%	1.45%	0.00%	2.60%	2.04%	2.04%	1.89%	1.41%	1.52%	1.34%

Table 59

**Northern District:** Between 2010 and 2019, there were 105 (17.56%) officers who used force in the Northern District. The highest amount was 15 (25.42%) in 2013. The fewest was six (12.24%) in 2015. Overall, the 10.5 (17.56%) officers from the 10-year average was comparable to the 9.0 (15.63%) officers from the most recent 5-year average. The 11 (16.67%) was just above both averages, but well within the standard deviation. This shows a fairly flat trend in the data.

**Downtown District:** The Downtown District had the most uses of force throughout the analysis period. A total of 327 (54.68%) officers used force in the Downtown District between 2010 and

2019. The most officers involved in a use of force downtown was 47 (68.12%) in 2012. The fewest officers was 25 in 2010 (51.02%) and again in 2013 (42.37%).

The year-of-year comparisons within the Downtown District have been relatively stable. The most recent 5-year average of 31.0 (53.82%) is only slightly lower than the 10-year average of 32.7 (54.68%). In 2019, there were 35 officers who had a use of force downtown, but the 53.03% was even closer to both averages.

**Southern District:** During the 2010 through 2019 analysis period, a total of 158 (26.42%) officers used force in the Southern District. That is moderately higher than the Northern District, but still well below the totals from the Downtown District. The highest number of uses of force was 25 (35.21%) officers in 2018. The fewest officers involved in the Southern District was nine (13.04%) in 2012.

The data shows an upward trend throughout the analysis period. The most recent 5-year average of 16.6 (28.82%) was higher than the 10-year average of 15.8 (26.42%) involved officers. The total was again higher in 2019 with 19 (28.79%) officers who had a use of force.

**Out of City:** It is not uncommon for Appleton officers to be requested to assist local agencies (mutual aid) during rapidly unfolding and dangerous events. At times these events end with an Appleton officer using force on an individual outside the City of Appleton. Between 2010 and 2019, there were a total of eight (1.34%) officers who used force outside city limits.

An initial look at the data would suggest an upward trend, but officers using force outside the city has been relatively stable the past five years. The highest amount was two (2.60%) in 2014, but that was offset by three years (2010, 2011, and 2013) which did not have any uses of force outside the city. Each year from 2015 through 2019 had one officer involved in a use of force. That balanced out the most recent 5-year average of 1.0 (1.74%) officers with the 10-year average of 0.8 (1.34%) officers.

## Specific Breakouts

Prior to this section, the use of force analysis focused on the city as a whole. However, it is important for administration and trainers to refine the analysis into more specific breakouts. Delineation between factors such as time of day or patrol districts provides important information for training purposes and resource allocation. Splitting overall information multiple ways helps show hidden trends that can be utilized by district commanders, patrol supervisors, and trainers.

Data collected between 2010 and 2019 was divided into seven distinct segments to provide a more detailed insight into the Appleton Police Department's use of force. These segments included:


- Northern District Patrol pg. 101
- Downtown District Patrol pg. 111
- Southern District Patrol pg. 121
- SRO Units Related to AASD pg. 131
- Daytime 0600-1400 Patrol pg. 140
- Afternoon 1400-2200 Patrol pg. 151
- Overnight 2200-0600 Patrol pg. 162

These seven segments, along with a solid foundation of overall statistics, provides a clear and accurate account of how force is used and identifies areas for improvement. The Appleton Police Department is committed to continuously re-evaluate best practices and strive for reduced injuries to individuals and officers.

**It is important to note that uses of force by school resource officers were separated from the patrol specific data.** This decision was made for a couple of reasons. First was due to the different dynamics of having an officer embedded in a school setting versus responding to calls for service. Second was the narrow age range and typically smaller sized individuals encountered by school resource officers. Third was the lack of additional officer resource and support options often encountered by school resource officers.

## Northern District Patrol

The Northern District is defined as any area within city limits starting from the northernmost borders south to and including Wisconsin Ave. The district contains a good mixture of residential and commercial properties. A few locations of note within the district include ThedaCare Regional Medical Center, ThedaCare’s Encircle Health campus, Thrivent, Scheel’s USA Youth Sports Complex, Northeast Business Park and portions of Interstates 41/441.



Graphic B shows a heat map of all 2019 uses of force within the Northern District. While the image reflects all days and times, this breakout section will focus specifically on patrol related uses of force. Any use of force by a school resource officer either on Appleton Area School District property or at a school function are addressed in the SRO Unit breakout on page 131.

Northern District Patrol Call Volume and Officer Involvement Summary								
	Previous 5-Yr	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Current 5-Yr	Total 10-Yr
Calls for Service	11.2 20.82%	6 15.79%	7 17.07%	10 20.00%	9 14.06%	10 17.54%	8.4 16.80%	9.8 18.88%
Involved Individuals	11.4 20.07%	6 15.00%	7 16.67%	10 20.00%	10 15.15%	10 17.24%	8.6 16.80%	10.0 18.52%
Involved Officers	16.0 20.46%	8 15.38%	9 15.25%	14 20.90%	15 17.44%	10 12.35%	11.2 16.23%	13.6 18.48%
Officers in Proximity	23.8 18.83%	12 13.33%	21 20.39%	26 23.42%	27 16.07%	21 14.00%	21.4 17.20%	22.6 18.02%

Table 60

Between 2010 and 2019, the Appleton Police Department had 98 calls for service (18.88% of all patrol) that resulted in a use of force within the Northern District. These calls for service directly involved 100 individuals (18.52%) who had force used on them. A total of 136 officers were directly involved, however, 226 were in close proximity during the incidents. While the Northern District accounts for a third of designated patrol districts, the district consistently accounted for less than 20 percent of city-wide use of force incidents. The total calls for service, number of individuals, and involved officers showed a downward trend.

Table 61 on the next page details seven situational specific categories of information regarding individuals who had force used on them by patrol officers within the Northern District. Overall, the district had fewer uses of force during the analysis period than the other two districts. This

correlates with the relatively low numbers seen in the table summary. The one exception was uses of force related to domestic investigations. The Northern District totaled seven more domestic related uses of force (21) than either the Downtown (14) or Southern (14) Districts.

Northern District Patrol Situational Specifics and Individual Information Summary								
	Previous 5-Yr	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Current 5-Yr	Total 10-Yr
Domestic Related	2.2	1	1	3	4	1	2.0	2.1
	19.30%	16.67%	14.29%	30.00%	40.00%	10.00%	23.26%	21.00%
Under the Influence	3.6	1	3	3	3	6	3.2	3.4
	31.58%	16.67%	42.86%	30.00%	30.00%	60.00%	37.21%	34.00%
Foot Pursuit	2.4	2	0	2	0	3	1.4	1.9
	21.05%	33.33%	0.00%	20.00%	0.00%	30.00%	16.28%	19.00%
Spit Hood	0.0	0	0	1	0	2	0.6	0.3
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	10.00%	0.00%	20.00%	6.98%	3.00%
Hobble	1.2	0	0	2	4	1	1.4	1.3
	10.53%	0.00%	0.00%	20.00%	40.00%	10.00%	16.28%	13.00%
While Detained	1.2	0	0	0	2	0	0.4	0.8
	10.53%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	20.00%	0.00%	4.65%	8.00%
Emergency Detention	1.2	2	2	1	0	3	1.6	1.4
	10.53%	33.33%	28.57%	10.00%	0.00%	30.00%	18.60%	14.00%

Table 61

**Domestic Related:** The Northern District had a total of 21 uses of force (21.00% of incidents) on individuals during a domestic related investigation between 2010 and 2019. As previously stated, that was more than the other two Appleton districts. The highest years were 2010 and 2018 with four involved individuals each year. The lowest years were 2012, 2015, 2016, and 2019 with just one individual each year. No major outliers were seen in the numbers during this analysis period. Refer back to page 33 for more information.

**Under the Influence:** Between 2010 and 2019, there were 34 uses of force (34.00% of incidents) in the Northern District on an individual who was believed to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. In 2019, the six incidents were nearly double totals typically seen (average of 3.4 each year) in the district. However, the highest year was 2013 when nine individuals were believed to be under the influence when force was used. Both 2013 and 2019 were the two outliers from the 5-year and 10-year averages. Refer back to page 36 for more information.

**Foot Pursuits:** There were a total of 19 uses of force (19.00% of incidents) during the 2010 to 2019 analysis period that involved a foot pursuit in the Northern District. This total was 11 less than the Southern District and 50 less than the Downtown District. Over the 10-year span, the number of foot pursuits in the Northern District were fairly consistent. The most in any one year was three which occurred four times (2011, 2012, 2013, and 2019). In two of the years (2016 and 2018) there were none. Refer back to page 27 for more information.

**Spit Hoods:** The Northern District had a total of three spit hood applications (3.00% of incidents) related to a use of force incident between 2010 and 2019. Two of the applications occurred in

2019, while the third was in 2017. The total number is approximately a third of applications used in the Southern (8) and Downtown (10) Districts. Refer back to page 28 for more information.


**Hobble:** During the 2010 to 2019 analysis period, a hobble was used on individuals 13 times (13.00% of incidents) in the Northern District. The most in any one year was four which occurred in 2018. However, in the three year period between 2014 and 2016 no hobbles were used in the district. The relatively wide range shows no clear trends or predictable indicators for hobble use by officers. Refer back to page 28 for more information.

**While Physically Detained:** There were a total of eight individuals (8.00% of incidents) who had force used on them in the Northern District after being placed in handcuffs between 2010 and 2019. In seven of the 10 years, there were no uses of force on handcuffed individuals in the district. The remaining three years encompassed the eight incidents. In 2011 and 2013 there were three incidents and in 2018 there were two incidents. Refer back to page 58 for more information.

**Emergency Detentions:** Between 2010 and 2019, there were 14 uses of force (14.00% of incidents) in the Northern District that resulted in an individual being placed on an emergency detention. This is slightly higher (12) than the Downtown District, but less than half (35) experienced in the Southern District. The highest years were 2014 and 2019 with three emergency detentions which had a use of force. The lowest years were 2010, 2013, and 2018 when no emergency detentions had a use of force. Refer back to page 34 for more information.

**Populous:** The majority of individuals involved in a use of force in the Northern District between 2010 and 2019 were Appleton residents. Reference chart 53 for a visual representation. A total of 63 (63.00%) were Appleton residents. Those remaining were 30 (30.0%) non-residents and seven (7.00%) homeless. Table 62 on the next page breaks out the data in a more detailed format.

Year-over-year, the data showed only one major anomaly in regards to populous. That involved the number of non-residents in 2013 involved in a use of force. The 10-year average showed 3.0 uses of force each year. In 2013, the data identified 10 non-residents. No other year in the Northern District had more than four.




Additionally, a few minor trends were identified. The involvement of individuals identified as homeless rose from two between 2010-2014 to five between 2015-2019. That is a major increase in terms of percentage, but due mostly to a relatively small sample size. Conversely, the number of Appleton residents and non-Appleton residents both showed a slight decline. The observable decline in non-resident average can be attributed in part to 2013 data. Data also shows the decline in Appleton residents may begin trending back to previous levels based on 2019 numbers.

That will not be known until 2020 numbers become available. As an overall percentage, the Northern District was similar to the Southern District, although slightly less Appleton residents and slighter higher non-Appleton residents. The homeless percentage was the same.

Northern District Patrol Populous of Involved Individuals											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
Resident	2010-2014 Average 7.2 (63.16%)					2015-2019 Average 5.4 (62.79%)					6.3
	7	9	8	4	8	5	4	6	4	8	63
	77.78%	75.00%	80.00%	26.67%	72.73%	83.33%	57.14%	60.00%	40.00%	80.00%	63.00%
Non-Resident	2010-2014 Average 3.8 (33.33%)					2015-2019 Average 2.2 (25.58%)					3.0
	2	3	1	10	3	0	2	3	4	2	30
	22.22%	25.00%	10.00%	66.67%	27.27%	0.00%	28.57%	30.00%	40.00%	20.00%	30.00%
Homeless	2010-2014 Average 0.4 (3.51%)					2015-2019 Average 1.0 (11.63%)					0.7
	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	0	7
	0.00%	0.00%	10.00%	6.67%	0.00%	16.67%	14.29%	10.00%	20.00%	0.00%	7.00%

Table 62

**Time of Day:** In regards to time of day, the Northern District saw a shift similar to the other districts. Between 2010 and 2014, the majority of uses of force occurred during the overnight hours. That majority shifted to the afternoon hours between 2015 and 2019. Chart 54 below shows the shift was more subtle in 2019, with additional details in table 63 on the next page.



**Daytime 0600-1400:** The Northern District daytime hours had the fewest uses of force (13) of any other analyzed segment. Additionally, the low numbers recorded are trending even lower. Zero uses of force occurred in four of ten years (2010, 2015, 2016, and 2017). Table 63 on the next page shows the yearly average declining even with a minor anomaly in 2018 when three uses of force were recorded.


Northern District Patrol Time of Day Analysis											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
0600-1400	2010-2014 Average 1.8 (15.79%)					2015-2019 Average 0.8 (9.30%)					1.3
	0	3	2	2	2	0	0	0	3	1	13
	0.00%	25.00%	20.00%	13.33%	18.18%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	30.00%	10.00%	13.00%
1400-2200	2010-2014 Average 4.0 (35.09%)					2015-2019 Average 4.8 (55.81%)					4.4
	2	4	5	5	4	3	4	6	7	4	44
	22.22%	33.33%	50.00%	33.33%	36.36%	50.00%	57.14%	60.00%	70.00%	40.00%	44.00%
2200-0600	2010-2014 Average 5.6 (49.12%)					2015-2019 Average 3.0 (34.88%)					4.3
	7	5	3	8	5	3	3	4	0	5	43
	77.78%	41.67%	30.00%	53.33%	45.45%	50.00%	42.86%	40.00%	0.00%	50.00%	43.00%

Table 63

**Afternoon 1400-2200:** The Northern District afternoon times saw an increase in the number of times force was used on an individual. Similar increases were seen in the Downtown and Northern Districts. The average increased from 4.0 individuals each year between 2010 and 2014 to 4.8 individuals each year between 2015 and 2019.

**Overnight 2200-0600:** The Northern District overnight times saw a decrease in the number of times force was used on an individual. The decline was more significant than the increasing trend during the afternoon. The average decreased from 5.6 individuals each year between 2010 and 2014 to 3.0 individuals each year between 2015 and 2019. However, despite trending differences, but the afternoon and overnight hours finished with 44 and 43 uses of force respectively by the end of the 10-year analysis.

Chart 55 below provides a more detailed hour-by-hour breakdown for uses of force in the Northern District in 2019. Also shown are the numbers in 2019 from the other districts along with the 5-year and 10-year Northern District averages.



**Day of Week:** The day of the week did not appear to be a major factor in the number of times force was used on an individual. On average, Friday had the most incidents. However, Tuesday was statistically not far behind and finished the same as Saturday. The least active day in the Northern District was Thursday.




Chart 56 shows the days of the week when force was used in the Northern District during 2019.

Northern District Patrol Uses of Force by Day of Week											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
Sunday	2010-2014 Average 0.6 (5.26%)					2015-2019 Average 1.4 (16.28%)					1.0
	0	1	0	1	1	0	2	2	2	1	10
	0.00%	8.33%	0.00%	6.67%	9.09%	0.00%	28.57%	20.00%	20.00%	10.00%	10.00%
Monday	2010-2014 Average 2.2 (19.30%)					2015-2019 Average 1.4 (16.28%)					1.8
	1	3	3	1	3	2	2	1	2	0	18
	11.11%	25.00%	30.00%	6.67%	27.27%	33.33%	28.57%	10.00%	20.00%	0.00%	18.00%
Tuesday	2010-2014 Average 1.2 (10.53%)					2015-2019 Average 1.6 (18.60%)					1.4
	0	1	1	3	1	0	1	2	2	3	14
	0.00%	8.33%	10.00%	20.00%	9.09%	0.00%	14.29%	20.00%	20.00%	30.00%	14.00%
Wednesday	2010-2014 Average 1.8 (15.79%)					2015-2019 Average 0.8 (9.30%)					1.3
	4	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	13
	44.44%	16.67%	10.00%	6.67%	9.09%	16.67%	14.29%	10.00%	0.00%	10.00%	13.00%
Thursday	2010-2014 Average 0.8 (7.02%)					2015-2019 Average 0.6 (6.98%)					0.7
	1	0	0	3	0	2	0	0	1	0	7
	11.11%	0.00%	0.00%	20.00%	0.00%	33.33%	0.00%	0.00%	10.00%	0.00%	7.00%
Friday	2010-2014 Average 2.2 (19.30%)					2015-2019 Average 1.8 (20.93%)					2.0
	1	3	3	2	2	1	1	2	2	3	20
	11.11%	25.00%	30.00%	13.33%	18.18%	16.67%	14.29%	20.00%	20.00%	30.00%	20.00%
Saturday	2010-2014 Average 2.6 (22.81%)					2015-2019 Average 1.0 (11.63%)					1.8
	2	2	2	4	3	0	0	2	1	2	18
	22.22%	16.67%	20.00%	26.67%	27.27%	0.00%	0.00%	20.00%	10.00%	20.00%	18.00%


Table 64

**Month of Year:** Overall, the month of the year did not make much of a difference in the number of times force was used in the Northern District. The highest month was July with 15 uses of force. The lowest month was May with just three uses of force. In 53 months during this analysis, no uses of force were reported in the Northern District. Reference table 65 below for further details.

Northern District Patrol Uses of Force by Month Breakdown											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
January	2010-2014 Average 0.8 (7.02%)					2015-2019 Average 0.2 (2.33%)					0.5
	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	5
	0.00%	8.33%	10.00%	6.67%	9.09%	0.00%	14.29%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	5.00%
February	2010-2014 Average 0.8 (7.02%)					2015-2019 Average 0.4 (4.65%)					0.6
	0	0	1	1	2	1	0	1	0	0	6
	0.00%	0.00%	10.00%	6.67%	18.18%	16.67%	0.00%	10.00%	0.00%	0.00%	6.00%
March	2010-2014 Average 0.8 (7.02%)					2015-2019 Average 1.0 (11.63%)					0.9
	0	1	0	3	0	0	2	1	2	0	9
	0.00%	8.33%	0.00%	20.00%	0.00%	0.00%	28.57%	10.00%	20.00%	0.00%	9.00%
April	2010-2014 Average 1.2 (10.53%)					2015-2019 Average 1.0 (11.63%)					1.1
	3	2	1	0	0	1	1	2	0	1	11
	33.33%	16.67%	10.00%	0.00%	0.00%	16.67%	14.29%	20.00%	0.00%	10.00%	11.00%
May	2010-2014 Average 0.6 (5.26%)					2015-2019 Average 0.0 (0.00%)					0.3
	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
	11.11%	0.00%	10.00%	6.67%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.00%
June	2010-2014 Average 1.4 (12.28%)					2015-2019 Average 0.6 (6.98%)					1.0
	0	2	2	1	2	0	2	0	0	1	10
	0.00%	16.67%	20.00%	6.67%	18.18%	0.00%	28.57%	0.00%	0.00%	10.00%	10.00%
July	2010-2014 Average 1.4 (12.28%)					2015-2019 Average 1.6 (18.60%)					1.5
	0	1	1	3	2	1	0	2	4	1	15
	0.00%	8.33%	10.00%	20.00%	18.18%	16.67%	0.00%	20.00%	40.00%	10.00%	15.00%
August	2010-2014 Average 0.6 (5.26%)					2015-2019 Average 0.6 (6.98%)					0.6
	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	6
	11.11%	0.00%	0.00%	6.67%	9.09%	16.67%	0.00%	10.00%	10.00%	0.00%	6.00%
September	2010-2014 Average 1.2 (10.53%)					2015-2019 Average 0.8 (9.30%)					1.0
	1	1	3	1	0	0	0	2	0	2	10
	11.11%	8.33%	30.00%	6.67%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	20.00%	0.00%	20.00%	10.00%
October	2010-2014 Average 1.6 (14.04%)					2015-2019 Average 1.0 (11.63%)					1.3
	1	2	0	3	2	0	1	0	2	2	13
	11.11%	16.67%	0.00%	20.00%	18.18%	0.00%	14.29%	0.00%	20.00%	20.00%	13.00%
November	2010-2014 Average 0.4 (3.51%)					2015-2019 Average 1.0 (11.63%)					0.7
	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	3	7
	11.11%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	9.09%	16.67%	0.00%	0.00%	10.00%	30.00%	7.00%
December	2010-2014 Average 0.6 (5.26%)					2015-2019 Average 0.4 (4.65%)					0.5
	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	5
	11.11%	16.67%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	16.67%	0.00%	10.00%	0.00%	0.00%	5.00%

Table 65

In terms of monthly averages, the numbers appeared to be fairly consistent. Chart 57 on the next page shows the 5-year and 10-year averages are nearly identical. The only minor exception was November of 2019 appears to show a small anomaly, but even that was only two above what would be expected off either average.



**Work Groups:** In regards to day-off group assignments, the 10-year data for work groups was not available. Therefore, all information is from the years 2015-2019. It is also important to remember that the data in table 66 below shows the number of officers involved in a use of force in the Northern District – not the number of individuals who had force used on them during an arrest or detainment.

Northern District Patrol Use of Force Work Group Comparison						
	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Totals
Red Group	<b>2015-2019 Average 4.0 (35.71%)</b>					<b>NA</b>
	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>20</b>
	25.00%	55.56%	50.00%	20.00%	30.00%	35.71%
Blue Group	<b>2015-2019 Average 5.6 (50.00%)</b>					<b>NA</b>
	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>28</b>
	37.50%	44.44%	28.57%	73.33%	60.00%	50.00%
Supervisor	<b>2015-2019 Average 0.8 (7.14%)</b>					<b>NA</b>
	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>4</b>
	0.00%	0.00%	21.43%	6.67%	0.00%	7.14%
Other Groups*	<b>2015-2019 Average 0.8 (7.14%)</b>					<b>NA</b>
	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>
	37.50%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	10.00%	7.14%

The (\*) references other groups including any other sworn officers who are not assigned to the Red or Blue Groups or work as a patrol

Table 66

The Blue Group officers accounted for the majority (50%) of uses of force in the Northern District between 2015 and 2019. There were 20 Red Group officers involved in uses of force over that same time period. Supervisors and other groups each had four uses of force.




Chart 58 above shows officer assignments at the time force was used in the Northern District during 2019. Table 66 on the previous page presents the same statistical information with percentages for each time category for the most recent 5-year period.

In 2019, the engagement for both red and blue day-off groups were fairly similar to the 5-year average. The relative consistency was seen since 2015 with the exception of blue group in 2018. Uses of force in Blue Group nearly tripled from the previous year. Refer back to table 66 for more detailed information. However, by 2019 the numbers declined back to the average. Overall, Blue Group experienced a slightly increasing trend while red group experience a slightly decreasing trend. Supervisors and those in the “other” category were more inconsistent.

Northern District Patrol Specifics in 2019									
	Red Group		Blue Group		Supervisor		Other Group*		Total Officers
<b>Daytime</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>0600-1400</b>	<b>0.00%</b>		<b>0.00%</b>		<b>0.00%</b>		<b>100%</b>		<b>10.00%</b>
<b>Afternoon</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>25.00%</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>75.00%</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>1400-2200</b>	<b>33.33%</b>		<b>50.00%</b>		<b>0.00%</b>		<b>0.00%</b>		<b>40.00%</b>
<b>Overnight</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>40.00%</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>60.00%</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>2200-0600</b>	<b>66.67%</b>		<b>50.00%</b>		<b>0.00%</b>		<b>0.00%</b>		<b>50.00%</b>
<b>Total Officers</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>30.00%</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>60.00%</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>10.00%</b>	<b>10</b>

The (\*) references two senior patrol officers who are assigned outside the Red and Blue Patrol Groups.

Table 67

Specific to 2019, the majority of uses of force occurred during the overnight hours. However, the afternoon hours only had one fewer. Blue Group patrol accounted for twice as many uses of force as Red Group patrol. No Northern District patrol officers had a use of force during the daytime

hours. The only daytime use of force from the other category was from a patrol officer who was assigned a shift that overlapped both Red and Blue Groups.

Northern District Patrol Average Age of Officer										
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Northern District	2010-2014 Average 33.3					2015-2019 Average 34.0				
	31.6	32.4	34.8	34.8	32.8	32.6	39.4	30.9	36.3	30.6
All Patrol Average	2010-2014 Average 33.5					2015-2019 Average 34.5				
	31.5	32.3	34.7	35.3	33.6	36.3	34.2	34.8	34.0	33.3
Difference	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.5	-0.8	-3.7	5.2	-3.9	2.3	-2.7

Table 68

**Average Age:** The average age of officers working in the Northern District trended slightly older between 2010 and 2019, which is similar to the trend seen citywide for patrol officers. However, there were a lot of fluctuations observed in the most recent 5-year period. The 10-year average was 33.6 years old for patrol officers who used force in the Northern District.

Northern District Patrol Average Work Experience of Officer at the Appleton Police Department										
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Northern District	2010-2014 Average 8.2					2015-2019 Average 7.7				
	7.4	7.3	8.7	9.1	8.7	7.4	10.0	5.8	9.1	6.4
All Patrol Average	2010-2014 Average 8.5					2015-2019 Average 9.1				
	6.5	7.0	9.9	10.0	9.0	11.1	8.4	9.8	8.5	7.6
Difference	0.9	0.3	-1.2	-0.9	-0.3	-3.7	1.6	-4.0	0.6	-1.2

Table 69

**Average Experience:** The average work experience for patrol officers at the Appleton Police Department trended upward between 2010 and 2019. Conversely, the patrol experience in the Northern district trended downward. The average experience level was nearly identical to the Southern District and just over a year less than the Downtown District officers. The Northern District patrol 10-year average work experience was 8.0 years.

## Downtown District Patrol

The Downtown District is defined as any area within city limits south of Wisconsin Ave down to the Fox River. The district includes a mixture of industrial, commercial, and residential properties. A few locations within the district include Lawrence University, the Performing Arts Center, Outagamie County Courthouse, Harbor House, Pillars Emergency Shelter, and the Transit Center.

Graphic C shows a heat map of all 2019 uses of force within the Downtown District. While the




image reflects all days and times, this breakout section will focus specifically on patrol related uses of force. Any use of force by a school resource officer either on Appleton Area School District property or at a school function are addressed in the SRO unit breakout on page 131.

Downtown District Patrol Call Volume and Officer Involvement Summary								
	Previous 5-Yr	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Current 5-Yr	Total 10-Yr
Calls for Service	29.0 53.90%	23 60.53%	22 53.66%	25 50.00%	34 53.13%	29 50.88%	26.6 53.20%	27.8 53.56%
Involved Individuals	31.4 55.28%	25 62.50%	23 54.76%	25 50.00%	34 51.52%	30 51.72%	27.4 53.52%	29.4 54.44%
Involved Officers	42.6 54.48%	32 61.54%	33 55.93%	36 53.73%	40 46.51%	45 55.56%	37.2 53.91%	39.9 54.21%
Officers in Proximity	69.0 54.59%	53 58.89%	49 47.57%	56 50.45%	81 48.21%	78 52.00%	63.4 50.96%	66.2 52.79%

Table 70

Between 2010 and 2019, the Appleton Police Department had 278 calls for service (53.56% of all patrol) that resulted in a use of force within the Downtown District. These calls for service directly involved 294 individuals (54.44%) who had force used on them. A total of 399 officers were directly involved, however, 662 were in close proximity during the incidents. While the Downtown District accounted for a third of designated patrol districts, the district consistently accounted for more than half of all citywide use of force incidents. The total calls for service, number of individuals, and involved officers showed a downward trend.

Table 71 on the next page details seven situational specific categories of information regarding individuals who had force used on them by patrol officers within the Downtown District. Overall, the district had the more uses of force during the analysis period than the other two districts. This correlates with the relatively high numbers seen in the table summary.

Downtown District Patrol Situational Specifics and Individual Information Summary								
	Previous 5-Yr	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Current 5-Yr	Total 10-Yr
Domestic Related	1.8	0	1	1	1	2	1.0	1.4
	5.73%	0.00%	4.35%	4.00%	2.94%	6.67%	3.65%	4.76%
Under the Influence	9.0	9	10	9	10	13	10.2	9.6
	28.66%	36.00%	43.48%	36.00%	29.41%	43.33%	37.23%	32.65%
Foot Pursuit	6.6	9	7	2	11	7	7.2	6.9
	21.02%	36.00%	30.43%	8.00%	32.35%	23.33%	26.28%	23.47%
Spit Hood	0.8	1	0	1	3	1	1.2	1.0
	2.55%	4.00%	0.00%	4.00%	8.82%	3.33%	4.38%	3.40%
Hobble	4.6	2	5	4	6	4	4.2	4.4
	14.65%	8.00%	21.74%	16.00%	17.65%	13.33%	15.33%	14.97%
While Detained	3.2	2	3	3	0	1	1.8	2.5
	10.19%	8.00%	13.04%	12.00%	0.00%	3.33%	6.57%	8.50%
Emergency Detention	1.6	0	0	2	2	0	0.8	1.2
	5.10%	0.00%	0.00%	8.00%	5.88%	0.00%	2.92%	4.08%

Table 71

**Domestic Related:** The Downtown District had a total of 14 uses of force (4.76% of incidents) on individuals during a domestic related investigation between 2010 and 2019. That was the same total that was recorded in the Southern District and fewer than the Northern District. The highest years were 2012 and 2014 with three involved individuals each year. The lowest year was 2015 when there were no uses of force during a domestic abuse investigation. No major outliers were observed and the overall trend declined. Refer back to page 33 for more information.

**Under the Influence:** Between 2010 and 2019, there were 96 uses of force (32.65% of incidents) in the Downtown District on an individual who was believed to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Despite the overall use of force numbers declining during the analysis period, those under the influence increased. The highest year was 2012 with 15, which was more than each of the previous two years. While uses of force on individuals under the influenced decreased immediately after 2012, the year-over-year numbers remained higher than had been recorded in the past. Refer back to page 36 for more information.

**Foot Pursuits:** There were a total of 69 uses of force (23.47% of incidents) during the 2010 to 2019 analysis period that involved a foot pursuit in the Downtown District. That total is nearly twice the number of foot pursuits recorded throughout the rest of the city. Over the 10-year span, the frequency of foot pursuits in the Downtown District were fairly consistent. The most in any in any one year was 11 in 2018, while the fewest was just two in 2017. Refer back to page 27 for more information.

**Spit Hoods:** The Downtown District had a total of 10 spit hood applications (3.40% of incidents) related to a use of force incident between 2010 and 2019. The number of applications remained relatively consistent during the analysis period. The use of spit hoods in the Downtown District was nearly the same as the Southern District and three times more frequent than the Northern District. Refer back to page 28 for more information.


**Hobble:** During the 2010 to 2019 analysis period, a hobble was used on individuals 44 times (14.97% of incidents) in the Downtown District. The most use of a hobble in any one year was nine in 2012. The fewest was just one the year prior. Overall, the use of a hobble has remained relatively consistent during the analysis period. Refer back to page 28 for more information.

**While Physically Detained:** There were a total of 25 individuals (8.50% of incidents) who had force used on them in the Downtown District after being placed in handcuffs between 2010 and 2019. An anomaly was recorded in 2014 when eight uses of force were recorded on physically detained individuals. That was equal to the previous four years combined. Years after 2014 returned back near the previous average. Refer back to page 58 for more information.

**Emergency Detentions:** Between 2010 and 2019, there were 12 uses of force (4.08% of incidents) in the Downtown District that resulted in an individual being placed on an emergency detention. This was slightly less than the Northern District, but more than half of involved individuals (35) in the Southern District. There was a downward trend observed, with three years (2015, 2016, and 2019) having no uses of force on someone who was placed on an emergency detention. Refer back to page 34 for more information.

**Populous:** The majority of individuals involved in a use of force in the Downtown District between 2010 and 2019 were Appleton residents. Reference chart 59 for a visual representation. A total of 140 (47.62%) were Appleton residents. Those remaining were 112 (38.10%) non-residents and 42 (14.29%) homeless. Table 72 on the next page breaks out the data in a more detailed format.

In both actual numbers and as a percentage, there were more non-Appleton residents involved in a use of force in the Downtown District than either of the other two districts. This is likely due in part to the high concentration of bars and restaurants along the College Avenue corridor.




Year-over-year, the data showed only one major anomaly in regards to populous. That involved the sharp decline (18 to 4) in 2013 and the subsequent sharp incline (4 to 18) in non-Appleton residents in 2014. A smaller anomaly related to the non-Appleton resident numbers was when the 2013 total (6) was significantly higher than the one use of force in 2011 and 2012 on homeless individuals.

The overall decline seen in non-residents during the analysis period was offset by an increase with involved homeless individuals. That inverse correlation also occurred in the Northern District. The Southern District experienced a slight upward trend in all three categories.

Downtown District Patrol Populous of Involved Individuals											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
Resident	2010-2014 Average 14.8 (47.13%)					2015-2019 Average 13.2 (48.18%)					14.0
	14	8	24	14	14	10	13	10	16	17	140
	56.00%	27.59%	55.81%	58.33%	38.89%	40.00%	56.52%	40.00%	47.06%	56.67%	47.62%
Non-Resident	2010-2014 Average 13.4 (42.68%)					2015-2019 Average 9.0 (32.85%)					11.2
	7	20	18	4	18	10	7	9	11	8	112
	28.00%	68.97%	41.86%	16.67%	50.00%	40.00%	30.43%	36.00%	32.35%	26.67%	38.10%
Homeless	2010-2014 Average 3.2 (10.19%)					2015-2019 Average 5.2 (18.98%)					4.2
	4	1	1	6	4	5	3	6	7	5	42
	16.00%	3.45%	2.33%	25.00%	11.11%	20.00%	13.04%	24.00%	20.59%	16.67%	14.29%

Table 72

**Time of Day:** In regards to time of day, the Downtown District saw a shift similar to the other districts. However, the shift was much more pronounced. Between 2010 and 2014, the overnight use of force numbers were nearly double those recorded in the afternoon. The totals began to shift in opposite directions between 2015 and 2019 until both finished with identical averages. Chart 60 below shows the major shift in the time of day comparisons, but table 73 on the next page presents more detailed information.



**Daytime 0600-1400:** The Downtown District daytime hour uses of force (40) were well above the Northern District (13) and Southern District (27) totals. As a percentage, the Downtown District daytime uses of force were actually the same as the Northern District (13.61% and 13.00% respectively) and lower than the Southern District (19.01%) uses of force. The only outlier in the Downtown District daytime number was the 10 uses of force in 2018. The next highest total after that was five (2012, 2015, 2017, and 2019) uses of force.


Downtown District Patrol Time of Day Analysis											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
0600-1400	2010-2014 Average 2.6 (8.28%)					2015-2019 Average 5.4 (19.71%)					4.0
	3	1	5	2	2	5	2	5	10	5	40
	12.00%	3.45%	11.63%	8.33%	5.56%	20.00%	8.70%	20.00%	29.41%	16.67%	13.61%
1400-2200	2010-2014 Average 9.2 (29.30%)					2015-2019 Average 11.0 (40.15%)					10.1
	6	8	12	9	11	9	9	10	10	17	101
	24.00%	27.59%	27.91%	37.50%	30.56%	36.00%	39.13%	40.00%	29.41%	56.67%	34.35%
2200-0600	2010-2014 Average 19.6 (62.42%)					2015-2019 Average 11.0 (40.15%)					15.3
	16	20	26	13	23	11	12	10	14	8	153
	64.00%	68.97%	60.47%	54.17%	63.89%	44.00%	52.17%	40.00%	41.18%	26.67%	52.04%

Table 73

**Afternoon 1400-2200:** The Downtown District afternoon times saw an increase in the number of times force was used on an individual. The averaged increased from 9.2 individuals/year between 2010 and 2014 to 11.0 individuals/year between 2015 and 2019.

**Overnight 2200-0600:** The Downtown District overnight times saw a significant decline in the number of times force was used on an individual. The 10-year high (26) was reached in 2012, followed by 23 in 2014 and 20 in 2011. The 5-year average between 2015 and 2019 was just 11.0 with a low of eight in 2019. Reductions in overnight uses of force in the Downtown District can likely be attributed to a reduction on the College Avenue corridor between midnight at 3am.

Chart 61 below provides a more detailed hour-by-hour breakdown for uses of force in the Downtown District in 2019. Also shown are the numbers in 2019 from the other districts along with the 5-year and 10-year Downtown District averages. Again, the major downward trend in the overnight hours can clearly be identified.



**Day of Week:** The day of the week did appear to be a factor in the number of times force was used on an individual. As expected with a large entertainment area, the Downtown District saw more uses of force on Friday and Saturday nights than any other days of the week. However, the decline in overnight uses of force also reduced the weekend totals in more recent years.




Chart 62 shows the days of the week when force was used in 2019 in the Downtown District.

Downtown District Patrol Uses of Force by Day of Week											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
Sunday	2010-2014 Average 3.0 (9.55%)					2015-2019 Average 3.2 (11.68%)					3.1
	5	2	3	4	1	3	6	1	4	2	31
	20.00%	6.90%	6.98%	16.67%	2.78%	12.00%	26.09%	4.00%	11.76%	6.67%	10.54%
Monday	2010-2014 Average 3.8 (12.10%)					2015-2019 Average 2.4 (8.76%)					3.1
	2	0	6	2	9	3	0	4	3	2	31
	8.00%	0.00%	13.95%	8.33%	25.00%	12.00%	0.00%	16.00%	8.82%	6.67%	10.54%
Tuesday	2010-2014 Average 2.8 (8.92%)					2015-2019 Average 3.8 (13.87%)					3.3
	2	2	3	2	5	1	3	5	3	7	33
	8.00%	6.90%	6.98%	8.33%	13.89%	4.00%	13.04%	20.00%	8.82%	23.33%	11.22%
Wednesday	2010-2014 Average 3.8 (12.10%)					2015-2019 Average 3.0 (10.95)					3.4
	4	4	6	3	2	3	0	5	4	3	34
	16.00%	13.79%	13.95%	12.50%	5.56%	12.00%	0.00%	20.00%	11.76%	10.00%	11.56%
Thursday	2010-2014 Average 2.0 (6.37%)					2015-2019 Average 4.0 (14.60%)					3.0
	2	1	3	1	3	3	2	0	7	8	30
	8.00%	3.45%	6.98%	4.17%	8.33%	12.00%	8.70%	0.00%	20.59%	26.67%	10.20%
Friday	2010-2014 Average 6.0 (19.11%)					2015-2019 Average 4.6 (16.79%)					5.3
	6	8	4	4	8	5	7	2	6	3	53
	24.00%	27.59%	9.30%	16.67%	22.22%	20.00%	30.43%	8.00%	17.65%	10.00%	18.03%
Saturday	2010-2014 Average 10.0 (31.85%)					2015-2019 Average 6.4 (23.36%)					8.2
	4	12	18	8	8	7	5	8	7	5	82
	16.00%	41.38%	41.86%	33.33%	22.22%	28.00%	21.74%	32.00%	20.59%	16.67%	27.89%


Table 74

**Month of Year:** Overall, the month of the year did not make much of a difference in the number of times force was used in the Downtown District. A slight exception would be a reduction in numbers during February (14) and December (19) when the weather is colder and individuals are outside less. The highest months for a use of force were March, April, and May (29 each). Reference table 75 below for further details.

Downtown District Patrol Uses of Force by Month Breakdown											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
January	2010-2014 Average 3.6 (11.46%)					2015-2019 Average 2.2 (8.03%)					2.9
	2	6	3	4	3	4	2	0	3	2	29
	8.00%	20.69%	6.98%	16.67%	8.33%	16.00%	8.70%	0.00%	8.82%	6.67%	9.86%
February	2010-2014 Average 0.8 (2.55%)					2015-2019 Average 2.0 (7.30%)					1.4
	2	0	0	2	0	1	0	1	7	1	14
	8.00%	0.00%	0.00%	8.33%	0.00%	4.00%	0.00%	4.00%	20.59%	3.33%	4.76%
March	2010-2014 Average 3.2 (10.19%)					2015-2019 Average 2.6 (9.49%)					2.9
	2	5	3	3	3	1	4	3	2	3	29
	8.00%	17.24%	6.98%	12.50%	8.33%	4.00%	17.39%	12.00%	5.88%	10.00%	9.86%
April	2010-2014 Average 2.4 (7.64%)					2015-2019 Average 3.4 (12.41%)					2.9
	2	2	3	0	5	5	2	4	2	4	29
	8.00%	6.90%	6.98%	0.00%	13.89%	20.00%	8.70%	16.00%	5.88%	13.33%	9.86%
May	2010-2014 Average 4.0 (12.74%)					2015-2019 Average 1.8 (6.57%)					2.9
	4	0	8	1	7	0	1	1	3	4	29
	16.00%	0.00%	18.60%	4.17%	19.44%	0.00%	4.35%	4.00%	8.82%	13.33%	9.86%
June	2010-2014 Average 3.2 (10.19%)					2015-2019 Average 2.0 (7.30%)					2.6
	2	1	4	3	6	3	1	2	1	3	26
	8.00%	3.45%	9.30%	12.50%	16.67%	12.00%	4.35%	8.00%	2.94%	10.00%	8.84%
July	2010-2014 Average 2.2 (7.01%)					2015-2019 Average 1.4 (5.11%)					1.8
	4	2	2	2	1	0	0	3	3	1	18
	16.00%	6.90%	4.65%	8.33%	2.78%	0.00%	0.00%	12.00%	8.82%	3.33%	6.12%
August	2010-2014 Average 2.2 (7.01%)					2015-2019 Average 2.6 (9.49%)					2.4
	2	4	2	1	2	0	4	1	7	1	24
	8.00%	13.79%	4.65%	4.17%	5.56%	0.00%	17.39%	4.00%	20.59%	3.33%	8.16%
September	2010-2014 Average 3.0 (9.55%)					2015-2019 Average 1.6 (5.84%)					2.3
	1	1	6	3	4	1	4	1	1	1	23
	4.00%	3.45%	13.95%	12.50%	11.11%	4.00%	17.39%	4.00%	2.94%	3.33%	7.82%
October	2010-2014 Average 2.6 (8.28%)					2015-2019 Average 2.6 (9.49%)					2.6
	1	3	6	2	1	1	2	3	3	4	26
	4.00%	10.34%	13.95%	8.33%	2.78%	4.00%	8.70%	12.00%	8.82%	13.33%	8.84%
November	2010-2014 Average 2.4 (7.64%)					2015-2019 Average 3.2 (11.68%)					2.8
	2	4	1	2	3	6	2	3	2	3	28
	8.00%	13.79%	2.33%	8.33%	8.33%	24.00%	8.70%	12.00%	5.88%	10.00%	9.52%
December	2010-2014 Average 1.8 (5.73%)					2015-2019 Average 2.0 (7.30%)					1.9
	1	1	5	1	1	3	1	3	0	3	19
	4.00%	3.45%	11.63%	4.17%	2.78%	12.00%	4.35%	12.00%	0.00%	10.00%	6.46%

Table 75

In terms of monthly averages, the numbers appeared to be fairly consistent. Chart 63 on the next page shows the 5-year and 10-year averages were similar. The only minor exception was May which showed differences for both averages and the 2019 totals. These differences, however, do not make a significant difference compared to the overall totals of individuals who had force used on them throughout the Downtown District.



**Work Groups:** In regards to day-off group assignments, the 10-year data for work groups was not available. Therefore, all information is from the years 2015-2019. It is also important to remember that the data in table 76 below shows the amount of officers involved in a use of force in the Downtown District – not the number of individuals who had force used on them during an arrest or detainment.

Downtown District Patrol Use of Force Work Group Comparison						
	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Totals
Red Group	<b>2015-2019 Average 17.2 (46.24%)</b>					<b>NA</b>
	<b>10</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>86</b>
	31.25%	66.67%	47.22%	30.00%	55.56%	46.24%
Blue Group	<b>2015-2019 Average 11.2 (30.11%)</b>					<b>NA</b>
	<b>11</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>56</b>
	34.38%	21.21%	22.22%	42.50%	28.89%	30.11%
Supervisor	<b>2015-2019 Average 5.2 (13.98%)</b>					<b>NA</b>
	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>26</b>
	12.50%	3.03%	25.00%	17.50%	11.11%	13.98%
Other Groups*	<b>2015-2019 Average 3.6 (9.68%)</b>					<b>NA</b>
	<b>7</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>18</b>
	21.88%	9.09%	5.56%	10.00%	4.44%	9.68%

The (\*) references other groups including any other sworn officers who are not assigned to the Red or Blue Groups or work as a patrol

Table 76

The Red Group officers accounted for the majority (46.24%) of uses of force in the Downtown District between 2015 and 2019. The 86 Red Group officers were significantly higher than the 56 Blue Group officers. Supervisors and other groups accounted for 26 and 18 uses of force respectively. There is not enough data to identify significant trends at this point.




Chart 64 above shows officer assignments at the time force was used in the Downtown District during 2019. Table 76 on the previous page presents the same statistical information with percentages for each time category for the most recent 5-year period.

In 2019, the engagement for both red and blue day-off groups were fairly similar to the 5-year average. The larger than normal afternoon total in Red Group did bring 2019 above the 5-year average. During this analysis period, the Red Group did not have less than 12 uses of force in the Downtown District. The Blue Group average in the same district was just 11.2 individuals. Subsequent supervisor review of these differences did not indicate a training or tactical reason. However, training will be adjusted if further information shows a deficiency that needs to be addressed with either day-off group.

Downtown District Patrol Specifics in 2019									
	Red Group		Blue Group		Supervisor		Other Groups*		Total Officers
Daytime	3	60.00%	1	20.00%	1	20.00%	0	0.00%	5
0600-1400	12.00%		7.69%		20.00%		0.00%		11.11%
Afternoon	14	58.33%	6	25.00%	2	8.33%	2	8.33%	24
1400-2200	56.00%		46.15%		40.00%		100%		53.33%
Overnight	8	50.00%	6	37.50%	2	12.50%	0	0.00%	16
2200-0600	32.00%		46.15%		40.00%		0.00%		35.56%
<b>Total Officers</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>55.56%</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>28.89%</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>11.11%</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4.44%</b>	<b>45</b>

The (\*) references two senior patrol officers who are assigned outside the Red and Blue Patrol Groups.

Table 77

Specific to 2019, the majority of uses of force occurred during the afternoon hours. Red Group afternoon patrol accounted for more than twice of the uses of force than Blue Group during the same time period.

Downtown District Patrol Average Age of Officer										
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Downtown District	2010-2014 Average 34.2					2015-2019 Average 34.8				
	32.5	33.0	35.6	36.4	33.6	37.8	32.2	36.6	34.4	33.0
All Patrol Average	2010-2014 Average 33.5					2015-2019 Average 34.5				
	31.5	32.3	34.7	35.3	33.6	36.3	34.2	34.8	34.0	33.3
Difference	1.0	0.7	0.9	1.1	0.0	1.5	-2.0	1.8	0.4	-0.3

Table 78

**Average Age:** The average age of officers working in the Downtown District trended slightly older between 2010 and 2019, which is similar to the trend seen citywide for patrol officers. Overall, officers in the Downtown District were only below the citywide average twice (2015 and 2019). The 10-year average was 34.5 years old for patrol officers who used force in the Downtown District.


Downtown District Patrol Average Work Experience of Officer at the Appleton Police Department										
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Downtown District	2010-2014 Average 9.1					2015-2019 Average 9.5				
	7.3	7.2	10.7	11.2	9.0	12.4	7.2	11.4	9.8	6.9
All Patrol Average	2010-2014 Average 8.5					2015-2019 Average 9.1				
	6.5	7.0	9.9	10.0	9.0	11.1	8.4	9.8	8.5	7.6
Difference	0.8	0.2	0.8	1.2	0.0	1.3	-1.2	1.6	1.3	-0.7

Table 79

**Average Experience:** The average work experience for patrol officers at the Appleton Police Department trended upward between 2010 and 2019. This trend held true for officers in the Downtown District as well. The average experience level was over 12-months higher for officers in the Downtown District. During this analysis period the average work experience in the Downtown District was 9.3 years.

## Southern District Patrol

The Southern District is defined as any area within city limits between the Fox River and the southernmost city limits. The district includes a mixture of retail and residential properties along with a large industrial park on the SE edge of the city. A few locations of note within the district include St. Elizabeth Hospital, the Fox River Walking Trail, Interstate 441, Reid Golf Course, Banta Bowl football stadium and “Big Box” stores such as Walmart, Home Depot, and Menards.



Graphic D shows a heat map of all 2019 uses of force within the Southern District. While the image reflects all days and times, this breakout section will focus specifically on patrol related uses of force. Any use of force by a school resource officer either on Appleton Area School District property or at a school function are address in the SRO Unit breakout on page 131.

Southern District Patrol Call Volume and Officer Involvement Summary								
	Previous 5-Yr	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Current 5-Yr	Total 10-Yr
Calls for Service	13.2 24.54%	9 23.68%	14 34.15%	14 28.00%	20 31.25%	17 29.82%	14.8 29.60%	14.0 26.97%
Involved Individuals	13.4 23.59%	9 22.50%	14 33.33%	14 28.00%	21 31.82%	17 29.31%	15.0 29.30%	14.2 26.30%
Involved Officers	18.6 23.79%	12 23.08%	18 30.51%	16 23.88%	30 34.88%	24 29.63%	20.0 28.99%	19.3 26.22%
Officers in Proximity	31.8 25.16%	25 27.78%	33 32.04%	26 23.42%	57 33.93%	49 32.67%	38.0 30.55%	34.9 27.83%

Table 80

Between 2010 and 2019, the Appleton Police Department had 140 calls for service (26.97% of all patrol) that resulted in a use of force within the Southern District. These calls for service directly involved 142 individuals (26.30%) who had force used on them. A total of 349 officers were directly involved, however, 226 were in close proximity during the incidents. While the Southern District accounts for a third of designated patrol districts, the district consistently accounted for approximately 26 percent of the citywide use of force incidents. Unlike the other two districts, the Southern District saw an upward trend in calls for service, number of individuals, and officers involved in uses of force.

Table 81 on the next page details seven situational specific categories of information regarding individuals who had force used on them by patrol officers within the Southern District. Overall,

the Southern District had fewer uses of force than the Downtown District but more than the Northern District.

Southern District Patrol Situational Specifics and Individual Information Summary								
	Previous 5-Yr	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Current 5-Yr	Total 10-Yr
Domestic Related	1.2 8.96%	0 0.00%	1 7.14%	2 14.29%	2 9.52%	3 17.65%	1.6 10.67%	1.4 9.86%
Under the Influence	4.6 34.33%	4 44.44%	4 28.57%	4 28.57%	7 33.33%	7 41.18%	5.2 34.67%	4.9 34.51%
Foot Pursuit	2.0 14.93%	0 0.00%	3 21.43%	6 42.86%	5 23.81%	6 35.29%	4.0 26.67%	3.0 21.13%
Spit Hood	0.4 2.99%	1 11.11%	0 0.00%	1 7.14%	1 4.76%	3 17.65%	1.2 8.00%	0.8 5.63%
Hobble	1.4 10.45%	4 44.44%	1 7.14%	3 21.43%	6 28.57%	3 17.65%	3.4 22.67%	2.4 16.90%
While Detained	1.4 10.45%	1 11.11%	0 0.00%	2 14.29%	3 14.29%	4 23.53%	2.0 13.33%	1.7 11.97%
Emergency Detention	3.0 22.39%	4 44.44%	4 28.57%	2 14.29%	8 38.10%	2 11.76%	4.0 26.67%	3.5 24.65%

Table 81

**Domestic Related:** The Southern District had a total of 14 uses of force (9.86% of incidents) on individuals during a domestic related investigation between 2010 and 2019. The year-over-year numbers were fairly consistent. The highest year was 2019 with three uses of force. The lowest years were 2011 and 2015 with no domestic related uses of force. No major outliers were seen in the numbers during this analysis period. Refer back to page 33 for more information.

**Under the Influence:** Between 2010 and 2019, there were 49 uses of force (34.51% of incidents) in the Southern District on an individual who was believed to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The highest years were 2013, 2018, and 2019 with seven uses of force each. The fewest was just two in 2012. Despite those differences, the Southern District only saw a slight upward trend in this category. The 5-year average between 2010 and 2014 was 4.6 while between 2015 and 2019 the average was 5.2 individuals each year. Refer back to page 36 for more information.

**Foot Pursuits:** There were a total of 30 uses of force (21.13% of incidents) during the 2010 to 2019 analysis period that involved a foot pursuit in the Southern District. This total was less than the Downtown District (69) but more than the Northern District (19) uses of force. Over the 10-year span, the average number of foot pursuits in the Southern District doubled. Between 2010 and 2014 the average was 2.0 foot pursuits with a use of force associated. During the 2015 to 2019 span the average had grown to 4.0 foot pursuits. Refer back to page 27 for more information.

**Spit Hoods:** The Southern District had a total of eight spit hood applications (5.63% of incidents) related to a use of force between 2010 and 2019. In five of the 10 years, no spit hoods were needed on individuals. The most applications occurred in 2019 with three placed on individuals. In 2013 there were two spit hoods utilized while just one was used in 2015, 2017, and 2018. The 5-year averages showed a clear upward trend. Refer back to page 28 for more information.


**Hobble:** During the 2010 through 2019 analysis period, a hobble was used on individuals 24 times (16.90% of incidents) in the Southern District. The most in any one year was six in 2018. This high contributed to an upward trend. The 5-year average between 2010 through 2014 was 1.4, while the 5-year average between 2015 and 2019 was more than double at 3.4 individuals/year. The only year a hobble was not used in the Southern District was 2010. Refer back to page 28 for more information.

**While Physically Detained:** There were a total of 17 individuals (11.97% of incidents) who had force used on them in the Southern District after being placed in handcuffs between 2010 and 2019. The highest yearly total was four which happened in 2013 and 2019. In three years (2010, 2014, and 2016) there were no uses of force on someone who was physically detained. Over the 10-year period, a slight upward trend was observed. Refer back to page 58 for more information.

**Emergency Detentions:** Between 2010 and 2019, there were 35 uses of force (24.65% of incidents) in the Southern District that resulted in an individual being placed on an emergency detention. This is more than twice as many as either of the other two districts and trended upward during the analysis period. The highest number came in 2018 with eight involved individuals. The lowest total was one in 2010. Refer back to page 34 for more information.

**Populous:** The majority of individuals involved in a use of force in the Southern District between 2010 and 2019 were Appleton residents. Reference chart 65 for a visual representation. A total of 101 (71.13%) were Appleton residents. Those remaining were 31 (21.83%) non-residents and 10 (7.04%) homeless. Table 82 on the next page breaks out the data in a more detailed format.

Year-over-year, the data showed only a slight upward trend in non-residents involved in a use of force. The 5-year average between 2010 and 2014 was 2.6 individuals, then grew to 3.6 individuals for a 5-year average between 2015 and 2019. The averages for Appleton residents and homeless remained consistent.



In 2018, there were 21 uses of force in the Southern District. This was the highest year during the analysis period and had the most (14) Appleton residents directly involved. The most non-residents in one year was eight in 2019 while 2013 and 2016 had the most homeless individuals with three each year.


One important trend that will be watched in the coming years is the rise in non-resident uses of force in the Southern District. In 2015, there were zero recorded uses of force. That number grew to two in 2016 and continued to rise each year thereafter. The total was three in 2017, five in

2018, and reached eight in 2019. No other populous 5-year segment grew as fast as the non-residents. As an overall percentage, the Southern District was similar to the Northern District.

Southern District Patrol Populous of Involved Individuals											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
Resident	2010-2014 Average 10.0 (74.63%)					2015-2019 Average 10.2 (68.00%)					10.1
	9	9	7	12	13	9	9	11	14	8	101
	75.00%	75.00%	87.50%	66.67%	76.47%	100%	64.29%	78.57%	66.67%	47.06%	71.13%
Non-Resident	2010-2014 Average 2.6 (19.40%)					2015-2019 Average 3.6 (24.00%)					3.1
	3	3	1	3	3	0	2	3	5	8	31
	25.00%	25.00%	12.50%	16.67%	17.65%	0.00%	14.29%	21.43%	23.81%	47.06%	21.83%
Homeless	2010-2014 Average 0.8 (5.97%)					2015-2019 Average 1.2 (8.00%)					1.0
	0	0	0	3	1	0	3	0	2	1	10
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	16.67%	5.88%	0.00%	21.43%	0.00%	9.52%	5.88%	7.04%

Table 82

**Time of Day:** In regards to time of day, the Southern District saw a shift similar to the other districts. Between 2010 and 2014, the majority of uses of force occurred during the overnight hours. That majority shifted to the afternoon hours between 2015 and 2019. Chart 66 below shows the shift continue further in 2019. Refer to table 83 on the next page for additional details.



**Daytime 0600-1400:** The Southern District daytime hours had fewer uses of force (27) than the afternoon or overnight shifts. A slight upward trend could be seen in the numbers – unlike the more drastic trend seen in the Downtown District during the daytime hours. The 5-year daytime average between 2015 and 2019 was 3.0 individuals/year. That total was a little higher than the 2.4 individuals/year recorded between 2010 and 2014. In 2012, there were zero uses of force recorded during the daytime in the Southern District. Two years later, there were a 10-year high of six uses of force on an individual.


Southern District Patrol Time of Day Analysis											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
0600-1400	2010-2014 Average 2.4 (17.91%)					2015-2019 Average 3.0 (20.00%)					2.7
	2	1	0	3	6	2	3	3	2	5	27
	16.67%	8.33%	0.00%	16.67%	35.29%	22.22%	21.43%	21.43%	9.52%	29.41%	19.01%
1400-2200	2010-2014 Average 5.0 (37.31%)					2015-2019 Average 7.0 (46.67%)					6.0
	5	4	3	7	6	5	5	6	11	8	60
	41.67%	33.33%	37.50%	38.89%	35.29%	55.56%	35.71%	42.86%	52.38%	47.06%	42.25%
2200-0600	2010-2014 Average 6.0 (44.78%)					2015-2019 Average 5.0 (33.33%)					5.5
	5	7	5	8	5	2	6	5	8	4	55
	41.67%	58.33%	62.50%	44.44%	29.41%	22.22%	42.86%	35.71%	38.10%	23.53%	38.73%

Table 83

**Afternoon 1400-2200:** The Southern District afternoon times saw an increase in the number of times force was used on an individual. Similar increases were seen in the Northern and Downtown Districts. The average increased from 5.0 individuals/year between 2010 and 2014 to 7.0 individuals/year between 2015 and 2019.

**Overnight 2200-0600:** The Southern District overnight times saw a slight decrease in the number of times force was used on an individual. That decrease, along with the increase during the afternoon hours, saw the afternoon overtake the overnight in total involved individuals. The overnight reached a 10-year high of eight twice (2013 and 2018) and a low of two in 2015. The 5-year average between 2015 and 2019 dropped to 5.0 individuals/year from the previous 5-year average of 6.0 individuals/year.

Chart 67 below provides a more detailed hour-by-hour breakdown of uses of force in the Southern District in 2019. Also shown are the numbers in 2019 from the other districts along with the 5-year and 10-year Southern District averages.



**Day of Week:** The day of the week did not appear to be a major factor in the number of times force was used on an individual. However, the Southern District was unique with Monday having more uses of force than either Thursday, Friday, or Saturday. The 2019 data showed a continuation of that trend.




Chart 68 shows the days of the week when forced was used in the Southern District during 2019.

Southern District Patrol Uses of Force by Day of Week											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
Sunday	2010-2014 Average 2.0 (14.93%)					2015-2019 Average 2.4 (16.00%)					2.2
	2	1	2	2	3	3	3	0	3	3	22
	16.67	8.33%	25.00%	11.11%	17.65%	33.33%	21.43%	0.00%	14.29%	17.65%	15.49%
Monday	2010-2014 Average 3.2 (23.88%)					2015-2019 Average 2.2 (14.67%)					2.7
	3	3	2	4	4	0	1	2	3	5	27
	25.00%	25.00%	25.00%	22.22%	23.53%	0.00%	7.14%	14.29%	14.29%	29.41%	19.01%
Tuesday	2010-2014 Average 2.2 (16.42%)					2015-2019 Average 1.6 (10.67%)					1.9
	1	2	1	4	3	2	2	1	1	2	19
	8.33%	16.67%	12.50%	22.22%	17.65%	22.22%	14.29%	7.14%	4.76%	11.76%	13.38%
Wednesday	2010-2014 Average 1.2 (8.96%)					2015-2019 Average 1.4 (9.33%)					1.3
	2	2	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	2	13
	16.67%	16.67%	12.50%	5.56%	0.00%	11.11%	7.14%	7.14%	9.52%	11.76%	9.15%
Thursday	2010-2014 Average 1.8 (13.43%)					2015-2019 Average 1.6 (10.67%)					1.7
	2	1	0	4	2	1	0	2	2	3	17
	16.67%	8.33%	0.00%	22.22%	11.76%	11.11%	0.00%	14.29%	9.52%	17.65%	11.97%
Friday	2010-2014 Average 1.8 (13.43%)					2015-2019 Average 2.4 (16.00%)					2.1
	1	2	0	3	3	0	4	4	4	0	21
	8.33%	16.67%	0.00%	16.67%	17.65%	0.00%	28.57%	28.57%	19.05%	0.00%	14.79%
Saturday	2010-2014 Average 1.2 (8.96%)					2015-2019 Average 3.4 (22.67%)					2.3
	1	1	2	0	2	2	3	4	6	2	23
	8.33%	8.33%	25.00%	0.00%	11.76%	22.22%	21.43%	28.57%	28.57%	11.76%	16.20%

Table 84

**Month of Year:** Overall, the month of the year did not make much of a difference in the number of times force was used in the Southern District. The highest months were in September and October, while the fewest uses of force on an individual occurred in June. Reference table 85 below for further details.


Southern District Patrol Uses of Force by Month Breakdown											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
January	2010-2014 Average 1.4 (10.45%)					2015-2019 Average 1.2 (8.00%)					1.3
	0	2	0	3	1	1	0	2	2	1	13
	0.00%	16.67%	0.00%	16.67%	11.76%	11.11%	0.00%	14.29%	9.52%	5.88%	9.15%
February	2010-2014 Average 0.4 (2.99%)					2015-2019 Average 1.6 (10.67%)					1.0
	1	1	0	0	0	4	0	1	3	0	10
	8.33%	8.33%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	44.44%	0.00%	7.14%	14.29%	0.00%	7.04%
March	2010-2014 Average 1.0 (7.46%)					2015-2019 Average 1.0 (6.67%)					1.0
	1	0	2	1	1	0	2	2	0	1	10
	8.33%	0.00%	25.00%	5.56%	5.88%	0.00%	14.29%	14.29%	0.00%	5.88%	7.04%
April	2010-2014 Average 1.2 (8.96%)					2015-2019 Average 0.8 (5.33%)					1.0
	0	1	2	0	3	0	1	2	0	1	10
	0.00%	8.33%	25.00%	0.00%	17.65%	0.00%	7.14%	14.29%	0.00%	5.88%	7.04%
May	2010-2014 Average 0.8 (8.97%)					2015-2019 Average 1.4 (9.33%)					1.1
	1	0	0	3	0	1	2	2	2	0	11
	8.33%	0.00%	0.00%	16.67%	0.00%	11.11%	14.29%	14.29%	9.52%	0.00%	7.75%
June	2010-2014 Average 0.6 (4.48%)					2015-2019 Average 1.0 (6.67%)					0.8
	1	1	0	1	0	0	2	1	1	1	8
	8.33%	8.33%	0.00%	5.56%	0.00%	0.00%	14.29%	7.14%	4.76%	5.88%	5.63%
July	2010-2014 Average 1.0 (7.46%)					2015-2019 Average 1.2 (8.00%)					1.1
	0	1	0	3	1	0	2	1	2	1	11
	0.00%	8.33%	0.00%	16.67%	5.88%	0.00%	14.29%	7.14%	9.52%	5.88%	7.75%
August	2010-2014 Average 1.0 (7.46%)					2015-2019 Average 1.6 (10.67%)					1.3
	0	1	2	1	1	0	1	1	2	4	13
	0.00%	8.33%	25.00%	5.56%	5.88%	0.00%	7.14%	7.14%	9.52%	23.53%	9.15%
September	2010-2014 Average 1.6 (11.94%)					2015-2019 Average 1.8 (12.00%)					1.7
	2	2	0	1	3	0	2	2	1	4	17
	16.67%	16.67%	0.00%	5.56%	17.65%	0.00%	14.29%	14.29%	4.76%	23.53%	11.97%
October	2010-2014 Average 2.0 (14.93%)					2015-2019 Average 1.4 (9.33%)					1.7
	1	2	2	3	2	0	2	0	2	3	17
	8.33%	16.67%	25.00%	16.67%	11.76%	0.00%	14.29%	0.00%	9.52%	17.65%	11.97%
November	2010-2014 Average 1.6 (11.94%)					2015-2019 Average 1.0 (6.67%)					1.3
	3	1	0	1	3	0	0	0	5	0	13
	25.00%	8.33%	0.00%	5.56%	17.65%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	23.81%	0.00%	9.15%
December	2010-2014 Average 0.8 (5.97%)					2015-2019 Average 1.0 (6.67%)					0.9
	2	0	0	1	1	3	0	0	1	1	9
	16.67%	0.00%	0.00%	5.56%	5.88%	33.33%	0.00%	0.00%	4.76%	5.88%	6.34%

Table 85

In terms of monthly averages, the numbers appeared to be fairly consistent. Chart 69 on the next page shows the 5-year and 10-year averages, with the exception of February, are similar. However, in 2019 there was a significant deviation from the averages in August and September totals. Those two months did not see similar totals going back to 2010, meaning they are likely an anomaly. Future use of force reviews will monitor August and September for long-term changes.

## 2019 Southern District Patrol Use of Force Monthly Comparison

Table 69



**Work Groups:** In regards to day-off group assignments, the 10-year data for work groups was not available. All day-off group information is from the years 2015 to 2019. It is also important to remember the data in table 86 below shows the number of officers involved in a use of force in the Southern District – not the number of individuals who had force used on them during an arrest or detainment.

Southern District Patrol Use of Force Work Group Comparison						
	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Totals
Red Group	<b>2015-2019 Average 11.2 (56.00%)</b>					<b>NA</b>
	<b>4</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>56</b>
	33.33%	61.11%	75.55%	56.67%	50.00%	56.00%
Blue Group	<b>2015-2019 Average 6.2 (31.00%)</b>					<b>NA</b>
	<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>31</b>
	58.33%	38.89%	12.50%	26.67%	29.17%	31.00%
Supervisor	<b>2015-2019 Average 1.6 (8.00%)</b>					<b>NA</b>
	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>8</b>
	0.00%	0.00%	6.25%	13.33%	12.50%	8.00%
Other Groups*	<b>2015-2019 Average 1.0 (5.00%)</b>					<b>NA</b>
	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>
	8.33%	0.00%	6.25%	3.33%	8.33%	5.00%

The (\*) references other groups including any other sworn officers who are not assigned to the Red or Blue Groups or work as a patrol

Table 86

The Red Group officers accounted for the majority (56.00%) of uses of force in the Southern District between 2015 and 2019. The Blue Group was responsible for 31.00% of uses of force while supervisors had 8.00% and other groups had 5.00%. In total, 100 officers were directly involved in a use of force in the Southern District.




Chart 70 above shows officer assignments at the time force was used in the Southern District during 2019. Table 86 on the previous page presents the same statistical information with percentages for each time category and day-off group.

In 2019, the engagement for both Red and Blue day-off groups were fairly similar to the 5-year average. In 2018, the Red Group had a 5-year high of 17 – which was about six uses of force above the average. Red Group also dropped well below the 5-year average in 2015 with just four uses of force. The Blue Group did not go more than two above the average in any given year, but did drop to a low of two uses of force (four below average) in 2017. The supervisors had a relatively high year in 2018, but with a small sample size.

Southern District Patrol Specifics in 2019									
	Red Group		Blue Group		Supervisor		Other Group*		Total Officers
<b>Daytime</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>50.00%</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>33.33%</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>16.67%</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>0600-1400</b>	25.00%		28.57%		0.00%		50.00%		25.00%
<b>Afternoon</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>58.33%</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>16.67%</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>16.67%</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>8.33%</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>1400-2200</b>	58.33%		28.57%		66.67%		50.00%		50.00%
<b>Overnight</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>33.33%</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>50.00%</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>16.67%</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>2200-0600</b>	16.67%		42.86%		33.33%		0.00%		25.00%
<b>Total Officers</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>50.00%</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>29.17%</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>12.50%</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>8.33%</b>	<b>24</b>

The (\*) references two senior patrol officers who are assigned outside the Red and Blue Patrol Groups.

Table 87

Specific to 2019, the majority of uses of force occurred during the afternoon hours. The afternoon hours had twice as many uses of force as either the daytime or afternoon time frames. Within the afternoon hours, the Red Group had a high of seven uses of force. That compares to two from

Blue Group and two from the supervisor group. The discrepancy in the afternoon did not carry over to the daytime or overnight time frames. Those times were more consistent between groups.

Southern District Patrol Average Age of Officer										
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Southern District	2010-2014 Average 31.8					2015-2019 Average 34.3				
	29.2	30.9	30.0	34.6	34.1	34.9	35.1	33.9	32.4	35.0
All Patrol Average	2010-2014 Average 33.5					2015-2019 Average 34.5				
	31.5	32.3	34.7	35.3	33.6	36.3	34.2	34.8	34.0	33.3
Difference	-2.3	-1.4	-4.7	-0.7	0.5	-1.4	0.9	-0.9	-1.6	1.7

Table 88

**Average Age:** The average age of officers working in the Southern District trended older between 2010 and 2019. While this was also true of the citywide trend, the Southern District trend saw a larger increase. By 2019, the 5-year averages were nearly identical even though the Southern District was 1.7 years older. The 10-year average was 33.0 years old for patrol officers who used force in the Southern District.

Southern District Patrol Average Work Experience of Officer at the Appleton Police Department										
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Southern District	2010-2014 Average 7.1					2015-2019 Average 9.1				
	4.3	6.2	6.8	9.1	9.3	10.4	9.8	9.8	6.6	9.1
All Patrol Average	2010-2014 Average 8.5					2015-2019 Average 9.1				
	6.5	7.0	9.9	10.0	9.0	11.1	8.4	9.8	8.5	7.6
Difference	-2.2	-0.8	-3.1	-0.9	0.3	-0.7	1.4	0.0	-1.9	1.5

Table 89

**Average Experience:** The average work experience for patrol officers at the Appleton Police Department trended upward for both the citywide average and the Southern District. The average experience level was nearly identical to the Northern District and just over a year less than Downtown District officers. The Southern District patrol 10-year average work experience was 8.1 years.

## SRO Unit in Schools

The School Resource Unit at the Appleton Police Department consists of 11 school resource officers, one sensitive crimes investigator, and one supervisory lieutenant. These officers serve a total of 36 schools and roughly 18,000 students in the Appleton Area School District.



Between 2010 and 2019, the SRO Unit had 58 uses of force either on AASD property or at a location directly related to a school district function. The vast majority of these uses of force involved a decentralization to try and gain control of a student. Most importantly, none of these uses of force resulted in significant injury.

Appleton police officers are trained to attempt de-escalation techniques prior to using force whenever possible. When the decision is made to use force, officers go to great lengths to minimize the risk of injury to students and school staff. This is especially true when officers are interacting with smaller, younger individuals.

SRO Unit Call Volume and Officer Involvement Summary								
	Previous 5-Yr	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Current 5-Yr	Total 10-Yr
Calls for Service	5.2 8.81%	9 19.15%	7 14.58%	3 5.66%	5 7.25%	8 12.31%	6.4 11.35%	5.8 10.05%
Involved Individuals	5.2 8.39%	9 18.37%	7 14.29%	3 5.66%	5 7.04%	8 12.12%	6.4 11.11%	5.8 9.70%
Involved Officers	5.4 6.46%	9 14.75%	8 11.94%	3 4.29%	5 5.49%	8 8.99%	6.6 8.73%	6.0 7.54%
Officers in Proximity	6.4 4.82%	13 12.62%	8 7.21%	3 2.63%	6 3.45%	8 5.06%	7.6 5.76%	7.0 5.29%

Table 90

Over the 10-year period, the SRO Unit averaged 5.8 calls for service each year that involved a use of force. The data showed a wide range in the numbers of time force was required. In 2013, there were just two uses of force. By the next year, the total had grown to 11 by school resource officers. While the comparison of averages would suggest use of force incidents were consistent, the wide range of year-over-year totals shows no predictable trend.

The number of involved students was equal to the number of calls for service – meaning force was not required on multiple students at the same time. The vast majority of uses of force by the SRO Unit involved a single student causing a disturbance. There were just two incidents that had a second officer assist in controlling a student.

The uses of force were broken down into four categories – grade school, middle school, high school, and off campus. Juveniles cause disturbances at all grade levels, but those rising to a level requiring a use of force were much more prevalent at the high school level. This is understandable since many high school students have reached a physical size comparable to the officers.




Chart 71 above shows the number of times force was used at each grade level in 2019. The chart also shows the 5-year and 10-year averages for each grade level. Table 91 presents the same information in a more detailed format.

SRO Unit Uses of Force on AASD Property											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
Grade School	2010-2014 Average 0.8 (15.38%)					2015-2019 Average 0.4 (6.25%)					0.6
	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	6
	0.00%	66.67%	14.29%	0.00%	9.09%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	25.00%	10.34%
Middle School	2010-2014 Average 0.2 (3.85%)					2015-2019 Average 0.4 (6.25%)					0.3
	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	3
	0.00%	0.00%	14.29%	0.00%	0.00%	11.11%	14.29%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	5.17%
High School	2010-2014 Average 4.0 (76.92%)					2015-2019 Average 4.4 (68.75%)					3.9
	3	1	4	2	10	6	3	2	5	6	42
	100%	33.33%	57.14%	100%	90.91%	66.67%	42.86%	66.67%	100%	75.00%	72.41%
Off Campus	2010-2014 Average 0.2 (3.85%)					2015-2019 Average 1.2 (18.75%)					0.7
	0	0	1	0	0	2	3	1	0	0	7
	0.00%	0.00%	14.29%	0.00%	0.00%	22.22%	42.86%	33.33%	0.00%	0.00%	12.07%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>58</b>

Table 91

Over half of all uses of force by the SRO Unit (51.72%) occurred at Appleton West High School. A likely factor in this SEBD (Severe Emotional/Behavioral Disability) program offered at the high school. The second highest total (17.24%) occurred at Appleton East High School. Appleton East does have an EBD (Emotional/Behavioral Disability) program, but the students enrolled do not require the same level of assistance as Appleton West.

Specific locations where uses of force by the SRO Unit took place during this analysis period included:

- Appleton West High School **(30)** 51.72%
- Appleton East High School **(10)** 17.24%
- Off Campus **(8)** 13.79%
- McKinley Elementary **(3)** 5.17%
- Appleton North High School **(2)** 3.45%
- Kaleidoscope Academy **(2)** 3.45%
- James Madison Middle School **(1)** 1.72%
- Foster Elementary School **(1)** 1.72%
- Edna Ferber Elementary School **(1)** 1.72%

In 2019, the eight total uses of force occurred in three schools; Appleton West High School (5), McKinley Elementary (2), and Appleton North High School (1).

As mentioned previously, officers tried to minimize the risk of injuries to students whenever a use of force was required. This was accomplished, in part, with the use of lower levels of force such as decentralizations more frequently than other force options.

Between 2010 and 2019, school resource officers utilized a decentralization on 55 (94.83%) of the 58 students who had force used on AASD property or related to an AASD incident.

Decentralizations were an important factor in gaining control of each juvenile and limiting the amount of injury. In each instance, the officer was able to control the rate of decent while protecting the juvenile’s head and neck area.

Decentralizations were the most frequently used (55) force option. Beyond decentralizations, school resource officers used one pressure point (1.72%), two stuns (3.45%), one knee strike (1.72%), and one TASER deployment (1.72%). These other use of force options were not even close to the frequency of decentralizations. The 3-Point Shin-on-Top position was used four times (6.90%). However, while that position is tracked it is not a use of force.

Perhaps more importantly were the number of techniques that were not used by school resource officers on juveniles. During the 10-year analysis period, no student was struck with a hand strike, elbow strike, defused strike, leg kick, baton strike, or OC spray deployment. Officers are aware these types of strikes have a higher potential of danger for smaller, younger individuals. Refer to table 92 on the next page for a more detailed breakdown of techniques utilized.

Injuries reported by juveniles due to a use of force were tracked using two different methods. The first method was with documentation of any claimed or visible injuries. The second method was with tracking medical treatment after a use of force. The results of both methods showed while just under 69% reported no injuries, 91.38% required no medical treatment due to a use of force. This can be attributed to the 31% reported injuries being very minor in nature.

Techniques Utilized by School Resource Officers								
	Previous 5-Yr Av	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Current 5-Yr Av	Total 10-Yr
Pressure Points	0.0	1	0	0	0	0	0.2	0.1
	0.00%	11.11%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.13%	1.72%
3-Point Shin-on-Top	0.0	1	2	0	1	0	0.8	0.4
	0.00%	1.11%	28.57%	0.00%	20.00%	0.00%	12.50%	6.90%
Decentralizations	5.0	8	7	3	5	7	6.0	5.5
	96.15%	88.89%	100%	100%	100%	87.50%	96.75%	94.83%
Vertical/Ground Stuns	0.2	1	0	0	0	0	0.2	0.2
	3.85%	11.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.13%	3.45%
Hand Strikes	0.0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Elbow Strikes	0.0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Defused Strikes	0.0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Knee Strikes	0.0	0	1	0	0	0	0.2	0.1
	0.00%	0.00%	14.29%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.13%	1.72%
Leg Kicks	0.0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
TASER Deployments	0.0	0	0	0	0	1	0.2	0.1
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	12.50%	3.13%	1.72%
Baton Strikes	0.0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
OC Sprays	0.0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Kinetic Energy Impact Weapons	0.0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Canine Bites	0.0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

Table 92

**Student Injury:** In regards to injuries caused by a use of force, just 11 (18.97%) individuals had visible injuries. Examples included bumps, bruises, or small abrasions. The seven claimed injuries were juveniles who said they felt sore or strained after the use of force. The one use of force which resulted in being medically treated and released was a claim of neck pain. He was transported for examination as a precaution and released shortly afterwards. Refer to table 94 on the next page for further.


Use of Force Resulting in Injury to Involved Individual											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
None	2010-2014 Average 3.4 (65.38%)					2015-2019 Average 4.6 (71.88%)					4.0
	2	2	5	0	8	7	5	1	3	7	40
	66.67%	66.67%	71.43%	0.00%	72.73%	77.78%	71.43%	33.33%	60.00%	87.50%	68.97%
Claimed	2010-2014 Average 1.0 (19.23%)					2015-2019 Average 0.4 (6.25%)					0.7
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	7
	33.33%	33.33%	14.29%	50.00%	9.09%	11.11%	14.29%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	12.07%
Visible	2010-2014 Average 0.8 (15.38%)					2015-2019 Average 1.4 (21.88%)					1.1
	0	0	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	11
	0.00%	0.00%	14.29%	50.00%	18.18%	11.11%	14.29%	66.67%	40.00%	12.50%	18.97%
Totals	3	3	7	2	11	9	7	3	5	8	58


Table 93

Required Student Medical Treatment After a Use of Force											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
None	2010-2014 Average 4.8 (92.31%)					2015-2019 Average 5.8 (90.63%)					5.3
	3	3	7	2	9	9	4	3	5	8	53
	100%	100%	100%	100%	81.82%	100%	57.14%	100%	100%	100%	91.38%
Waiver	2010-2014 Average 0.0 (0.00%)					2015-2019 Average 0.4 (6.25%)					0.2
	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	28.57%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.45%
First Aid	2010-2014 Average 0.4 (7.69%)					2015-2019 Average 0.0 (0.00%)					0.2
	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	18.18%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.45%
Treated / Released	2010-2014 Average 0.0 (0.00%)					2015-2019 Average 0.2 (3.13%)					0.1
	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	14.29%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.72%
Treated / Admitted	2010-2014 Average 0.0 (0.00%)					2015-2019 Average 0.0 (0.00%)					0.0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Other	2010-2014 Average 0.0 (0.00%)					2015-2019 Average 0.0 (0.00%)					0.0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Totals	3	3	7	2	11	9	7	3	5	8	58

Table 94

**Time of Day:** During the analysis period, the time of day was a factor as to when a use of force occurred. Between 2010 and 2019, there were no uses of force prior to 8am or after 3pm. That would be expected based on typical school hours. During the school day, use of force incidents did increase as the day progressed closer to the lunch hours.





**Day of Week:** Between 2010 and 2019, the day of the week did seem to contribute to when a use of force occurred. Chart 72 above shows the 2019 data compared to the most recent 5-year average and the overall 10-year average. Despite what is shown for Tuesdays in 2019, a downward trend in occurrences was recorded.

The data did show a clear upward trend for uses of force on a Friday. The 5-year average between 2010 and 2014 had 0.6 uses of force. The 5-year average between 2015 and 2019 rose to 2.0 uses of force. The increase continued with three uses of force recorded in 2019. Table 95 below provides a detailed breakdown of the daily breakdown.

SRO Unit Uses of Force by Day of Week											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
Monday	<b>2010-2014 Average 0.8 (15.38%)</b>					<b>2015-2019 Average 1.6 (25.00%)</b>					<b>1.2</b>
	0	0	1	0	3	3	0	0	3	2	12
	0.00%	0.00%	14.29%	0.00%	27.27%	33.33%	0.00%	0.00%	60.00%	25.00%	20.69%
Tuesday	<b>2010-2014 Average 2.2 (42.31%)</b>					<b>2015-2019 Average 1.0 (15.63%)</b>					<b>1.6</b>
	2	2	2	1	4	1	2	0	0	2	16
	66.67%	66.67%	28.57%	50.00%	36.36%	11.11%	28.57%	0.00%	0.00%	25.00%	27.59%
Wednesday	<b>2010-2014 Average 0.8 (15.38%)</b>					<b>2015-2019 Average 0.8 (12.50%)</b>					<b>0.8</b>
	0	0	1	1	2	1	1	0	1	1	8
	0.00%	0.00%	14.29%	50.00%	18.18%	11.11%	14.29%	0.00%	20.00%	12.50%	13.79%
Thursday	<b>2010-2014 Average 0.8 (15.38%)</b>					<b>2015-2019 Average 1.0 (15.63%)</b>					<b>0.9</b>
	1	0	2	0	1	1	2	2	0	0	9
	33.33%	0.00%	28.57%	0.00%	9.09%	11.11%	28.57%	66.67%	0.00%	0.00%	15.52%
Friday	<b>2010-2014 Average 0.6 (11.54%)</b>					<b>2015-2019 Average 2.0 (31.25%)</b>					<b>1.3</b>
	0	1	1	0	1	3	2	1	1	3	13
	0.00%	33.33%	14.29%	0.00%	9.09%	33.33%	28.57	33.33%	20.00%	37.50	22.41%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>58</b>


Table 95

**Month of Year:** The month of September was the most significant month in regards to uses of force. The 12 recorded in September was roughly twice the total of other months during the school year with the exception of nine in December. It is possible the September numbers are high as students adjust to the constraints of school versus less restrictive summer schedules.

<b>SRO Unit Uses of Force by Month Breakdown</b>											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
January	<b>2010-2014 Average 0.0 (0.00%)</b>					<b>2015-2019 Average 1.0 (15.63%)</b>					<b>0.5</b>
	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	1	0	5
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	33.33%	14.29%	0.00%	20.00%	0.00%	8.62%
February	<b>2010-2014 Average 0.4 (7.69%)</b>					<b>2015-2019 Average 0.8 (12.50%)</b>					<b>0.6</b>
	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	6
	33.33%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	9.09%	11.11%	0.00%	33.33%	20.00%	12.50%	10.34%
March	<b>2010-2014 Average 0.8 (15.38%)</b>					<b>2015-2019 Average 0.6 (9.38%)</b>					<b>0.7</b>
	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	2	7
	33.33%	33.33%	0.00%	0.00%	18.18%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	20.00%	25.00%	12.07%
April	<b>2010-2014 Average 0.2 (3.85%)</b>					<b>2015-2019 Average 0.8 (12.50%)</b>					<b>0.5</b>
	0	1	0	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	5
	0.00%	33.33%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	22.22%	14.29%	33.33%	0.00%	0.00%	8.62%
May	<b>2010-2014 Average 1.0 (19.23%)</b>					<b>2015-2019 Average 0.2 (3.13%)</b>					<b>0.6</b>
	0	1	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	6
	0.00%	33.33%	57.14%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	12.50%	10.34%
June	<b>2010-2014 Average 0.0 (0.00%)</b>					<b>2015-2019 Average 0.2 (3.13%)</b>					<b>0.1</b>
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	33.33%	0.00%	0.00%	1.72%
July	<b>2010-2014 Average 0.0 (0.00%)</b>					<b>2015-2019 Average 0.0 (0.00%)</b>					<b>0.0</b>
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
August	<b>2010-2014 Average 0.0 (0.00%)</b>					<b>2015-2019 Average 0.0 (0.00%)</b>					<b>0.0</b>
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
September	<b>2010-2014 Average 1.6 (30.77%)</b>					<b>2015-2019 Average 0.8 (12.50%)</b>					<b>1.2</b>
	0	0	3	2	3	0	2	0	0	2	12
	0.00%	0.00%	42.86%	100%	27.27%	0.00%	28.57%	0.00%	0.00%	25.00%	20.69%
October	<b>2010-2014 Average 0.2 (3.85%)</b>					<b>2015-2019 Average 0.6 (9.38%)</b>					<b>0.4</b>
	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	4
	33.33%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	11.11%	28.57%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	6.90%
November	<b>2010-2014 Average 0.4 (7.69%)</b>					<b>2015-2019 Average 0.2 (3.13%)</b>					<b>0.3</b>
	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	3
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	18.18%	11.11%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	5.17%
December	<b>2010-2014 Average 0.6 (11.54%)</b>					<b>2015-2019 Average 1.2 (18.75%)</b>					<b>0.9</b>
	0	0	0	0	3	1	1	0	2	2	9
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	27.27%	11.11%	14.29%	0.00%	40.00%	25.00%	15.52%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>58</b>

Table 96

Table 96 above breaks down the month-by-month use of force numbers between 2010 and 2019. Chart 74 on the next page provides a visual representation of the same information. In the chart are uses of force from 2019 along with the most recent 5-year average and a 10-year average.



The data shown in chart 74 shows relatively consistent averages. December has a slight increasing trend that continued into 2019. March and September both showed numbers twice the averages. However, those are off a relatively small sample size.

SRO Unit Average Age of Officer										
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
SRO Unit	2010-2014 Average 42.1					2015-2019 Average 35.2				
	41.3	41.5	43.7	38.3	45.5	33.6	35.6	30.6	38.5	37.6
Overall Average	2010-2014 Average 34.1					2015-2019 Average 34.6				
	31.9	32.7	35.4	35.4	35.0	35.9	34.6	34.6	34.2	33.7
Difference	9.4	8.8	8.3	2.9	10.5	-2.3	1.0	-4.0	4.3	3.9

Table 97

**Average Age:** The average age of officers working in the SRO Unit who were involved in a use of force declined by 6.9 years during the analysis period. However, the average age of all Appleton officers who were in a use of force increased by 0.5 years over the same time period. The highest average SRO age was 45.5 in 2014. By comparison, the highest overall average age was 35.9 in 2015. In just two of the eight years (2015 and 2017) the SRO Unit averaged younger than the overall average age of officers in a use of force.

SRO Unit Average Work Experience of Officer at the Appleton Police Department										
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
SRO Unit	2010-2014 Average 15.9					2015-2019 Average 9.3				
	18.0	15.3	17.0	12.2	17.0	8.2	10.5	7.9	7.2	12.6
Overall Average	2010-2014 Average 8.9					2015-2019 Average 9.1				
	7.0	7.3	10.4	10.0	9.9	10.7	8.7	9.7	8.4	8.0
Difference	11.0	8.0	6.6	2.2	7.1	-2.5	1.8	-1.8	-1.2	4.6

Table 98

**Average Experience:** The average work experience for officers at the Appleton Police Department who were involved in a use of force increased slightly between 2010 and 2019. Similar to SRO average ages, the work experience within the SRO Unit declined dramatically over the same time period. The 5-year average between 2010 and 2014 was 15.9 years and had a high of 18.0 years of experience. The 5-year average between 2015 and 2019 was 9.3 years and had a high of 12.6 years of experience.

## Daytime 0600-1400 Patrol

During the 2010 to 2019 analysis period, the daytime 0600-1400 hours had 78 calls for service on patrol that included a use of force. These calls for service involved 81 individuals and required 106 officers to use force during the detainment process.



These numbers, along with the remainder of data in this section, do not include uses of force by a school resource officer either on Appleton Area School District property or working on an AASD related incident. Those are addressed in the SRO Unit breakout on page 131.

Officers are trained to have at least one assisting officer on scene when taking someone into custody or dealing with a dangerous situation. Between 2010 and 2019, the daytime 0600-1400 patrol officers averaged a ratio of 2.07 officers on scene for each individual who had force used on them. The proper amount of officers on scene often resulted in a situation which ended faster and with less injury to the individual and the officers.

Daytime 0600-1400 Patrol Call Volume and Officer Involvement Summary								
	Previous 5-Yr	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Current 5-Yr	Total 10-Yr
Calls for Service	6.6 12.27%	6 15.79%	5 12.20%	8 16.00%	15 23.44%	11 19.30%	9.0 18.00%	7.8 15.03%
Involved Individuals	7.0 12.32%	7 17.50%	5 11.90%	8 16.00%	15 22.73%	11 18.97%	9.2 17.97%	8.1 15.00%
Involved Officers	9.4 12.02%	8 15.38%	6 10.17%	10 14.93%	23 26.74%	12 14.81%	11.8 17.10%	10.6 14.40%
Officers in Proximity	13.4 10.60%	12 13.33%	13 12.62%	16 14.41%	35 20.83%	25 16.67%	20.2 16.24%	16.8 13.40%

Table 99

While the daytime 0600-1400 patrol accounts for one third of the day, the total times force was used equated to much less than a third of total patrol incidents. The 81 individuals involved in a use of force between 0600 and 1400 was 15% of all uses of force. The declining percentages for officers involved (14.40%) and officers in close proximity (13.40%) also show that daytime 0600-1400 patrol officers had less support from back-up officers during a use of force than either the afternoon 1400-2200 or overnight 2200-0600 timeframes.

Table 100 on the next page details seven situational specific categories of information regarding individuals who had force used on them by patrol officers who were on duty between 0600 and 1400 hours. Overall, this time period had fewer uses of force during this analysis period than the other two time frames. This correlates with the relatively low numbers seen in the table breakdown. The only two categories which were close to the other time frames were foot pursuits and dealing with individuals who were under the influence of either drugs or alcohol.

Daytime 0600-1400 Patrol Situational Specifics and Individual Information Summary								
	Previous 5-Yr Av	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Current 5-Yr Av	Total 10-Yr Av
Domestic Related	0.8	0	0	1	1	0	0.4	0.6
	11.43%	0.00%	0.00%	12.50%	6.67%	0.00%	4.35%	7.41%
Under the Influence	1.6	1	1	0	2	4	1.6	1.6
	22.86%	14.29%	20.00%	0.00%	13.33%	36.36%	17.39%	19.75%
Foot Pursuit	1.0	1	2	2	5	3	2.6	1.8
	14.29%	14.29%	40.00%	25.00%	33.33%	27.27%	28.26%	22.22%
Spit Hood	0.0	0	0	0	1	2	0.6	0.3
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	6.67%	18.18%	6.52%	3.70%
Hobble	1.0	0	1	0	2	0	0.6	0.8
	14.29%	0.00%	20.00%	0.00%	13.33%	0.00%	6.52%	9.88%
While Detained	1.0	0	0	0	2	1	0.6	0.8
	14.29%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	13.33%	9.09%	6.52%	9.88%
Emergency Detention	1.8	1	0	0	2	1	0.8	1.3
	25.71%	14.29%	0.00%	0.00%	13.33%	9.09%	8.70%	16.05%

Table 100

**Domestic Related:** The daytime 0600-1400 patrol time period had a total of six uses of force (7.41% of incidents) on individuals during a domestic related investigation between 2010 and 2019. That was three time less than the afternoon 1400-2200 patrol and four times less than the overnight 2200-0600 patrol. The highest year during the daytime was in 2013 with two. In five of the years there were no domestic related uses of force, including a three year consecutive span between 2014 and 2016. No major outliers were seen in the numbers during this analysis period. Refer back to page 33 for more information.

**Under the Influence:** Between 2010 and 2019, there were 16 uses of force (19.75% of incidents) during daytime 0600-1400 patrol on individuals believed to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. A high of four was reached twice (2013 and 2019) while a low of zero occurred three times (2010, 2011, and 2017). The 5-year and 10-year averages were all 1.6 individuals/year with no real outliers seen in the data. Refer back to page 36 for more information.

**Foot Pursuit:** There were a total of 18 uses of force (22.22% of incidents) during the 2010 to 2019 analysis period that involved a foot pursuit during the daytime 0600-1400 patrol timeframe. This was far less than the afternoon 1400-2200 patrol total (44) or the overnight 2200-0600 total (57) during the same time period. The 5-year average between 2010 and 2014 more than doubled between the years 2015 and 2019. This was due in part to five foot pursuits involving a use of force recorded in 2018 which was well above typical yearly totals. Refer back to page 27 for more information.

**Spit Hood:** The daytime 0600-1400 patrol had a total of three spit hood applications (3.70% of incidents) related to a use of force between 2010 and 2019. Two of the applications occurred in 2019, while the third occurred in 2018. From 2010 to 2017 there were no spit hood applications required during the 0600-1400 time period. Subsequent analysis will determine if this is a new trend or if applications will return to past levels. Refer back to page 28 for more information.


**Hobble:** During the 2010 to 2019 analysis period, a hobble was used on an individual eight times (9.88% of incidents) during daytime 0600-1400 patrol. This was lower than the 39 applied during the overnight patrol hours and 35 during the afternoon patrol hours. Data showed hobble applications during the daytime declined during this analysis period and had zero uses in 2019. Refer back to page 28 for more information.

**While Physically Detained:** There were a total of eight individuals (9.88% of incidents) who had force used on them during daytime 0600-1400 patrol after being placed in handcuffs between 2010 and 2019. While this was less than the afternoon or overnight time periods, it was consistent as a percentage. The afternoon 1400-2200 patrol used force on a physically detained person during 9.52% of incidents while the overnight 2200-0600 patrol used force during 9.13% of incidents when someone was physically detained. The highest number of occurrences during the daytime was two, which happened twice during this analysis period. Refer back to page 58 for more information.

**Emergency Detentions:** Between 2010 and 2019, there were 13 uses of force (16.05% of incidents) during daytime 0600-1400 patrol that resulted in an individual being placed on an emergency detention. As a percentage, the 16.05% of daytime uses of force with an emergency detention was higher than the 11.43% of afternoon (24) and 9.92% of overnight (25) incidents. The highest year of incidents was five in 2014, while the seven of the years recorded just one use of force with an emergency detention. Refer back to page 34 for more information.

**Populous:** The majority of individuals involved in a use of force during daytime 0600-1400 patrol between 2010 and 2019 were Appleton residents. Reference chart 75 for a visual representation. A total of 45 (55.56%) were Appleton residents. Those remaining were 22 (27.16%) non-residents and 14 (17.28%) homeless. Table 101 on the next page breaks out the data in a more detailed format.

Year-over-year, the data showed only one major anomaly in regards to populous. That involved the number of homeless who were involved in a use of force in 2018. Previously, the high had been just three individuals. Four of the years in the analysis did not have any homeless individuals involved in a use of force during daytime 0600-1400 patrol.



No major trends were identified during this analysis period. The number of involved residents remained relatively consistent. The number of non-residents did increase slightly. The 5-year average between 2010 and 2014 was 1.6 individuals each year. That number increased to 2.8 individuals each year between 2015 and 2019.

Daytime 0600-1400 Patrol Populous of Involved Individuals											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
Resident	2010-2014 Average 4.4 (62.86%)					2015-2019 Average 4.6 (50.00%)					2.5
	3	5	5	4	5	6	2	5	4	6	45
	60.00%	100%	62.50%	57.14%	50.00%	85.71%	40.00%	62.50%	26.67%	54.55%	55.56%
Non-Resident	2010-2014 Average 1.6 (22.86%)					2015-2019 Average 2.8 (30.43%)					2.2
	1	0	2	3	2	1	3	2	5	3	22
	20.00%	0.00%	25.00%	42.86%	20.00%	14.29%	60.00%	25.00%	33.33%	27.27%	27.16%
Homeless	2010-2014 Average 1.0 (14.29%)					2015-2019 Average 1.8 (19.57%)					1.4
	1	0	1	0	3	0	0	1	6	2	14
	20.00%	0.00%	12.50%	0.00%	30.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1250%	40.00%	18.18%	17.28%


Table 101

**Time of Day:** In regards to time of day, the daytime 0600-1400 patrol remained relatively consistent within each hour throughout the analysis. The exception would be an increase in average involved individuals during the 1000-1200 time periods. The only decrease seen in averages was shown during the 1300-1400 time frame. Refer to table 102 below for further.


Daytime 0600-1400 Patrol Hourly Breakdown											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
0600	2010-2014 Average 0.8 (11.43%)					2015-2019 Average 0.6 (6.52%)					0.7
	1	1	0	2	0	0	2	0	1	0	7
	20.00%	20.00%	0.00%	28.57%	0.00%	0.00%	40.00%	0.00%	6.67%	0.00%	8.64%
0700	2010-2014 Average 0.6 (8.57%)					2015-2019 Average 0.6 (6.52%)					0.6
	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	1	6
	20.00%	0.00%	0.00%	14.29%	10.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	13.33%	9.09%	7.41%
0800	2010-2014 Average 0.6 (8.57%)					2015-2019 Average 0.4 (4.35%)					0.5
	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	5
	20.00%	0.00%	0.00%	14.29%	10.00%	14.29%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	9.09%	6.17%
0900	2010-2014 Average 1.2 (17.14%)					2015-2019 Average 1.4 (15.22%)					1.3
	0	0	2	0	4	0	0	3	3	1	13
	0.00%	0.00%	25.00%	0.00%	40.00%	0.00%	0.00%	37.50%	20.00%	9.09%	16.05%
1000	2010-2014 Average 0.4 (5.71%)					2015-2019 Average 2.0 (21.74%)					1.2
	0	1	0	0	1	2	1	3	3	1	12
	0.00%	20.00%	0.00%	0.00%	10.00%	28.57%	20.00%	37.50%	20.00%	9.09%	14.81%
1100	2010-2014 Average 0.4 (5.71%)					2015-2019 Average 2.2 (23.91%)					1.3
	0	1	0	1	0	3	1	1	5	1	13
	0.00%	20.00%	0.00%	14.29%	0.00%	42.86%	20.00%	12.50%	33.33%	9.09%	16.05%
1200	2010-2014 Average 1.2 (17.14%)					2015-2019 Average 1.2 (13.04%)					1.2
	0	0	3	1	2	0	1	1	0	4	12
	0.00%	0.00%	37.50%	14.29%	20.00%	0.00%	20.00%	12.50%	0.00%	36.36%	14.81%
1300	2010-2014 Average 1.8 (25.71%)					2015-2019 Average 0.8 (8.70%)					1.3
	2	2	3	1	1	1	0	0	1	2	13
	40.00%	40.00%	37.50%	14.29%	10.00%	14.29%	0.00%	0.00%	6.67%	18.18%	16.05%

Table 102

Specific to 2019, the 1200-1300 time frame was significantly higher than both the 5-year and 10-year averages. The Downtown District and Southern District individually had more than collective averages. Chart 76 on the next page provides a visual representation of the difference. In addition, the chart also shows the 0900-1100 time frames lower than the typical averages seen during daytime patrol hours.




**Day of Week:** The day of the week did not appear to be a major factor in the number of times force was used on an individual during the daytime 0600-1400 patrol timeframe. Monday and Tuesday were the highest day of the week. The other days of the week, including Friday and Saturday, averaged just one use of force on an individual. Statistically speaking, the weekend did not prove to be a factor. Chart 77 below and table 103 on the next page show the 5-year and 10-year averages are nearly identical and consistent with the 2019 incidents.



Daytime 0600-1400 Patrol Uses of Force by Day of Week											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
Sunday	2010-2014 Average 0.8 (11.43%)					2015-2019 Average 1.2 (13.04%)					1.0
	0	0	1	2	1	1	2	0	2	1	10
	0.00%	0.00%	12.50%	28.57%	10.00%	14.29%	40.00%	0.00%	13.33%	9.09%	12.35%
Monday	2010-2014 Average 2.4 (34.29%)					2015-2019 Average 1.8 (19.57%)					2.1
	1	3	4	1	3	2	1	1	2	3	21
	20.00%	60.00%	50.00%	14.29%	30.00%	28.57%	20.00%	12.50%	13.33%	27.27%	25.93%
Tuesday	2010-2014 Average 1.2 (17.14%)					2015-2019 Average 2.2 (23.91%)					1.7
	0	1	0	3	2	1	1	2	4	3	17
	0.00%	20.00%	0.00%	42.86%	20.00%	14.29%	20.00%	25.00%	26.67%	27.27%	20.99%
Wednesday	2010-2014 Average 0.6 (8.57%)					2015-2019 Average 1.2 (13.04%)					0.9
	0	0	2	1	0	3	0	1	1	1	9
	0.00%	0.00%	25.00%	14.29%	0.00%	42.86%	0.00%	12.50%	6.67%	9.09%	11.11%
Thursday	2010-2014 Average 0.8 (11.43%)					2015-2019 Average 0.8 (8.70%)					0.8
	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	1	8
	40.00%	20.00%	0.00%	0.00%	10.00%	0.00%	0.00%	12.50%	13.33%	9.09%	9.88%
Friday	2010-2014 Average 0.8 (11.43%)					2015-2019 Average 1.0 (10.87%)					0.9
	2	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	3	1	9
	40.00%	0.00%	12.50%	0.00%	10.00%	0.00%	0.00%	12.50%	20.00%	9.09%	11.11%
Saturday	2010-2014 Average 0.4 (5.71%)					2015-2019 Average 1.0 (10.87%)					0.7
	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	2	1	1	7
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	20.00%	0.00%	20.00%	25.00%	6.67%	9.09%	8.64%

Table 103

**Month of Year:** Overall, the month of the year did not make much of a difference in the number of times force was used during the daytime 0600-1400 patrol shifts. None of the 5-year or 10-year averages rose higher than two and the highest total in any year during the analysis period was three which occurred in multiple years. Between 2010 and 2019, July through August had the most uses of force on an individual. May had the fewest with just three.



Daytime 0600-1400 Patrol Uses of Force by Month Breakdown											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
January	2010-2014 Average 1.0 (14.29%)					2015-2019 Average 0.2 (2.17%)					0.6
	1	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	6
	20.00%	0.00%	25.00%	28.57%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	6.67%	0.00%	7.41%
February	2010-2014 Average 0.4 (5.71%)					2015-2019 Average 0.4 (4.35%)					0.4
	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	4
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	14.29%	10.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	6.67%	9.09%	4.94%
March	2010-2014 Average 0.6 (8.57%)					2015-2019 Average 0.8 (8.70%)					0.7
	0	1	1	1	0	0	2	1	1	0	7
	0.00%	20.00%	12.50%	14.29%	0.00%	0.00%	40.00%	12.50%	6.67%	0.00%	8.64%
April	2010-2014 Average 0.0 (0.00%)					2015-2019 Average 1.0 (10.87%)					0.5
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	5
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	12.50%	6.67%	27.27%	6.17%
May	2010-2014 Average 0.4 (5.71%)					2015-2019 Average 0.2 (2.17%)					0.3
	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
	20.00%	0.00%	12.50%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	9.09%	3.70%
June	2010-2014 Average 0.6 (8.57%)					2015-2019 Average 0.4 (4.35%)					0.5
	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	5
	20.00%	40.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	14.29%	0.00%	12.50%	0.00%	0.00%	6.17%
July	2010-2014 Average 0.8 (11.43%)					2015-2019 Average 1.4 (15.22%)					1.1
	2	0	1	0	1	0	0	3	3	1	11
	40.00%	0.00%	12.50%	0.00%	10.00%	0.00%	0.00%	37.50%	20.00%	9.09%	13.58%
August	2010-2014 Average 0.8 (11.43%)					2015-2019 Average 1.2 (13.04%)					1.0
	0	0	0	2	2	0	1	1	2	2	10
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	28.57%	20.00%	0.00%	20.00%	12.50%	13.33%	18.18%	12.35%
September	2010-2014 Average 1.4 (20.00%)					2015-2019 Average 0.6 (6.52%)					1.0
	0	2	1	1	3	1	0	0	1	1	10
	0.00%	40.00%	12.50%	14.29%	30.00%	14.29%	0.00%	0.00%	6.67%	9.09%	12.35%
October	2010-2014 Average 0.4 (5.71%)					2015-2019 Average 1.0 (10.87%)					0.7
	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	2	2	7
	0.00%	0.00%	12.50%	0.00%	10.00%	0.00%	20.00%	0.00%	13.33%	18.18%	8.64%
November	2010-2014 Average 0.4 (5.71%)					2015-2019 Average 1.4 (15.22%)					0.9
	0	0	0	0	2	3	1	0	3	0	9
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	20.00%	42.86%	20.00%	0.00%	20.00%	0.00%	11.11%
December	2010-2014 Average 0.2 (2.86%)					2015-2019 Average 0.6 (6.52%)					0.4
	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	4
	0.00%	0.00%	12.50%	0.00%	0.00%	28.57%	0.00%	12.50%	0.00%	0.00%	4.94%

Table 104

Specific to 2019, April had the most uses of force during the daytime 0600-1400 patrol time period. It was the only year in the analysis timeframe that April was the highest. It also marked an upward trend as April had no uses of force on an individual between 2010 and 2016. In 2017 and 2018, there were one use of force during each year.

**District Comparisons:** The districts did have an impact when comparing where a use of force occurred between 0600-1400 hours. The 5-year and 10-year averages were highest in the Downtown District. The Southern District averages were slightly lower, but relatively close to the averages downtown. The Northern District had the fewest of the three districts and only one use of force occurred outside the city (mutual aid) during the same time period.




Chart 79 above compares the uses of force from 2019 during the daytime 0600-1400 patrol timeframe to the 5-year and 10-year averages. Table 105 below offers additional information including yearly percentages.

Daytime 0600-1400 Patrol District Comparison								
	Previous 5-Yr Av	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Current 5-Yr Av	Total 10-Yr Av
Northern	1.8 25.71%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	3 20.00%	1 9.09%	0.8 8.70%	1.3 16.05%
Downtown	2.6 37.14%	5 71.43%	2 40.00%	5 62.50%	10 66.67%	5 45.45%	5.4 58.70%	4.0 49.38%
Southern	2.4 34.29%	2 28.57%	3 60.00%	3 37.50%	2 13.33%	5 45.45%	3.0 32.61%	2.7 33.33%
Out of City	0.2 2.86%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0.0 0.00%	0.1 1.23%


Table 105

**Northern District:** Between 2010 and 2019, the Northern District saw a decline in the number of times force was used on an individual during the 0600-1400 timeframe. In total, there were 13 uses of force, with nine of those occurring between 2010 and 2014. There were no uses of force between the years 2015 and 2017.

**Downtown District:** The Downtown District had a significant increase in the number of times force was used during the analysis period. The 5-year average between 2010 and 2014 involved an average of 2.6 individuals each year. The 5-year average between 2015 and 2019 increased to 5.4 individuals each year. The highest single year for any district was the downtown with 10 involved individuals in 2018. That does appear to be an anomaly as the year before and year after were just five and represented the second highest totals for the district.

**Southern District:** During the 2010 to 2019 analysis period, there was a small upward trend in the number of individuals who had force used them during the daytime 0600-1400 patrol timeframe. The 5-year average between 2010 and 2014 was 2.4 individuals involved in a use of force. However, the high during that range was six in 2014. The 5-year average between 2015 and 2019 increased to 3.0 individuals involved in a use of force. The high during this time period was five in 2019. In total, 27 individuals were involved in a use of force in the Southern District between 0600 and 1400 hours.

**Out of City:** The one time during this analysis period force was used outside of city limits within the daytime 0600-1400 patrol timeframe was in 2012.



**Work Groups:** In regards to day-off group assignments, the 10-year data for work groups was not available. Therefore, all information is from the years 2015-2019. It is also important to remember that the data in table 106 on the next page shows the number of officers involved in a use of force during the daytime 0600-1400 patrol group – not the number of individuals who had force used on them during an arrest or detainment.

**Red Group:** Between 2015 and 2019, the Red Group had the most uses of force between 0600 and 1400 hours. The 5-year average for that time was 4.6 officers each year. There was a relatively large range of totals for a small sample size. In 2015, there were just two officers involved in a use of force. Two years later, there were seven involved. Despite the range in difference, there were no real outliers in the data.

**Blue Group:** An initial look at the totals would suggest the Blue Group was not much different than the Red Group. The Red Group had 23 officers use force when the Blue Group had 20 over the same time period. The averages were also similar with 4.6 and 4.0 officers involved. However, over half of the involved officers from Blue Group had their use of force in the same year.

Daytime 0600-1400 Patrol Use of Force Day-Off Comparison						
	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Totals
Red Group	2015-2019 Average 4.6 (38.98%)					NA
	2	5	7	3	6	23
	25.00%	83.33%	70.00%	13.04%	50.00%	38.98%
Blue Group	2015-2019 Average 4.0 (33.90%)					NA
	3	1	0	13	3	20
	37.50%	16.67%	0.00%	56.52%	25.00%	33.90%
Supervisor	2015-2019 Average 1.6 (8.00%)					NA
	1	0	1	3	1	6
	12.50%	0.00%	10.00%	13.04%	8.33%	10.17%
Other Work Groups*	2015-2019 Average 2.0 (16.95%)					NA
	2	0	2	4	2	10
	25.00%	0.00%	20.00%	17.39%	16.95%	16.95%

The (\*) references ISU, SIU, CLO, BHO, Threat Assessment, and those in field training

Table 106

In 2017, officers from the Blue Group had zero uses of force between 0600 and 1400 hours. In 2018, there were 13 involved officers. The total then dropped to three officers involved in a use of force in 2019. While the averages and totals would suggest similarities between the Red and Blue Groups, there are differences the groups. The 2018 Blue Group outlier skewed the average and total much higher than the other four years in this time period.

**Supervisor:** Supervisors had a total of six uses of force between 2015 and 2019 during daytime 0600 to 1400 hours. No trends were observed during that time frame with each year finishing close to the 5-year average. The highest year was three in 2018 and the lowest was zero in 2016.

**Other Work Groups:** Officers assigned to groups other than patrol accounted for 10 uses of force between 0600 and 1400 hours. The 5-year high was four officer and the 5-year low was zero officers. The three remaining years fell right on the 2.0 officer average during the 2015 to 2019 time period.

Daytime 0600-1400 Patrol Specifics in 2019									
	Red Group		Blue Group		Supervisor		Other Groups*		Total Officers
Northern	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	1	100%	1
	0.00%		0.00%		0.00%		50.00%		8.33%
Downtown	3	60.00%	1	20.00%	1	20.00%	0	0.00%	5
	50.00%		33.33%		100%		0.00%		41.67%
Southern	3	50.00%	2	33.33%	0	0.00%	1	16.67%	6
	50.00%		66.67%		0.00%		50.00%		50.00%
Out of City	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0
	0.00%		0.00%		0.00%		0.00%		0.00%
<b>Total Officers</b>	6	50.00%	3	25.00%	1	8.33%	2	16.67%	12

The (\*) references ISU, SIU, CLO, BHO, Threat Assessment, and those in field training

Table 107

Specific to 2019, the Southern District had the most uses of force (6) between 0600-1400. The Downtown had one less with five uses of force. Interestingly, there was only one use of force in the Northern District. The Red Group had the highest uses of force with six, while the Blue Group had three. Supervisors accounted for just one use of force and all other work groups combined added two more in 2019.

Daytime 0600-1400 Patrol Average Age of Officer										
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Daytime Patrol	2010-2014 Average 36.0					2015-2019 Average 39.2				
	34.5	35.4	36.5	34.9	38.5	40.7	40.9	37.9	38.1	38.6
All Patrol Average	2010-2014 Average 33.5					2015-2019 Average 34.5				
	31.5	32.3	34.7	35.3	33.6	36.3	34.2	34.8	34.0	33.3
Difference	3.0	3.1	1.8	-0.4	4.9	4.4	6.7	3.1	4.1	5.3

Table 108

**Average Age:** The average age of officers on duty between 0600-1400 trended older between 2010 and 2016 before coming back down closer to the 10-year average. The overall patrol average age increased by one year over the same time period. In nine of the 10 years, the daytime patrol officers who used force were older than the overall patrol officers who used force. The one exception was in 2013. The largest age difference was in 2016 when daytime officers averaged 6.7 years older than the overall patrol officers who used force.

Daytime 0600-1400 Patrol Average Work Experience of Officer at the Appleton Police Department										
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Daytime Patrol	2010-2014 Average 11.5					2015-2019 Average 14.0				
	9.7	12.1	10.5	10.1	14.9	17.1	13.3	13.5	12.2	14.1
All Patrol Average	2010-2014 Average 8.5					2015-2019 Average 9.1				
	6.5	7.0	9.9	10.0	9.0	11.1	8.4	9.8	8.5	7.6
Difference	3.2	5.1	0.6	0.1	5.9	6.0	4.9	3.7	3.7	6.5

Table 109

**Average Experience:** The average work experience for patrol officers who were on duty between 0600-1400 and was involved in a use of force trended upward between 2010 and 2019. The 5-year average between 2010 and 2014 (11.5 years) increased by 2.5 years during the next five years to reach an average of 14.0 years. The overall patrol averages also increased, but by less than one year of experience. The analysis also showed that 2015 had the highest average experiences for both daytime patrol (17.1 years) and overall patrol experience (11.1 years). By all measures, the daytime 0600-1400 patrol had more experience than either the afternoon or overnight patrol officers and had the fewest uses of force.

## Afternoon 1400-2200 Patrol

During the 2010 to 2019 analysis period, the afternoon 1400-2200 hours had 203 calls for service on patrol that included a use of force. These calls for service included 210 individuals and required 289 officers to use force during the detainment process.

These numbers, along with the remainder of data in this section, do not include uses of force by a school resource officer either on Appleton Area School District property or working on an AASD related incident. Those are addressed in the SRO Unit breakout on page 131.



Officers are trained to have at least one assisting officer on scene when taking someone into custody or dealing with a dangerous situation. Between 2010 and 2019, the afternoon 1400-2200 patrol officers averaged a ratio of 2.33 officers on scene for each individual who had force used on them. The proper amount of officers on scene often resulted in a situation which ended faster and with less injury to the individual and the officers.

Afternoon 1400-2200 Patrol Call Volume and Officer Involvement Summary								
	Previous 5-Yr Av	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Current 5-Yr Av	Total 10-Yr Av
Calls for Service	17.8 33.09%	17 44.74%	18 43.90%	22 44.00%	28 43.75%	29 50.88%	22.8 45.60%	20.3 39.11%
Involved Individuals	18.6 32.75%	17 42.50%	19 45.24%	22 44.00%	29 43.94%	30 51.72%	23.4 45.70%	21.0 38.89%
Involved Officers	26.2 33.50%	26 50.00%	26 44.07%	28 41.79%	36 41.86%	42 51.85%	31.6 45.80%	28.9 39.27%
Officers in Proximity	43.4 34.34%	41 45.56%	36 34.95%	45 40.54%	73 43.45%	77 51.33%	54.4 43.73%	48.9 39.00%

Table 110

While the afternoon 1400-2200 patrol accounts for one third of the day, the total times force was used equated to more than a third of total patrol incidents. The 210 individuals involved in a use of force between 1400 and 2200 was 38.89% of all uses of force. However, the afternoon numbers trended upward. Between 2015 and 2019, the afternoon hours accounted for 45.70% of all involved individuals. The year-over-year consistency in percentages between individuals and officers also showed the 2.33 ratio was relatively consistent throughout the analysis period.

Table 111 on the next page details seven situational specific categories of information regarding individuals who had force used on them by patrol officers who were on duty between 1400 and 2200 hours. Overall, this time period had fewer uses of force than the overnight time period.

However, the overnight experienced a declining trend. Overnight patrol still had more uses of force than afternoon patrol, but by a relatively small amount. In more recent years, the afternoon patrol has averaged the most uses of force among all the time periods.

Afternoon 1400-2200 Patrol Situational Specifics and Individual Information Summary								
	Previous 5-Yr Av	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Current 5-Yr Av	Total 10-Yr Av
Domestic Related	1.6	1	0	2	4	4	2.2	1.9
	8.60%	5.88%	0.00%	9.09%	13.79%	13.33%	9.40%	9.05%
Under the Influence	3.6	6	7	8	12	11	8.8	6.2
	19.35%	35.29%	36.84%	36.36%	41.38%	36.67%	37.61%	29.52%
Foot Pursuit	3.4	3	1	7	6	10	5.4	4.4
	18.28%	17.65%	5.26%	31.82%	20.69%	33.33%	23.08%	20.95%
Spit Hood	0.6	0	0	1	0	1	0.4	0.5
	3.23%	0.00%	0.00%	4.55%	0.00%	3.33%	1.71%	2.38%
Hobble	2.2	4	4	3	8	5	4.8	3.5
	11.83%	23.53%	21.05%	13.64%	27.59%	16.67%	20.51%	16.67%
While Detained	1.8	2	2	2	2	3	2.2	2.0
	9.68%	11.76%	10.53%	9.09%	6.90%	10.00%	9.40%	9.52%
Emergency Detention	2.2	1	3	2	4	3	2.6	2.4
	11.83%	5.88%	15.79%	9.09%	13.79%	10.00%	11.11%	11.43%

Table 111

**Domestic Related:** The afternoon 1400-2200 patrol time period had a total of 19 uses of force (9.05% of incidents) on individuals during a domestic related investigation between 2010 and 2019. That was five less than during overnight patrol and 13 more than during daytime patrol. The afternoon timeframe also experienced an increase in occurrences during the last two years of the analysis. The two highest years in the afternoon were in 2018 and 2019 with four domestic related uses of force each. While four is a relatively low number, it is an increase from previous years. Refer back to page 33 for more information.

**Under the Influence:** Between 2010 and 2019, there were 62 uses of force (29.52% of incidents) during afternoon 1400-2200 patrol on individuals believed to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. There was a substantial increase in the number of individuals who were under the influence during the analysis period. The 5-year average between 2010 and 2014 was 3.6 individuals each year. That increased to an average of 8.8 individuals each year between 2015 and 2019. In 2018, 41.38% (12) of all individuals who had force used on them during the afternoon patrol times were believed to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Comparatively, there were just two individuals in each of the years 2010, 2011, and 2012. Refer back to page 36 for more information.

**Foot Pursuit:** There were a total of 44 uses of force (22.22% of incidents) during the 2010 to 2019 analysis period that involved a foot pursuit during the afternoon 1400-2200 patrol timeframe. Year-over-year an increase was seen in the number of foot pursuits, but the increase was not as dramatic as seen with those under the influence. In 2019, there were 10 uses of force (33.33% of incidents) that involved a foot pursuit during the afternoon patrol period. That was a 10-year high and brought the most recent 5-year average up to 5.4 individuals per year. The 5-year average between 2010 and 2014 was 3.4 individuals per year. Refer back to page 27 for more information.


**Spit Hood:** The afternoon 1400-2200 patrol had a total of 5 spit hood applications (2.38% of incidents) related to a use of force between 2010 and 2019. The 5-year averages for spit hood use remained fairly consistent, however spit hood were only used in three of the 10 years in the analysis period. Three spit hoods were applied in 2013, with the remainder used in 2017 (1) and 2019 (1). The number of applications was similar to during daytime patrol and far less than used during overnight patrol. Refer back to page 28 for more information.

**Hobble:** During the 2010 to 2019 analysis period, a hobble was used on an individual 35 times (16.67% of incidents) during afternoon 1400-2200 patrol. Similar to other afternoon categories, the use of a hobble increased year-over-year. The 5-year average between 2010 and 2014 was 2.2 individuals each year. That increased to an average of 4.8 individuals each year between 2015 and 2019. The most uses were in 2018 with eight, while the fewest was one each in 2010 and 2011. Refer back to page 28 for more information.

**While Physically Detained:** There were a total of 20 individuals (9.52% of incidents) who had force used on them during afternoon 1400-2200 patrol after being place in handcuffs between 2010 and 2019. The need for a use of force after someone had been physically detained remained consistent throughout the analysis period. The 5-year average between 2010 and 2014 was 1.8 individuals each year. The average increased slightly to 2.2 individuals each year between 2015 and 2019. The highest year was four individuals in 2014. In five of the years a total of two were recorded each year – which was consistent with the averages recorded. Refer back to page 58 for more information.

**Emergency Detentions:** Between 2010 and 2019, there were 24 uses of force (11.43% of incidents) during afternoon 1400-2200 patrol that resulted in an individual being place on an emergency detention. This was fairly even with the overnight patrol total of 25 individuals. The 5-year average between 2010 and 2014 was 2.2 individuals each year. The average increased slightly to 2.6 individuals each year between 2015 and 2019. No significant anomalies or outliers were identified with the emergency detention data. A small spike was seen in 2012 when five (25.00%) uses of force resulted in an emergency detention. The year prior had just two (12.50%) and the year after had two (9.52%) again. Refer back to page 34 for more information.

**Populous:** The majority of individuals involved in a use of force during afternoon 1400-2200 patrol between 2010 and 2019 were Appleton residents. Reference chart 81 for a visual representation. A total of 128 (60.95%) were Appleton residents. Those remaining were 52 (24.76%) non-residents and 30 (14.29%) homeless. Table 112 on the next page breaks out the data in a more detailed format.



Afternoon 1400-2200 Patrol Populous of Involved Individuals											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
Appleton Resident	2010-2014 Average 12.2 (65.59%)					2015-2019 Average 13.4 (57.26%)					12.8
	9	10	17	11	14	10	15	11	17	14	128
	69.23%	62.50%	85.00%	52.38%	60.87%	58.82%	78.95%	50.00%	58.62%	46.67%	60.95%
Non-Resident	2010-2014 Average 4.2 (22.58%)					2015-2019 Average 6.2 (26.50%)					5.2
	2	5	2	4	8	1	3	7	7	13	52
	15.38%	31.25%	10.00%	19.05%	34.78%	5.88%	15.79%	31.82%	24.14%	43.33%	24.76%
Homeless	2010-2014 Average 2.2 (11.83%)					2015-2019 Average 3.8 (16.24%)					3.0
	2	1	1	6	1	6	1	4	5	3	30
	15.38%	6.25%	5.00%	28.57%	4.35%	35.29%	5.26%	18.18%	17.24%	10.00%	14.29%


Table 112

Year-over-year, there was an increase in all three residential categories. However, as a percentage there was a decrease in the amount of Appleton residents involved in a use of force during the afternoon 1400-2200 patrol timeframe. Between 2010 and 2014, an average of 65.59% of involved individuals were Appleton residents. That percentage when down to 57.26% between 2015 and 2019. During the same time period non-residents when from 22.58% to 26.50% and homeless increased from 11.83% to 16.24%.


Afternoon 1400-2200 Patrol Hourly Breakdown											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
1400	2010-2014 Average 1.6 (8.60%)					2015-2019 Average 3.8 (16.24%)					2.7
	0	0	2	2	4	4	1	5	3	6	27
	0.00%	0.00%	10.00%	9.52%	17.39%	23.53%	5.26%	22.73%	10.34%	20.00%	12.86%
1500	2010-2014 Average 1.8 (9.68%)					2015-2019 Average 2.0 (8.55%)					1.9
	3	1	0	3	2	1	2	1	2	4	19
	23.08%	6.25%	0.00%	14.29%	8.70%	5.88%	10.53%	4.55%	6.90%	13.33%	9.05%
1600	2010-2014 Average 2.2 (11.83%)					2015-2019 Average 3.8 (16.24%)					3.0
	1	3	3	0	4	3	4	5	6	1	30
	7.69%	18.75%	15.00%	0.00%	17.39%	17.65%	21.05%	22.73%	20.69%	3.33%	14.29%
1700	2010-2014 Average 1.4 (7.53%)					2015-2019 Average 3.2 (13.68%)					2.3
	0	1	2	3	1	0	6	3	2	5	23
	0.00%	6.25%	10.00%	14.29%	4.35%	0.00%	31.58%	13.64%	6.90%	16.67%	10.95%
1800	2010-2014 Average 2.0 (10.75%)					2015-2019 Average 3.0 (12.82%)					2.5
	3	2	1	3	1	3	4	1	3	4	25
	23.08%	12.50%	5.00%	14.29%	4.35%	17.65%	21.05%	4.55%	10.34%	13.33%	11.90%
1900	2010-2014 Average 2.6 (13.98%)					2015-2019 Average 2.0 (8.55%)					2.3
	1	1	3	3	5	2	1	3	3	1	23
	7.69%	6.25%	15.00%	14.29%	21.74%	11.76%	5.26%	13.64%	10.34%	3.33%	10.95%
2000	2010-2014 Average 2.4 (12.90%)					2015-2019 Average 2.8 (11.97%)					2.6
	2	3	2	1	4	2	0	3	4	5	26
	15.38%	18.75%	10.00%	4.76%	17.39%	11.76%	0.00%	13.64%	13.79%	16.67%	12.38%
2100	2010-2014 Average 4.6 (24.73%)					2015-2019 Average 2.8 (11.97%)					3.7
	3	5	7	6	2	2	1	1	6	4	37
	23.08%	31.25%	35.00%	28.57%	8.70%	11.76%	5.26%	4.55%	20.69%	13.33%	17.62%

Table 113

**Time of Day:** In regards to time of day, the afternoon 1400-2200 patrol remained relatively consistent within each hour throughout the analysis. Two exceptions would be between 1400-1500 hours where numbers are increasing steadily and 1900-2000 where numbers have decreased slightly. Chart 82 on the next page provides a visual representation of the information.




**Day of Week:** When looking at the 5-year and 10-year averages, the day of the week did not appear to be a major factor in the number of times force was used on an individual during the afternoon 1400-2200 patrol timeframe. Chart 83 below does show a significant increase recorded on Tuesday and Thursday during 2019 afternoon periods. Both days were double what would have been expected based on averages. Table 114 on the next page show similar random spikes on different days in various years.



Afternoon 1400-2200 Patrol Uses of Force by Day of Week											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
Sunday	2010-2014 Average 3.0 (16.13%)					2015-2019 Average 4.4 (18.80%)					3.7
	3	3	1	5	3	5	7	1	6	3	37
	23.08%	18.75%	5.00%	23.81%	13.04	29.41%	36.84%	4.55%	20.69%	10.00%	17.62%
Monday	2010-2014 Average 4.0 (21.51%)					2015-2019 Average 2.8 (11.97%)					3.4
	2	2	6	2	8	2	1	4	4	3	34
	15.38%	12.50	30.00%	9.52%	34.78%	11.76%	5.26%	18.18%	13.79%	10.00%	16.19%
Tuesday	2010-2014 Average 2.8 (15.05%)					2015-2019 Average 2.8 (11.97%)					2.8
	2	3	3	2	4	1	2	3	1	7	28
	15.38%	18.75%	15.00%	9.52%	17.39%	5.88%	10.53%	13.64%	3.45%	23.33%	13.33%
Wednesday	2010-2014 Average 2.4 (12.90%)					2015-2019 Average 3.0 (12.82%)					2.7
	3	3	3	2	1	2	2	5	3	3	27
	23.08%	18.75	15.00%	9.52%	4.35%	11.76%	10.53%	22.73%	10.34%	10.00%	12.86%
Thursday	2010-2014 Average 2.2 (11.83%)					2015-2019 Average 3.0 (12.82%)					2.6
	2	1	0	4	4	3	0	1	3	8	26
	15.38%	6.25%	0.00%	19.05%	17.39%	17.65%	0.00%	4.55%	10.34%	26.67%	12.38%
Friday	2010-2014 Average 1.4 (7.53%)					2015-2019 Average 3.2 (13.68%)					2.3
	0	0	3	3	1	1	4	3	5	3	23
	0.00%	0.00%	15.00%	14.29%	4.35%	5.88%	21.05%	13.64%	17.24%	10.00%	10.95%
Saturday	2010-2014 Average 2.8 (15.05%)					2015-2019 Average 4.2 (17.95%)					3.5
	1	4	4	3	2	3	3	5	7	3	35
	7.69%	25.00%	20.00%	14.29%	8.70%	17.65%	15.79%	22.73%	24.14%	10.00%	16.67%

Table 114

**Month of Year:** Overall, the month of the year did not make a significant difference in the number of times force was used during the afternoon 1400-2200 patrol shifts. Total uses of force did decline slightly in December and January. It is likely the cold weather contributed to the lower totals. As shown in Chart 84 below, October 2019 had eight uses of force. However, the previous year had three and there were zero recorded in 2015 and 2017.




Afternoon 1400-2200 Patrol Uses of Force by Month Breakdown											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
January	2010-2014 Average 0.8 (4.30%)					2015-2019 Average 1.4 (5.98%)					1.1
	1	2	0	0	1	1	1	0	2	3	11
	7.69%	12.50%	0.00%	0.00%	4.35%	5.88%	5.26%	0.00%	6.90%	10.00%	5.24%
February	2010-2014 Average 1.0 (5.38%)					2015-2019 Average 2.0 (8.55%)					1.5
	2	0	0	1	2	5	1	2	2	0	15
	15.38%	0.00%	0.00%	7.76%	8.70%	29.41%	5.26%	9.09%	6.90%	0.00%	7.14%
March	2010-2014 Average 1.8 (9.68%)					2015-2019 Average 2.2 (9.40%)					2.0
	1	4	1	3	0	1	4	3	2	1	20
	7.69%	25.00%	5.00%	14.29%	0.00%	5.88%	21.05%	13.64%	6.90%	3.33%	9.52%
April	2010-2014 Average 2.2 (11.83%)					2015-2019 Average 2.4 (10.26%)					2.3
	2	2	2	0	5	3	2	5	0	2	23
	15.38%	12.50%	10.00%	0.00%	21.74%	17.65%	10.53%	22.73%	0.00%	6.67%	10.95%
May	2010-2014 Average 1.8 (9.68%)					2015-2019 Average 1.6 (6.84%)					1.7
	0	0	3	4	2	1	1	2	2	2	17
	0.00%	0.00%	15.00%	19.05%	8.70%	5.88%	5.26%	9.09%	6.90%	6.67%	8.10%
June	2010-2014 Average 1.0 (5.38%)					2015-2019 Average 2.0 (8.55%)					1.5
	0	0	3	0	2	1	3	1	1	4	15
	0.00%	0.00%	15.00%	0.00%	8.70%	5.88%	15.79%	4.55%	3.45%	13.33%	7.14%
July	2010-2014 Average 1.4 (7.53%)					2015-2019 Average 1.8 (7.69%)					1.6
	0	1	1	3	2	0	1	1	6	1	16
	0.00%	6.25%	5.00%	14.29%	8.70%	0.00%	5.26%	4.55%	20.69%	3.33%	7.62%
August	2010-2014 Average 1.6 (8.60%)					2015-2019 Average 2.0 (8.55%)					1.8
	0	2	1	1	4	0	2	0	6	2	18
	0.00%	12.50%	5.00%	4.76%	17.39%	0.00%	10.53%	0.00%	20.69%	6.67%	8.57%
September	2010-2014 Average 1.8 (9.68%)					2015-2019 Average 2.0 (8.55%)					1.9
	2	0	3	2	2	0	3	3	1	3	19
	15.38%	0.00%	15.00%	9.52%	8.70%	0.00%	15.79%	13.64%	3.45%	10.00%	9.05%
October	2010-2014 Average 3.2 (17.20%)					2015-2019 Average 2.4 (10.26%)					2.8
	2	4	4	6	0	0	1	0	3	8	28
	15.38%	25.00%	20.00%	28.57%	0.00%	0.00%	5.26%	0.00%	10.34%	26.67%	13.33%
November	2010-2014 Average 0.8 (4.30%)					2015-2019 Average 2.2 (9.40%)					1.5
	2	0	1	0	1	2	0	2	4	3	15
	15.38%	0.00%	5.00%	0.00%	4.35%	11.76%	0.00%	9.09%	13.79%	10.00%	7.14%
December	2010-2014 Average 1.2 (6.45%)					2015-2019 Average 1.4 (5.98%)					1.3
	1	1	1	1	2	3	0	3	0	1	13
	7.69%	6.25%	5.00%	4.76%	8.70%	17.65%	0.00%	13.64%	0.00%	3.33%	6.19%

Table 115

**District Comparisons:** The districts did have an impact when comparing where a use of force occurred between 1400-2200 hours. The 5-year and 10-year averages were highest in the Downtown District. The Southern District had the second highest numbers, followed by the Northern District and outside the city.

**Northern District:** Between 2010 and 2019, the Northern District saw an increase in the number of times force was used on an individual during the 1400-2200 timeframe. In total, there were 44 uses of force within the district. There were 20 involved individuals between 2010 and 2014. That number grew to 24 between 2015 and 2019. The highest single year was seven uses of force in 2018. The lowest year was 2010 with two uses of force. In total, 44 individuals were involved in a use of force in the Northern District between 1400-2200 hours.




**Downtown District:** The Downtown District experienced a larger increase than the Northern District. The 5-year average between 2010 and 2014 involved an average of 9.2 individuals each year. The 5-year average between 2015 and 2019 increased to 11.0 individuals each year. The highest single year for any district was the downtown with 17 involved individuals in 2019. While the Downtown District has the most frequent uses of force, the 2019 total was five higher than the next highest year in the analysis timeframe. In total, 101 individuals were involved in a use of force in the Downtown District between 1400-2200 hours.

Afternoon Patrol District Comparison								
	Previous 5-Yr Av	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Current 5-Yr Av	Total 10-Yr Av
Northern	4.0	3	4	6	7	4	4.8	4.4
	21.51%	17.65%	21.05%	27.27%	24.14%	13.33%	20.51%	20.95%
Downtown	9.2	9	9	10	10	17	11.0	10.1
	49.46%	52.94%	47.37%	45.45%	34.48%	56.67%	47.01%	48.10%
Southern	5.0	5	5	6	11	8	7.0	6.0
	26.88%	29.41%	26.32%	27.27%	37.93%	26.67%	29.91%	28.57%
Out of City	0.4	0	1	0	1	1	0.6	0.5
	2.15%	0.00%	5.26%	0.00%	3.45%	3.33%	2.56%	2.38%

Table 116

**Southern District:** During the 2010 to 2019 analysis period, there was an upward trend in the number of individuals who had force used on them during the afternoon 1400-2200 patrol times. The 5-year average between 2010 and 2014 was 5.0 individuals involved in a use of force. That average grew to 7.0 individuals between 2015 and 2019. The highest single year in the Southern District was 11 in 2018. In total, 60 individuals were involved in a use of force in the district between 1400-2200 hours.

**Out of City:** The afternoon 1400-2200 patrol timeframe had the most uses of force outside the city. The daytime and overnight patrol times had just one each. The afternoon times had five between 2010 and 2019. Two of them occurred in 2014 and one of them occurred in each of the years 2016, 2018, and 2019.



**Work Groups:** In regards to day-off group assignments, the 10-year data for work groups was not available. Therefore, all information is from years 2015-2019. It is also important to remember that the data in table 117 on the next page shows the number of officers involved in a use of force during the afternoon 1400-2200 patrol group – not the number of individuals who had force used on them during an arrest or detainment.

**Red Group:** Between 2015 and 2019, the Red Group had the most uses of force between 1400 and 2200 hours. The 5-year average during the afternoon was 16.0 officers each year. Those 16.0 officers were just over half (50.63%) of all afternoon officers involved in a use of force. In 2019, a total of 23 officers was reached, marking a five year high.

**Blue Group:** The Blue Group finished with 50 involved officers involved in a use of force between 2015 and 2019. This was 30 fewer officers (18.98% lower) than involved Red Group officers. While the data suggested an upward trend with Red Group involvement, the Blue Group numbers were more consistent with the 10.0 average. In 2016, the total was just three officers involved in a use of force. All other Blue Group totals were between eight and 15 officers.

**Supervisor:** Supervisors had a total of 12 uses of force between 2015 and 2019 during the afternoon 1400 to 2200 hours. An upward trend was shown in the data. In 2015, no supervisors were involved in a use of force. Each year after the totals increased until 2018 and 2019 when four uses of force were recorded in each year.

Afternoon 1400-2200 Patrol Use of Force Day-Off Comparison						
	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Totals
Red Group	2015-2019 Average 16.0 (50.63%)					NA
	8	17	16	16	23	80
	30.77%	65.38%	57.14%	44.44%	54.76%	50.63%
Blue Group	2015-2019 Average 10.0 (31.65%)					NA
	13	3	8	15	11	50
	50.00%	11.54%	28.57%	41.67%	26.19%	31.65%
Supervisor	2015-2019 Average 2.4 (7.59%)					NA
	0	1	3	4	4	12
	0.00%	3.85%	10.71%	11.11%	9.52%	7.59%
Other Work Groups*	2015-2019 Average 3.2 (10.13%)					NA
	5	5	1	1	4	16
	19.23%	19.23%	3.57%	2.78%	9.52%	10.13%

The (\*) references ISU, SIU, CLO, BHO, Threat Assessment, and those in field training

Table 117

**Other Work Groups:** Officers assigned to groups other than patrol accounted for 16 uses of force between 1400 and 2200 hours. This was higher than the daytime and overnight time frames combined. The 5-year average was 3.2 involved officers. With a high of five and a low of one officer, the range did not deviate too far off the average.

Afternoon 1400-2200 Patrol Specifics in 2019									
	Red Group		Blue Group		Supervisor		Other Groups*		Total Officers
Northern	1	25.00%	3	75.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	4
	4.35%		27.27%		0.00%		0.00%		%
Downtown	14	58.33%	6	25.00%	2	8.33%	2	8.33%	24
	60.87%		54.55%		50.00%		50.00%		%
Southern	7	58.33%	2	16.67%	2	16.67%	1	8.33%	12
	30.43%		18.18%		50.00%		25.00%		%
Out of City	1	50.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	1	50.00%	2
	4.35%		0.00%		0.00%		25.00%		%
<b>Total Officers</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>54.76%</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>26.19%</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>9.52%</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>9.52%</b>	<b>42</b>

The (\*) references ISU, SIU, CLO, BHO, Threat Assessment, and those in field training

Table 118

Specific to 2019, the Downtown District had the most uses of force (24) between 1400-2200. The Southern District finished the year with half (12) of the downtown total. The Red Group had the highest uses of force with 23, while the Blue Group finished with 11 involved officers. Supervisors and those assigned to other work groups had four uses of force each.

Afternoon 1400-2200 Patrol Average Age of Officer										
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Afternoon Patrol	2010-2014 Average 32.0					2015-2019 Average 33.9				
	28.1	30.8	32.7	35.6	32.7	35.0	35.1	34.3	32.7	32.6
All Patrol Average	2010-2014 Average 33.5					2015-2019 Average 34.5				
	31.5	32.3	34.7	35.3	33.6	36.3	34.2	34.8	34.0	33.3
Difference	-3.4	-1.5	-2.0	0.3	-0.9	-1.3	0.9	-0.5	-1.3	-0.7

Table 119

**Average Age:** The average age of officers on duty between 1400-2200 trended older between 2010 and 2016 before coming back down to just below the 10-year average (33.0 years old). The

overall patrol average followed a similar trend. In 2010, the average age of an officer who used force during the afternoon time period was 28.1 years old. That was 3.4 years younger than average of all patrol officers who used force. Afternoon patrol officers averaged younger than the overall average in all but two years (2013 and 2016).

Afternoon 1400-2200 Patrol Average Work Experience of Officer at the Appleton Police Department										
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Afternoon Patrol	2010-2014 Average 7.3					2015-2019 Average 8.9				
	4.1	5.3	8.7	10.2	8.0	10.0	10.3	9.4	7.5	7.5
All Patrol Average	2010-2014 Average 8.5					2015-2019 Average 9.1				
	6.5	7.0	9.9	10.0	9.0	11.1	8.4	9.8	8.5	7.6
Difference	-2.4	-1.7	-1.2	0.2	-1.0	-1.1	1.9	-0.4	-1.0	-0.1

Table 120

**Average Experience:** The average work experience for patrol officers who were on duty between 1400-2200 and was involved in a use of force trended upward between 2010 and 2019. The 5-year average between 2010 and 2014 was 7.3 years of experience. That increased to 8.9 years of experience between 2015 and 2019. The overall patrol averages also increased, but at a lower rate than the afternoon officer group. In the most recent three years (2017-2019) the experience difference between afternoons and the overall patrol averages was less than half a year.

## Overnight 2200-0600 Patrol

During the 2010 to 2019 analysis period, the overnight 2200-0600 hours had 241 calls for service on patrol that included a use of force. These calls for service involved 252 individuals and required 344 officers to use force during the detainment process.



These numbers, along with the remainder of data in this section, do not include uses of force by a school resource officer either on Appleton Area School District property or working on an AASD related incident. Those are addressed in the SRO Unit breakout on page 131.

Officers are trained to have at least one assisting officer on scene when taking someone into custody or dealing with a dangerous situation. Between 2010 and 2019, the overnight 2200-0600 patrol officers averaged a ratio of 2.38 officers on scene for each individual who had force used on them. The proper amount of officers on scene often resulted in a situation which ended faster and with less injury to the individual and the officers.

Overnight 2200-0600 Patrol Call Volume and Officer Involvement Summary								
	Previous 5-Yr	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Current 5-Yr	Total 10-Yr
Calls for Service	29.4	15	21	20	21	17	18.8	24.1
	54.65%	39.47%	51.22%	40.00%	32.81%	29.82%	37.60%	46.44%
Involved Individuals	31.2	16	21	20	22	17	19.2	25.2
	54.93%	40.00%	50.00%	40.00%	33.33%	29.31%	37.50%	46.67%
Involved Officers	42.6	18	30	29	27	27	26.2	34.4
	54.48%	34.62%	50.85%	43.28%	31.40%	33.33%	37.97%	46.74%
Officers in Proximity	69.6	37	57	50	60	48	50.4	60.0
	55.06%	41.11%	55.34%	45.05%	35.71%	32.00%	40.51%	47.85%

Table 121

While the overnight 2200-0600 patrol accounts for one third of the day, the total times force was used equated to much more than a third of total patrol incidents. The 252 individuals involved in a use of force between 2200 and 2200 was 46.67% of all uses of force. However, the uses of force during overnight hours declined throughout the analysis period. The 5-year average of 31.2 individuals each year reached 19.2 individuals between 2015 and 2019.

Table 122 on the next page details seven situational specific categories of information regarding individuals who had force used on them by patrol officers who were on duty between 2200 and 0600 hours. Overall, this time period had the most uses of force during this analysis period.

Overnight 2200-0600 Patrol Situational Specifics and Individual Information Summary								
	Previous 5-Yr	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Current 5-Yr	Total 10-Yr
Domestic Related	2.8	0	3	3	2	2	2.0	2.4
	8.97%	0.00%	14.29%	15.00%	9.09%	11.76%	10.42%	9.52%
Under the Influence	12.0	7	9	8	7	11	8.4	10.2
	38.46%	43.75%	42.86%	40.00%	31.82%	64.71%	43.75%	40.48%
Foot Pursuit	6.6	7	7	1	6	3	4.8	5.7
	21.15%	43.75%	33.33%	5.00%	27.27%	17.65%	25.00%	22.62%
Spit Hood	0.6	2	0	2	3	3	2.0	1.3
	1.92%	12.50%	0.00%	10.00%	13.64%	17.65%	10.42%	5.16%
Hobble	4.0	2	2	6	6	3	3.8	3.9
	12.82%	12.50%	9.52%	30.00%	27.27%	17.65%	19.79%	15.48%
While Detained	3.0	1	2	3	1	1	1.6	2.3
	9.62%	6.25%	9.52%	15.00%	4.55%	5.88%	8.33%	9.13%
Emergency Detention	1.8	4	3	3	4	2	3.2	2.5
	5.77%	25.00%	14.29%	15.00%	18.18%	11.76%	16.67%	9.92%

Table 122

Despite having the most uses of force, the overnight did not necessarily have the highest counts in the situational specifics.

**Domestic Related:** The overnight 2200-0600 patrol time period had a total of 24 uses of force (9.52% of incidents) on individuals during a domestic related investigation between 2010 and 2019. This was higher than either the daytime or afternoon totals, but trended lower during the analysis period. In 2010, there was a total of five uses of force that were domestic related. Those five were the highest for the analysis period, followed by 2012 with four uses of force. There were just two uses of force that occurred in each of the years 2018 and 2019. Refer back to page 33 for more information.

**Under the Influence:** Between 2010 and 2019, there were 102 uses of force (40.48% of incidents) during overnight 2200-0600 patrol on individuals believed to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. This was well above the 62 recorded in the afternoon or 16 recorded during the daytime. Interestingly, the 5-year totals averages declined during the time period while the percentage of incidents increased. The 5-year average between 2010 and 2014 was 12.0 involved individuals. That represented 38.46% of all uses of force during the overnight hours. The 5-year average between 2015 and 2019 declined to 8.4 involved individuals but increased in percentage to 43.75% of all incidents. Refer back to page 36 for more information.

**Foot Pursuit:** There were a total of 57 uses of force (22.62% of incidents) during the 2010 to 2019 analysis period that involved a foot pursuit during the overnight 2200-0600 patrol timeframe. The involvement of foot pursuits declined during the analysis timeframe. The 5-year average between 2010 and 2014 was 6.6 individuals each year. The average declined to 4.8 individuals each year between 2015 and 2019. The rate dropped far enough that the overnight total of 24 between 2015 and 2019 was less than the 27 involved individuals during the afternoons. Refer back to page 27 for more information.


**Spit Hood:** The overnight 2200-0600 patrol had a total of 13 spit hood applications (5.16% of incidents) related to a use of force between 2010 and 2019. This more than the afternoon and daytime combined and likely related to the high number of overnight uses of force on individuals who were under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The totals did trend upward even though the use of force numbers trended downward. Between 2010 and 2014, there were three spit hood applications during overnight patrol hours. That total went up to 10 between 2015 and 2019. Refer back to page 28 for more information.

**Hobble:** During the 2010 to 2019 analysis period, a hobble was used on an individual 39 times (15.48% of incidents) during overnight 2200-0600 patrol. The use of a hobble remained fairly consistent during the analysis timeframe. The 5-year average between 2010 and 2014 was 20 individuals. That total went down by one to 19 individuals between 2015 and 2019. However, because the total uses of force declined over that same time, the percentage of use increased from 12.82% to 19.79%. Refer back to page 28 for more information

**While Physically Detained:** There were a total of 23 individuals (9.13% of incidents) who had force used on them during the overnight 2200-0600 patrol after being placed in handcuffs between 2010 and 2019. During the analysis period, the uses of force on physically detained individuals declined at nearly the same rate as overall uses of force. The 5-year average between 2010 and 2014 was 3.0 individuals (9.62%). The total changed to 1.6 individuals (8.33%) between 2015 and 2019. The most in any single year was four which happened in 2011 and again in 2013. Refer to page 58 for more information.

**Emergency Detentions:** Between 2010 and 2019, there were 25 uses of force (9.92% of incidents) during overnight 2200-0600 patrol that resulted in an individual being placed on an emergency detention. This was just one more than occurred during the afternoon patrol timeframe. In total, there were nine uses of force between 2010 and 2014. The subsequent 5-year total rose to 16 uses of force which ended with an emergency detention. As a percentage, the 5-year averages increased from 5.77% to 16.67% of all overnight incidents. Refer back to page 34 for more information.

**Populous:** The majority of individuals involved in a use of force during overnight 2200-0600 patrol between 2010 and 2019 were Appleton residents. Reference chart 87 for a visual representation. A total of 131 (51.98%) were Appleton residents. Those remaining were 106 (42.06%) non-residents and 15 (5.95%) homeless. Table 123 on the next page breaks out the data in a more detailed format.



Year-over-year, the data showed a major shift in regards to populous. In terms of totals, the number of Appleton residents decreased from 77 to 54 individuals involved. However, despite that decline, the percentage Appleton residents represented in uses of force during overnight patrol increased from 49.36% to 56.25%. Non-residents had even more of a total decline – going from 73 to 33 individuals involved. For non-residents, the percentage went from 46.79% to 34.38%. The homeless total increased by three individuals with a percentage increase from 3.85% to 9.38% over that same timeframe.


Overnight 2200-0600 Patrol Populous of Involved Individuals											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
Appleton Resident	2010-2014 Average 15.4 (49.36%)					2015-2019 Average 10.8 (56.25%)					13.1
	18	11	17	15	16	8	9	11	13	13	131
	64.29%	34.38%	50.00%	51.72%	48.48%	50.00%	42.86%	55.00%	59.09%	76.47%	51.98%
Non-Resident	2010-2014 Average 14.6 (46.79%)					2015-2019 Average 6.6 (34.38%)					10.6
	9	21	17	10	16	8	6	7	9	3	106
	32.14%	65.63%	50.00%	34.48%	48.48%	50.00%	28.57%	35.00%	40.91%	17.65%	42.06%
Homeless	2010-2014 Average 1.2 (3.85%)					2015-2019 Average 1.8 (9.38%)					1.5
	1	0	0	4	1	0	6	2	0	1	15
	3.57%	0.00%	0.00%	13.79%	3.03%	0.00%	28.57%	10.00%	0.00%	5.88%	5.95%

Table 123


**Time of Day:** In regards to time of day, the decline in overnight 2200-0600 patrol uses of force between 2010 and 2019 are seen mostly between the hours of midnight and 0300 hours. However, the percentage differences remained relatively consistent. Refer to table 124 to see how the averages declined while the percentages were relatively unchanged.

Overnight 2200-0600 Patrol Hourly Breakdown											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
2200	2010-2014 Average 3.2 (10.26%)					2015-2019 Average 2.8 (14.58%)					3.0
	4	1	3	3	5	2	1	6	3	2	30
	14.29%	3.13%	8.82%	10.34%	15.15%	12.50%	4.76%	30.00%	13.64%	11.76%	11.90%
2300	2010-2014 Average 3.4 (10.90%)					2015-2019 Average 3.0 (15.63%)					3.2
	0	4	3	7	3	2	3	2	6	2	32
	0.00%	12.50%	8.82%	24.14%	9.09%	12.50%	14.29%	10.00%	27.27%	11.76%	12.70%
0000	2010-2014 Average 4.2 (13.46%)					2015-2019 Average 2.2 (11.46%)					3.2
	5	3	6	2	5	3	3	2	1	2	32
	17.86%	9.38%	17.65%	6.90%	15.15%	18.75%	14.29%	10.00%	4.55%	11.76%	12.70%
0100	2010-2014 Average 8.2 (26.28%)					2015-2019 Average 4.8 (25.00%)					6.5
	10	6	12	6	7	4	7	4	8	1	65
	35.71%	18.75%	35.29%	20.69%	21.21%	25.00%	33.33%	20.00%	36.36%	5.88%	25.79%
0200	2010-2014 Average 8.4 (26.92%)					2015-2019 Average 4.8 (25.00%)					6.6
	5	13	5	9	10	4	6	6	4	4	66
	17.86%	40.63%	14.71%	31.03%	30.30%	25.00%	28.57%	30.00%	18.18%	23.53%	26.19%
0300	2010-2014 Average 1.6 (5.13%)					2015-2019 Average 0.8 (4.17%)					1.2
	0	3	4	1	0	1	0	0	0	3	12
	0.00%	9.38%	11.76%	3.45%	0.00%	6.25%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	17.65%	4.76%
0400	2010-2014 Average 1.6 (5.13%)					2015-2019 Average 0.6 (3.13%)					1.1
	3	1	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	3	11
	10.71%	3.13%	2.94%	3.45%	6.06%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	17.65%	4.37%
0500	2010-2014 Average 0.6 (1.92%)					2015-2019 Average 0.2 (1.04%)					0.4
	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	4
	3.57%	3.13%	0.00%	0.00%	3.03%	0.00%	4.76%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.59%

Table 124




**Day of Week:** The day of the week had the most influence over the use of force totals during the overnight 2200-0600 patrol timeframe. Friday and Saturday nights had significantly more uses of force than the other days of the week. Between 2010 and 2019, Friday nights totaled 63 and Saturday nights totaled 81 uses of force. The next closest overnight total during the same time period was 24 during Wednesday nights. As the totals for each overnight decreased, the Friday and Saturday night totals were less dramatic, but still average higher than other nights.



Overnight 2200-0600 Patrol Uses of Force by Day of Week											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
Sunday	2010-2014 Average 1.8 (5.77%)					2015-2019 Average 1.6 (8.33%)					1.7
	4	1	3	0	1	0	2	2	2	2	17
	14.29%	3.13%	8.82%	0.00%	3.03%	0.00%	9.52%	10.00%	9.09%	11.76%	6.75%
Monday	2010-2014 Average 3.0 (9.62%)					2015-2019 Average 1.6 (8.33%)					2.3
	3	1	2	4	5	1	1	3	2	1	23
	10.71%	3.13%	5.88%	13.79%	15.15%	6.25%	4.76%	15.00%	9.09%	5.88%	9.13%
Tuesday	2010-2014 Average 2.2 (7.05%)					2015-2019 Average 2.2 (11.46%)					2.2
	1	1	2	4	3	1	3	3	1	3	22
	3.57%	3.13%	5.88%	13.79%	9.09%	6.25%	14.29%	15.00%	4.55%	17.65%	8.73%
Wednesday	2010-2014 Average 3.8 (12.18%)					2015-2019 Average 1.0 (5.21%)					2.4
	7	5	3	2	2	0	0	1	2	2	24
	25.00%	15.63%	8.82%	6.90%	6.06%	0.00%	0.00%	5.00%	9.09%	11.76%	9.52%
Thursday	2010-2014 Average 2.0 (6.41%)					2015-2019 Average 2.4 (12.50%)					2.2
	1	0	3	4	2	3	2	0	5	2	22
	3.57%	0.00%	8.82%	13.79%	6.06%	18.75%	9.52%	0.00%	22.73%	11.76%	8.73%
Friday	2010-2014 Average 7.8 (25.00%)					2015-2019 Average 4.8 (25.00%)					6.3
	6	13	3	6	11	5	9	4	4	2	63
	21.43%	40.63%	8.82%	20.69%	33.33%	31.25%	42.86%	20.00%	18.18%	11.76%	25.00%
Saturday	2010-2014 Average 10.6 (33.97%)					2015-2019 Average 5.6 (29.17%)					8.1
	6	11	18	9	9	6	4	7	6	5	81
	21.43%	34.38%	52.94%	31.03%	27.27%	37.50%	19.05%	35.00%	27.27%	29.41%	32.14%

Table 125

**Month of Year:** Overall, the month of the year did not make much of a difference in the number of times force was used during the overnight 2200-0600 patrol shifts. The declines observed between 2010 and 2019 were primarily during the months of May, June, and July. The early summer reductions were due in part to fewer uses of force on College Avenue in the Entertainment District.



Overnight 2200-0600 Patrol Uses of Force by Month Breakdown											
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	10-Yr
January	2010-2014 Average 3.6 (11.54%)					2015-2019 Average 2.0 (10.42%)					2.8
	0	7	2	6	3	4	2	2	2	0	28
	0.00%	21.88%	5.88%	20.69%	9.09%	25.00%	9.52%	10.00%	9.09%	0.00%	11.11%
February	2010-2014 Average 1.0 (3.21%)					2015-2019 Average 1.8 (9.38%)					1.4
	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	7	0	14
	3.57%	3.13%	2.94%	3.45%	3.03%	6.25%	0.00%	5.00%	31.82%	0.00%	5.56%
March	2010-2014 Average 2.6 (8.33%)					2015-2019 Average 1.6 (8.33%)					2.1
	2	1	3	3	4	0	2	2	1	3	21
	7.14%	3.13%	8.82%	10.34%	12.12%	0.00%	9.52%	10.00%	4.55%	17.65%	8.33%
April	2010-2014 Average 2.6 (8.33%)					2015-2019 Average 1.8 (9.38%)					2.2
	3	3	4	0	3	3	2	2	1	1	22
	10.71%	9.38%	11.76%	0.00%	9.09%	18.75%	9.52%	10.00%	4.55%	5.88%	8.73%
May	2010-2014 Average 3.2 (10.26%)					2015-2019 Average 1.4 (7.29%)					2.3
	5	0	5	1	5	0	2	1	3	1	23
	17.86%	0.00%	14.71%	3.45%	15.15%	0.00%	9.52%	5.00%	13.64%	5.88%	9.13%
June	2010-2014 Average 3.6 (11.54%)					2015-2019 Average 1.2 (6.25%)					2.4
	2	2	3	5	6	1	2	1	1	1	24
	7.14%	6.25%	8.82%	17.24%	18.18%	6.25%	9.52%	5.00%	4.55%	5.88%	9.52%
July	2010-2014 Average 2.6 (8.33%)					2015-2019 Average 1.4 (7.29%)					2.0
	2	3	2	5	1	1	1	3	1	1	20
	7.14%	9.38%	5.88%	17.24%	3.03%	6.25%	4.76%	15.00%	4.55%	5.88%	7.94%
August	2010-2014 Average 1.8 (5.77%)					2015-2019 Average 1.6 (8.33%)					1.7
	3	3	3	0	0	1	2	2	2	1	17
	10.71%	9.38%	8.82%	0.00%	0.00%	6.25%	9.52%	10.00%	9.09%	5.88%	6.75%
September	2010-2014 Average 2.6 (8.33%)					2015-2019 Average 1.6 (8.33%)					2.1
	2	2	5	2	2	0	3	2	0	3	21
	7.14%	6.25%	14.71%	6.90%	6.06%	0.00%	14.29%	10.00%	0.00%	17.65%	8.33%
October	2010-2014 Average 2.6 (8.33%)					2015-2019 Average 1.8 (9.38%)					2.2
	1	3	3	2	4	1	3	3	2	0	22
	3.57%	9.38%	8.82%	6.90%	12.12%	6.25%	14.29%	15.00%	9.09%	0.00%	8.73%
November	2010-2014 Average 3.2 (10.26%)					2015-2019 Average 1.6 (8.33%)					2.4
	4	5	0	3	4	2	1	1	1	3	24
	14.29%	15.63%	0.00%	10.34%	12.12%	12.50%	4.76%	5.00%	4.55%	17.65%	9.52%
December	2010-2014 Average 1.8 (5.77%)					2015-2019 Average 1.4 (7.29%)					1.6
	3	2	3	1	0	2	1	0	1	3	16
	10.71%	6.25%	8.82%	3.45%	0.00%	12.50%	4.76%	0.00%	4.55%	17.64%	6.35%

Table 126

Specific to 2019, October had no uses of force during the overnight hours. This was contrary to the higher numbers seen in the daytime and afternoon timeframes. Having no uses of force in January, February, and October helped keep the overall yearly total lower as well. The highest total in 2019 was just three (March, September, November, and December).

**District Comparisons:** Similar to the afternoon totals, the districts did have an impact when comparing where a use of force occurred between 2200-0600 hours. The 5-year and 10-year averages were significantly higher in the Downtown District. This was true for both the actual totals and the percentage comparisons. In addition, the 5-year averages in all districts declined during the analysis period.




Chart 91 above compares the use of force from 2019 during the overnight 2200-0600 patrol timeframe to the 5-year and 10-year averages. Table 127 below offers additional information including yearly percentages.

Overnight 2200-0600 Patrol District Comparison								
	Previous 5-Yr Av	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Current 5-Yr Av	Total 10-Yr Av
Northern	5.6	3	3	4	0	5	3.0	4.3
	17.95%	18.75%	14.29%	20.00%	0.00%	29.41%	15.63%	17.06%
Downtown	19.6	11	12	10	14	8	11.0	15.3
	62.82%	68.75%	57.14%	50.00%	63.64%	47.06%	57.29%	60.71%
Southern	6.0	2	6	5	8	4	5.0	5.5
	19.23%	12.50%	28.57%	25.00%	36.36%	23.53%	26.04%	21.83%
Out of City	0.0	0	0	1	0	0	0.2	0.1
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	5.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.04%	0.40%

Table 127


**Northern District:** Between 2010 and 2019, the Northern District saw a decline in the number of times force was used on an individual during the 2200-0600 timeframe. In total, there were 43 uses of force on an individuals. The 5-year average between 2010 and 2014 was 5.6 individuals each year. That total was reduced to 3.0 individuals each year between 2015 and 2019.

**Downtown District:** The decline in the Downtown District was higher than either the Northern or Southern Districts. However, even with a substantial decline, the Downtown District still had more than twice the total uses of force from the other districts. During the 2010 to 2019 analysis, there were 153 uses of force in the Downtown District during the overnight hours. That represented 60.71% of the total uses of force between 2200-0600 hours. The 5-year average between 2010 and 2014 was 19.6 individuals each year. That number declined to 11.0 individuals each year

between 2015 and 2019. Despite the 5-year average dropping 8.6 individuals, the percentage was only reduced from 62.82% to 57.29%. Still well above the other districts.

**Southern District:** During the 2010 to 2019 analysis period, the Southern District remained the most consistent. The 5-year average between 2010 and 2014 was 6.0 individuals each year. The average reduced by just one to 5.0 individuals between 2015 and 2019. The most involved individuals in any one year was eight (2013 and 2018) and the least number of involved individuals was two in 2015. In total, there were 55 individuals involved in a use of force in the Southern District between 2200-0600 hours.

**Out of City:** The one time during this analysis period force was used outside of city limits within the overnight 2200-0600 patrol timeframe was in 2017.



**Work Groups:** In regards to day-off group assignments, the 10-year data for work groups was not available. Therefore, all information is from the years 2015-2019. It is also important to remember that the data in table 128 on the next page shows the number of officers involved in a use of force during the overnight 2200-0600 patrol group – not the number of individuals who had force used on them during an arrest or detention.

**Red Group:** Between 2015 and 2019, the Red Group had the most uses of force between 2200 and 0600 hours. The 5-year average for that time was 12.2 officers each year. The only year that finished well outside the average was 2015 when just six officers were involved in a use of force. No other outliers were seen in the data, although it was a relatively small sample size.

**Blue Group:** The Blue Group had 45 officers involved in a use of force between 2015 and 2019. That put the 5-year average at 9.0 officers each year. However, the totals from each year only fell near the average once. In 2018, the total number of officers was eight. Other totals included five

in 2015 and 14 in 2016. The wider range makes it difficult to observed reliable trends – especially with a relatively small sample size.

Overnight 220-0600 Patrol Use of Force Day-Off Comparison						
	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Totals
Red Group	2015-2019 Average 12.2 (46.56%)					NA
	6	16	13	14	12	61
	33.33%	53.33%	44.83%	51.85%	44.44%	46.56%
Blue Group	2015-2019 Average 9.0 (34.35%)					NA
	5	14	6	8	12	45
	27.78%	46.67%	20.69%	29.63%	44.44%	34.35%
Supervisor	2015-2019 Average 4.0 (15.27%)					NA
	3	0	9	5	3	20
	16.67%	0.00%	31.03%	18.52%	11.11%	15.27%
Other Work Groups*	2015-2019 Average 1.0 (3.82%)					NA
	4	0	1	0	0	5
	22.22%	0.00%	3.45%	0.00%	0.00%	3.82%

The (\*) references ISU, SIU, CLO, BHO, Threat Assessment, and those in field training

Table 128

**Supervisors:** Supervisors had a total of 20 uses of force between 2015 and 2019 during overnight 2200-0600. This was well above the daytime and afternoon totals. A spike was seen when there were zero supervisors involved in 2016, followed by nine in 2017. A portion of the 2017 uses of force were supervisors assigned to work the College Avenue overtime detail to assist during the times immediately surrounding bar closures.

**Other Work Groups:** Officers assigned to groups other than patrol accounted for five uses of force between 2200 and 0600 hours. No trends were observed between 2015 and 2019. There were four officers involved in a use of force in 2015, and then only one after (2017). No uses of force were attributed to other work groups in 2016, 2018, or 2019.

Overnight 2200-0600 Patrol Specifics in 2019									
	Red Group		Blue Group		Supervisor		Other Groups*		Total Officers
Northern	2	40.00%	3	60.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	5
	16.67%		25.00%		0.00%		0.00%		18.52%
Downtown	8	50.00%	6	37.50%	2	12.5%	0	0.00%	16
	66.67%		50.00%		66.67%		0.00%		59.26%
Southern	2	33.33%	3	50.00%	1	16.67%	0	0.00%	6
	16.67%		25.00%		33.33%		0.00%		22.22%
Out of City	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0
	0.00%		0.00%		0.00%		0.00%		0.00%
<b>Total Officers</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>44.44%</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>44.44%</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>11.11%</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>27</b>

The (\*) references ISU, SIU, CLO, BHO, Threat Assessment, and those in field training

Table 129

Specific to 2019, the Downtown District had the most uses of force (16) between 2200-0600. That was more than twice the total that occurred in either of the other two districts. Unlike the daytime or afternoon timeframes, the Red and Blue Groups finished with the same number of officers involved in a use of force (12). Supervisor accounted for three of the officers involved. No other work groups had a use of force during the 2200-0600 time period.

Overnight 2200-0600 Patrol Average Age of Officer										
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Overnight Patrol	2010-2014 Average 33.8					2015-2019 Average 33.3				
	32.5	32.7	35.3	35.3	33.1	36.4	31.8	34.1	32.2	31.9
All Patrol Average	2010-2014 Average 33.5					2015-2019 Average 34.4				
	31.5	32.3	34.7	35.3	33.6	36.3	34.2	34.8	34.0	33.3
Difference	1.0	0.4	0.6	0.0	-0.5	0.1	-2.4	-0.7	-1.8	-1.4

Table 130

**Average Age:** The average age of officers on duty between 2200-0600 remained fairly steady between 2010 and 2019. The 5-year average between 2010 and 2014 was only a half year older than the average age during the 5-year timeframe between 2015 and 2019. During those same time periods the overall patrol average increased by almost one year. Year-over-year the largest age difference between overnight and overall patrol was just 2.4 years. In seven of the 10 years the difference was only one year or less.

Overnight 2200-0600 Patrol Average Work Experience of Officer at the Appleton Police Department										
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Overnight Patrol	2010-2014 Average 8.5					2015-2019 Average 7.3				
	7.0	7.1	10.3	9.7	8.2	10.2	5.9	9.0	6.7	4.7
All Patrol Average	2010-2014 Average 8.5					2015-2019 Average 9.1				
	6.5	7.0	9.9	10.0	9.0	11.1	8.4	9.8	8.5	7.6
Difference	0.5	0.1	0.4	-0.3	-0.8	-0.9	-2.5	-0.8	-1.8	-2.9

Table 131

**Average Experience:** The average work experience for patrol officers who were on duty between 2200-0600 and was involved in a use of force decreased slightly between 2010 and 2019. The 5-year average between 2010 and 2014 (8.5 years) decreased by 1.2 years during the next five years to reach an average of 7.3 years. During the same time period the overall patrol average increased by 0.6 years. The 10-year average for overnight experience was nearly identical to the 10-year afternoon average. Year-over year the largest gap in experience between overnight and the all patrol average was 2.5 years. During the analysis period, 2019 had the least experienced overnight officers who used force with 4.7 years of experience at the time force was used.

## Conclusion

It is the policy of the Appleton Police Department that officers shall use only the amount of force that is reasonably necessary to achieve a lawful objective. In accordance with that policy, reasonable force is defined as an act by a police officer in the performance of duty used to accomplish a legitimate law enforcement goal and is objectively reasonable under the totality of circumstances as perceived by the officer at the time the officer acted. The totality of circumstances perceived by the officer can include statements made by the person or a known prior history of resistive or assaultive behavior. Any force used shall be in accordance with the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Wisconsin.

The U.S. Supreme Court in *Graham v. Connor* provided law enforcement officers with specific guidelines when determining “reasonableness.” The Court established an Objective Reasonableness Standard which says that reasonableness should be judged under the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene with similar training and experience. Three elements of the standard are:

1. The severity of the alleged crime at issue.
2. Whether the person poses an imminent threat to the safety of officers and/or others.
3. Whether the person is actively resisting seizure or attempting to evade seizure by flight.

Each use of force is documented and reviewed by the Assistant Chief, District or Unit Commander, Unified Tactics Coordinator, Defensive Tactics Coordinator, and the supervisor assigned to complete the use of force summary. In addition to the formal reviews, many operations supervisors conduct an immediate debriefing following a use of force incident to discuss that worked well and what could be improved. The immediate review of audio/video of an incident, when available, provides officers and supervisors with immediate feedback on the sequence of events.

From a training perspective, the Department will continue to focus on dialog as a critical intervention option. Providing clear and immediate verbal commands to suspects remains a priority. The use of passive and active countermeasures for decentralizing and controlling the actions of a suspect are used with the greatest frequency.

Between 2010 and 2019, the Appleton Police Department DAAT program continued to discuss and train keeping a safe distance between a subject and an officer. Using principles learned from Crisis Intervention Training on de-escalation, officers are practicing stepping back and allowing a subject to process the arrest command before going “hands-on.” This important concept can be the key to less use of force incidents in the future.

Because training staff pays close attention to statistical analysis of types of force used and the types of injuries sustained, and by instituting best practices of de-escalation, use of cover and slowing things down, the Appleton Police Department is dedicated to reducing force used on individuals in the community.

The Appleton Police Department remains committed to maintaining current policies, realistic training, and comprehensive reviews of all incidents involving the use of force. The training cadre at the APD is further committed to continue reducing the number of physical interventions by practicing verbal de-escalation and giving subjects time and space to consider the implications of their actions. It is a reality in law enforcement that no matter how polite and considerate an officer is there is a small percentage of individuals who have made up their mind to resist arrest. There are also many who are so impaired by drugs or alcohol that they cannot make rational decisions. For those subjects, Appleton Police Department Officers will be ready through realistic and difficult training. Use of force is not taken lightly. Officers must be prepared to defend their own life and the lives of citizens. We are steadfast in our resolve to do so legally and ethically.

Based on the data compiled in this analysis, officers from the Appleton Police Department used a level of force that met the reporting requirements during 577 calls for service that directly involved 598 individuals. These uses of force occurred during a variety of days, times, and locations. The majority occurred during the afternoons and overnights in the Downtown District.

Some additional quick-facts include:

- 99.99% plus of citizen contacts were resolved with presence and dialog – not with force
- 46,000 arrests were accomplished with 98.8% not requiring physical force
- 71.57% of all uses of force were on adult males
- 58.03% of all uses of force involved an Appleton resident
- 54.68% of all uses of force occurred in the Downtown District
- 92.14% of use of force incidents resulted from active resistance or assaultive behavior
- 84.28% of individuals involved in a use of force required no medical treatment
- The most common use of force was a decentralization, involving 73.58% of individuals
- Since 2010, the Appleton Police Department has not used a baton strike, brachial stun, or sprayed an individual with OC (pepper) spray
- 42.14% of all uses of force occurred between 2200 and 0600 hours
- 20.57% of all uses of force occurred on a Saturday
- The overall average for an officer involved in a use of force was 34.3 years old with 9.0 years of experience at the department

Appleton Police defensive tactics instructors are following best practices from The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), the President's Task Force on 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing, and other experts in the field. The continued emphasis on de-escalation in training coupled with the expanding number of Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) officers has created a new normal. Officers in the field are slowing things down, using effective dialogue, and creating the distance needed to work more safely. This is also reflected in the low number of injuries reported.

The Appleton Police Department prides itself in transparency as it relates to calls for service, citizen complaints, and use of force documentation. Training and detailed documentation of incidents will continue to be a focus of senior command staff. By tracking these incidents, defensive tactics leaders can narrowly focus on training concerns and craft training to help upgrade skills that are being frequently used in the field.


## Appendix

### Intervention Options

<u>Mode</u>	<u>Purpose</u>
A. Presence	<i>To present a visible display of authority</i>
B. Dialog	<i>To verbally persuade</i>
C. Control Alternatives	<i>To overcome passive resistance, active resistance, or their threats</i>
a. Escort Holds	
b. Compliance Holds	
c. Control Devices	
i. OC Spray	
ii. Electronic Control Devices (ECD's)	
d. Passive Countermeasures	
D. Protective Alternatives	<i>To overcome continued resistance, assaultive behavior, or their threats</i>
a. Active Countermeasures	
b. Incapacitating Techniques	
c. Intermediate Weapon (APD Approved Baton)	
E. Kinetic Energy Impact Projectile Weapons	
F. Canine (K-9) apprehension resulting in bite	
G. Deadly Force	<i>To stop the threat</i>

## Use of Force Wheel

There are many different visual variations of Use of Force Continuums. Some are displayed as a matrix, others as pyramid or a graphic correlating increased or continued resistance with additional options to the officer.



Graphic E

## Definitions

Active Countermeasures: An opposing measure, taken in response to the actions of another.

Active Resistance: Behavior which physically counteracts an officer's control efforts and which creates a risk of bodily harm to the officer, subject, and/or other persons.

Assaultive Behavior: Direct actions or conduct that generates bodily harm.

Baton: A police impact weapon used to impede an adversary by striking parts of the body. Conventional batons are made of wood or plastic; expanding batons are constructed of a series of telescoping metal shafts.

Continued Resistance: Maintaining a level of counteractive behavior that is not controlled by an officer's current efforts.

Core Competencies: A listing of department trained techniques identified by the DAAT Coordinator which receive more focus than others during training sessions.

DAAT System: A system of verbalization skills coupled with physical alternatives for Wisconsin law enforcement.

Deadly Force: The intentional use of a firearm or other instrument that creates a high probability of death or great bodily harm.

Decentralization: To direct a person to the ground in an effort to control their movements and stabilize prior to handcuffing.

De-escalation: To decrease in intensity, to select another, less extreme alternative.

Electronic Control Device (ECD): A device that transmits a safe amount of electrical current through probes deployed into a person with the objective of gaining control through temporary neuro-muscular incapacitation.

Great Bodily Harm: Means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or other serious bodily injury. (939.22(14))

Hobble: A heavy-duty nylon strap with a snap hook on one end and a self-locking alligator clip on the other to assist with subject control and transport.

Impact Weapon: Weapon (baton) whose force is manifested by blunt force caused by striking.

Incapacitating Techniques: Techniques and movements done to a person with the goal of creating immediate, temporary cessation of violent behavior.

Intervention Options: An element of Disturbance Resolution in DAAT containing five modes in which an officer can intervene with a subject.

Kinetic Energy Impact Weapon: Kinetic energy is energy possessed by a body in motion. Kinetic energy = half mass x velocity squared.

Objectively Reasonable: The standard by which many actions of a police officer are judged. As an example: 'Would your actions be judged appropriate by a reasonable person based on the totality of circumstances and the information known to you at that time?'

Part 1 / Group A Crimes: Collection of charges include; arson, assault, bribery, burglary, forgery, damage to property, drug offenses, embezzlement, extortion, fraud, gambling offenses, homicide, human trafficking, kidnapping, larceny, vehicle theft, prostitution, robbery, sex offenses, stolen property, weapon violations, and animal cruelty.

Part 2 / Group B Crimes: Collection of charges include; curfew, loitering, vagrancy, disorderly conduct, driving under the influence, non-violent family offenses, liquor law violations, peeping tom, probation violations, and bail jumping.

Passive Countermeasures: Techniques and movements done to decentralize a person.

Passive Resistance: Non-compliant and non-threatening behavior.

Pre-Attack Cues: Signals or certain behaviors provided by the subject that are often associated with a high level of danger to officers. Behaviors that may indicate imminent danger of physical assault.

ECD Leads/Probes: The ends of the ECD projectile that make contact with the target of the deployment.

## Resources

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